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INTRODUCTION 
There are few more emoti ve and content i ous contemporary issues of end uri ng 
nature than the subject of economic sanctions and South Africa. The 
controversy surrounding this issue has implications for the structure of 
international social, political and economic order. The threads of the debate 
are woven into the historical fabric of the past two decades, Quring which the 
acri mony of arguments both for and aga i nst sanctions on South Afri ca has 
increased. Indeed, for each argument in the debate can be found a 
counter-argument and "lies, damned lies and statistics" abound. 
The complex and widespread nature of the question has elevated a practical 
issue into the realm of theoretical analysis. This thesis is neither purely 
descriptive nor purely theoretical. It has essentially two focal points, 
firstly, an attempt at a systematic and reasoned investigation of the many 
claims and counter-claims, designed to put these arguments into a broad 
economi c framework. There is generally a greater volume of pro-sanctions 
literature than anti-sanctions literature, some of which is freely available 
in South Africa, while some is restricted and some not available at all. 
However, thi s part i all ack of access i bil ity wou 1 d seem to pose no materi a 1 
problem of omission: as much of the literature is repetitive, the unavailable 
material is usually adequately "represented" by material which is available. 
Also a great part of the literatUre contains little or no economic analysis 
since it focuses more on political issues. In this respect the thesis tries 
to represent the main points of the broad arguments concerned rather than 
individual nuances and personal viewpoints. It is concerned with sanctions of 
an economic nature rather than wider sanctions that may affect South African 
citizens more generally, for example, sport and diplomatic boycotts, bans and 
restrictions on international travel, etc. 
The second focal point of the thesis is aimed at an evaluation of the 
potential effects of sanctions on the South African economy. The methodology 
of the thesis is perforce somewhat piecemeal. The assessment of the impact of 
sanctions in principle implies the use of one of two types of model. 
Typically, the first model is a linear one designed to capture the nature of 
the economy via input-output linkages: then, by making seemingly 
"appropri ate" assumptions the "probable" effects of sanctions on the domestic 
economy may be simulated and "optimal" counter-measures identified. Such a 
moael has been publ ished by Arnt Spandau and it is probable that government 
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bodies have specified and estimated similar unpublished models of the South 
Afri can economy. However, vari ous problems ex i st" in connect ion with such 
models. For example: input-output tables do not necessarily always bring out 
the effects of sanctions as such. Moreover, as economic variables are 
affected by non-economic variables, there follows a practical difficulty in 
the sense that we do not know what changes to assume in the exogenous 
variables, ie. we do not know exactly what form sanctions may take. This, in 
turn, has implications for the model specification, and the model may become 
inappropriate. So changes in the endogenous variables may also be accompanied 
by changes in the relations between endogenous variables, ie. parametric 
changes. Added to such methodological problems is the practical difficulty of 
obtaining sufficient and accurate basic data. Although the usefulness of such 
models is questioned here, it was simply not practicable, nor did it seem 
desirable, to follow a highly formalised approach i.n this thesis. 
The alternative model may be said to rest on a commonsense approach, where the 
initial point of reference is represented by those organisations which are 
advocating sanctions against South Africa, which is why we also look at the 
literature on sanctions. Given this point of departure, we can then identify 
the broad sectors of the national economy most likely to be affected, and also 
consider the credibility of sanctions, ie. their chances of success, given the 
"will" " to apply sanctions and the nature of available counter-measures. 
Sanctions may also have "external" effects, especially in the broader Southern 
African, or regional, context. This approach is obviously piecemeal and may 
be somewhat arbitrary but it has the virtues of commonsense and flexibility, 
and has therefore been adopted in this thesis. 
No attempt has been made to introduce "dramatic new viewpoints" on the subject 
of economi c sancti ons and South Afri ca; what has been attempted is the 
gathering, presentation and analys"is of available information on this topic 
within the confines of a single treatise. A great deal of the literature on 
economic sanctions and South Africa is not in general circulation and as the 
stock continues to grow, it becomes increasingly difficult for the 
non-specialist to remain au fait with the topic. Thus this thesis, on the one 
hand, attempts to present the major threads of the sanctions debate by 
presenting and correlating the more significant arguments found in the 
widespread literature. This has naturally entailed some significant 
selectivity of materi al, not only to avoid tedious repetition, but also to 
keep the individual chapters within reasonable limits. For example, in 
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Chapter III, which gives a broad outline of economic sanctions in relation to 
South Africa, lengthy and detailed studies on the topic have sometimes been 
summarised in a few words which give only the general thrust and import of the 
relevant study. 
In addition to discussing the major arguments of the sanctions debate as found 
in the literature, this thesis as mentioned above, analyses the sanctions 
issue, in general, and also in relation to the South African economy. with 
the exception of the comparatively brief (and homogenous) Chapter III, 
individual chapters are SUbdivided along functional lines for the sake of 
convenience. Chapter I deals with economic sanctions mainly as a political 
institution and is thus concerned with the concept, origin and legal status of 
sanctions and related matters. Chapter II is more explicitly concerned with 
the economic aspects of and approaches to sanctions, with some reference to 
the Rhodesian and South African economies. Chapter III refers to "The Case of 
South Africa" which outlines the salient features of a strategy of economic 
sanctions aimed specifically at South Africa as a potential target case. 
However, sanctions do not occur in a vacuum and the institutional mechanism 
which transmits the effects of sanctions from the "senders" to ' the "receiers" 
is the Balance of Payments. Accordingly, Chapters IV and V aea1 with the 
current account and Chapter VI with the capital account of the South African 
Ba 1 ance of Payments. Thi s 1 ogi ca 1 approach is then used to i dent if y the broad 
sectors of vulnerability in the country's economy. Chapter IV focuses 
attent i on on South Afri ca' s i nternat i ona 1 trade pattern in general and on 
mineral exports (excepting gold) in particular. Chapter V first discusses the 
export-orientated nature of agriculture and the gold mining industry, and then 
South Africa's import requisites with reference to capital goods and oil. 
Chapter VI also details the capital account of the Balance of Payments with 
reference to foreign investment, and its qualitative impact in South Africa, 
and, in the broad sense of the word, disinvestment. The last chapter, 
(Chapter V I I) descri bes the i nsti tuti ona 1 features of the Southern Afri can 
region wh i ch have a bearing on the sanctions issue. 
Finally, it may be legitimate to enquire whether the somewhat hackneyed 
subject of sanctions needs further elaboration or study . In spite of the 
present hiatus in credible calls for sanctions on South Africa, it does not 
follow that such pressure has ceased or is likely to do so. Those who believe 
this fall into the same trap as many of the sanctions protagonists, namely, 
that of wishful thi nking. Although t he governments of So uth Africa's major 
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trading partners are unlikely to press for economic sanctions at present, even 
the short term position is unpredictable, and given the current proclivity of 
the West, and particularly the USA, for economic sanctions (eg. on the Soviet 
Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, on the Polish authorities for their 
recent domest i c po 1 i ci es and on Argenti na duri ng the Fa 1 k 1 ands war) it does 
seem sensible to investigate the case of South Africa which will no doubt 
remain a long rather than a short term international issue. 
CHAPTER I 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AS AN INSTITUTION 
This chapter essentially explores the meaning and implications of economic 
sanctions as an institution; this is done under the nine consecutive headings 
that follow: 
THE CONCEPT OF SANCTIONS 
Economic sanctions are economic measures directed to pol itical Objectives. l 
The Pan Books Dictionary of Economics and Commerce, for example, defines 
"economi c sanctions" as: "Embargoes on the export of gOOdS, servi ces and 
capital to a particular nation. They can be used in addition to military 
operations, as in the blockades of the UK and Europe in the Napoleonic wars; 
or as a substitute for war, e.g. the ban by members of the League of Nations 
on the export of certain products to Italy in 1936 and the United Nations' 
similar embargo on Rhodesia which started in 1965."2 
~icDougall and Feliciano have described the nature of "economic coercion" in 
the following terms: "the management of access to a flow of goods, services 
and money, as we 11 as to markets, with the end of denyi ng the target state 
such access whi le maintaining it for oneself. All the familiar methods of 
economic warfare developed in the last two world wars may be included, such as 
the blocking or freezing of the target's assets; the imposition of import and 
export embargoes, total or selective; blacklisting of foreign firms and 
individuals who deal with the target state; drying up of foreign supplies by 
preclusive buying; control of re-exportation from a non-participant's 
territory; and control of shipping through selective admission to credit, 
insurance, stores, fuel, port and repair facilities .. • The monetary system 
of the target-state may be substantially impaired by skilful manipulation of 
foreign exchange markets, withdrawal or refusal of credits, dumping of large 
quantities of currency to compel the target-state to pay in gold, by 
psychological methods calculated to cast doubts on the target-state's ability 
or wi 11 ingness to pay; and by simple counterfeiting of the currency. Other 
techniques include the creation of artificial scarcity and high prices and the 
retarding of technological development through cartelization schemes, and the 
control of patents, the refusal to grant loans, or to pay for previous loans, 
2 
and, of course, the taking, expropriation. or confiscation of enterprises and 
property. ,,3 
Economic sanctions may aiso be seen as a distinctive subset of a number of 
related measures, · which have been set out by Wallensteen under the four 
headings given below: 
" 1 • Economic Warfare 
This covers situations where military as well as economic measures 
are used to inflict maximum damage to the economy of other nations. 
Usually, the military means applied are the more important. Economic 
warfare includes a scale of vari ous mil itary actions, from 1 imi ted 
naval blockades to all-out bombing. The examples are many, ranging 
from sieges via the Pacific Blockades of the 1800s to the Blockades 
of the Napoleonic War and the World Wars. 
2. Economic Sanctions 
This includes general trade bans between nations, where most of the 
trade between parties is affected. It presupposes no use of military 
means. 
3. Specific economic actions 
Examp 1 es are mani pu 1 at ions with economi c aid, arms embargoes, 
nationalisations, etc. not taking the form of general trade bans. 
These actions are less comprehensive, and therefore frequently used. 
4. Tariff wars 
This means changes of tariffs and other export-import restrictions in 
order to influence other nations."4 
THE ORIGINS AND LEGAL STATUS OF SANCTIONS 
Economic sanctions imply a relationship between two parties, where the 
sanctioner is sometimes also referred to as the "sender" or "imposer", and the 
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sanctionee as the "receiver" or "target" of sanctions. The selection of means 
and the constraints to which they are subject, both sUbstantive and secondary, 
is obviously a vital area of concern to policy makers, and though this thesis 
makes no pretence to be a definitive work on such policy options, they will be 
examined here. The reasons underlying sanctions find their basis in the 
objective of national, regional or international political organisations, to 
being pressure to bear (here implying economic pressure) on one or more 
parties for purposes of persuading them to conform to those organisations' 
norms. 
Such a description raises many moral, legal and political problems. If 
sanctions are "conformity-defending practices, and conformity means adherence 
to prescribed patterns, "5 then it is legitimate to ask whose or what 
prescribed patterns are applicable. There are obviously no unique answers to 
normative questions and it is unlikely that any universally acceptable norms 
and procedures can be uncovered in this respect. 
activity. The moral Sanction is primarily 
foundation of sanctions 
an expression of political 
in transnational activity draws from the concept of a 
"just war". War is one possible sanction open to policy makers and the moral 
basis of all international action draws on similar precepts. The "just war" 
is a term evidently coined by Aristotle, and he explained it as a means to an 
end, namely the furthering of the morality of peace and jUstice. 6 Since the 
articulation of this Aristotelian concept many transnational acts have been 
viewed in these terms, and the present-day international concert, such as it 
is, essentially relies on similar precepts, though not necessarily with such 
recourse to "just war" as such . 
The legal position of sanctions is far from simple. Since there is no 
universally accepted, nor codified system of international law, attempts to 
find legal bases for transnational action must draw from a variety of national 
or domestic legal systems. This is, however, by no means a straightforward 
matter: "Traditional analytical approach to domestic law is of doubtful use 
when transferred to the international context. Domestic law models are of 
limited value to the international lawyer ... and we could go so far 
that domestic analogues obscure and restrict the potential 
as to say 
of the 
international context taken on its own merits."7 Margaret Doxey, a prol ific 
writer on the subject of sanctions, relates sanctions to law in the following 
t erms : "Sa nctions in the context of a legal system are negative measures 
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which seek to influence conduct by threatening, or if necessary, imposing 
penalties for non-conformity with law."S In another publication Doxey 
comments: "There is no accepted functioning system of law and order between 
states, wide ideological and economic chasms yawn between them, and self-help 
is prevalent. Inevitably, there is recourse to multilateral and unilateral 
coercion and retal iation ••• consensus on norms, or standards, can only be 
found at a generalised level, and tends to dissolve rapidly into disagreement 
over detailed interpretation, particularly over claims that standards have 
been violated. 'Aggression' can be presented as 'self-evidence', intervention 
justified as assistance to a friendly government."g 
However, if aquas i -state of 1 aw and order between nat ions is to be uphe 1 d, 
there must be a recognised authority structure which must not only be 'legal' 
but also ' legitimised'. In the absence of a legitimised status for the 
system, any conformity will be influenced not by commitment but by sanction. 
In this context four possible authority structures may be isolated: the 
single state acting alone; a group of states acting in alliance or under a 
hegemony; an international organisation operating on a principle of concern; 
and lastly, some sort of central authority existing over and above the 
individual members of the world community.10 The last of these structures 
has no real counterpart in history,_ but the other three systems have all had 
recourse to international sanctioning. The way in which they are viewed as 
authority structures is circumstantial and not universally applicable. As 
MacDonald notes: "Traditional criticisms of international law, directed at 
the validity of international law as law, confuse a principle of order with 
the problem of its application in a particular context at a particular time. 
The criteria is, and must be, feasibility and effectiveness ..• and it is in 
the light of feasibility and effectiveness that sanctions in international law 
must be examined."ll Thus the dictates of international law are such that 
it cannot be viewed as static. It is dynamic and contextual rather than 
immutable. 
For this reason arguments as to whether the imposition of sanctions is legal 
or illegal are misleading. International law, having a shifting base, due to 
changes in prevailing or accepted norms and practices, is thus a poor measure 
of the need or justification for sanctions since the law can be tailored to a 
particular situation, thus rendering any sanction 'legal'. Thus international 
law and the authority structure may be legal in this sense, as Doxey points 
out, but not necessarily legiti mised - which by definiti on may give rise to 
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the need to put sanctions on deviant behaviour. It is more likely that 
sanctions will be viewed as legitimate if they have the backing of a universal 
or a large, multilateral group. Unilateral action by one nation against 
another is likely to be viewed with suspicion, especially if it lacks 
international support. Moreover, the 'punishment' must fit the 'crime'. Not 
only must it be accepted that sanctions are warranted, but the actual scope 
and severity of them within the context must be examined. Additionally, if 
i nternat i ona 1 1 aw, as it is deemed to be, is to have any beari ng on the 
situation, then it must be universally applicable, because to oate some acts 
which would indicate collective censure have not necessarily attracted it, 
whi 1st other less dubious acts have drawn castigation. These issues are, 
necessarily, only likely to be resolved at an international political level, 
ana, intertwined as this issue is with legal and moral matters, it is subject 
to much inconsistency. 
A THEORY OF SANCTIONS 
Attempts to generalise about a theory of sanctions must start with an analysis 
of the factors relevant to their functioning drawn from past experiences and 
received know1eage. According to Doxey, sanctions must be examined in the 
light of the following considerations: 
1. The communications factor, or the extent to which norms and penalties are 
comprehended. 
2. The commitment factor: 
(a) the status of the sanctioning body as an authority structure; 
(b) the availability of alternative institutionalised value systems; 
(c) the status of the norm(s) being upheld by sanction. 
3. The competence factor or the competence of the responsible organisation to 
detect offences, and to apply and enforce sanctions. 
4. The value or 'deprivation/gain' factor: 
(a) the estimated or felt impact of the sanction by the target in terms 
of resulting deprivation; 
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(b) the value or gain ascribed to non-conforming conduct. 12 
Doxey emphasises the effectiveness of sanctions, simply because only effective 
sanctions are plausible. Sanctions should not amount to a purely abstract 
exercise if they are to be concerned with real pol icy options. In other 
words, the theory must be based on the evidence and practicability. 
With reference to Doxey's schema, the commun i cat i on factor refers to the 
perception that protagonists have of their respective value systems. If the 
sender (sanctioner) and receiver (sanctionee) of sanctions operate within 
different value systems, then their norms of behaviour wi 11 differ and the 
role of sanctions as a legitimate, deterrent and compliant institution will be 
open to question. If the receiver does not believe that sanctions fall within 
these criteria, sanctions then become motivators of conduct rather than 
indicators of error. Under such circumstances both the sender and the 
receiver of sanctions must be aware of the penalties to be imposed and 
incurred respectively. The progatonists must be able to communicate so that 
the objectives and penalties are fully comprehended. In establishing the 
deterrent aspect of sanctions, no deterrence is, for example, possible from 
the point of view of the receiver if it is unaware of what it is being 
deterred from, or alternatively, with what it must comply. The communication 
factor is the foundation of a sanctioning policy, for without comprehension 
little can be achieved. 
Doxey analyses the tommitment factor by subdividing it into three parts. The 
first subdivision deals with the status of the sanctioning body as an 
authority structure, which, she argues, is of prime importance provided the 
norm and penalty are fully comprehended. In other words, provided the 
communication factor is met, commitment to a syst'em and its norms i.e. the 
legitimisation of the international order is most important. The second and 
third subdivisions deal with related aspects, namely, access to alternative 
value systems and the status or importance of the norm being upheld by 
sanctions. If an alleged delinquent state has a different value system, or at 
least access to such, it may view pressure to confirm as unacceptable within 
the constraints of its existing value system ana norms. A state that has an 
ambivalent value system and set of norms may be pushed even further from the 
sender's value system, particularly if unrealistic demanas are made of the 
all eged de linquent. 13 . 
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The next major feature of the general framework above is the competence 
factor, which refers to the ability of the sanctioning body to detect offences 
and initiate and enforce sanctions. In other words, it focuses on the 
operation of sanctions on a practical level, insight into which is possible by 
studying past sanctions programs. 
The last point stressed by Doxey, the value factor, concerns how the 
sanctioner and the sanctionee view the coats and benefits of sanctions. She 
emphasises non-material values including the value ascribed to non-confirming 
conduct, i.e., how the sanctionee views its own value system in relation to 
that which is sought to be imposed on it. The deterrent value of sanctions 
may not exert suffi ci ent pressure to ensure conformi ty, if non-confi rmity is 
highly valued. Indeed, sanctions may reinforce the value of non-conformity in 
the face of a common, yet ineffectual threat. 
This general framework tends to emphasise social and political rather than 
economic factors. Particular consideration of the competence factor is 
necessary as Doxey makes no reference to the selection of specific measures, 
which are necessry if sanctions are to serve as policy instruments. It should 
be remembered here that we are dealing preclusively with a situation short of 
war. This distinction is sometimes difficult to draw, and it is fraught with 
ambiguity: 14 "whilst some advocates of sanctions see them as an alternative 
to force, there is a contrary view that sanctions can only 
force is available and ready to be used if required."lS 
unli'kely that peacetime sanctions will be as effective as 
and blockades, due to a more limited material commitment. 
TYPES OF SANCTIONS 
be effective when 
However, it seems 
wartime embargoes 
Sanctions may be essentially divided into three categories - universal, 
comprehensive and mandatory, which are of course not mutually exclusive . 
Universal sanctions refer to the number of states involved in sanctions -
universal here implying that all states are theoreticlly involved in the 
sanctioning process. Comprehensive sanctions imply that most items (e . g. 
those traded) are subject to embargo rather than a select few, and mandatory 
sanctions refer to the legal or implied legal status of the sanctions. Under 
mandatory sanctions all states involved are under at least some compulsion or 
obligation t o follow the "law". 
CLASSIFICATIuN 
uF 
ObJECTI VES 
PRII'IARY 
S t C U ~ U A R Y 
TEkTIARY 
TABLE I 
AUT H 0 R I T Y S T R U C T U RES 
INTERNATIONAL 
THE LEAGUE OF 
NATiONS AND 
ITALY 
The protection of 
Abyssinia trom Italy. 
The demonstration of 
the utility ot the 
League of Nations 
Tne protection of 
~ritish interests in 
the Middle East. 
The consolidation of 
the British 
government's 
domestic support. 
THE UN ITED 
NATIONS AND 
RHODESIA 
The return of 
Khoaesia to legality 
under the British 
government. 
The defence of the 
British government 
from attacks by 
opposition parties. 
lhe maintenance of the The securing of 
international status ~ritish status 
quo in the face of within the Common-
European revisionism. wealth and United 
To ensure that Italy Nations. 
did not ally with 
Germany. 
REGIONAL UNILATERAL 
ORGANISATION OF 
AMERICAN STATES 
AND CUBA 
The prevention ot 
violent subversion 
in the region. 
Ketaliation for 
anti-American 
policies. 
Incite internal 
t;uban revolt. 
The attempt to 
capture domestic 
American support 
during an election 
year. 
The containment 
of Communism in 
the Western 
Hemi sphere. To 
increase the 
Soviet Union's 
costs of supply-
ing Cuba. 
COMECON 
AND 
YUGOSLAVIA 
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concern about 
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AUTHORITY STRUCTURES 
On page 8 above, three possible authority structures were identified in 
general terms. We now examine them in more detail starting with international 
organisations, of which two have dominated recent history; namely, the League 
of Nations and the United Nations Organisation. The League of Nations applied 
sanctions on Italy during the Abyssinian Crisis (1935-6)16 and the United 
Nations (UN) imposed sanctions on Southern Rhodesia after she unilaterally 
declared independence in 1965. 17 The former organisation, though now 
defunct, provided many of the principles and norms of international conduct. 
The UN, though it cannot pretend to be a world government, has almost 
universal membership, and its precepts spell out the rudimentary, widely 
acepted codes of international conduct. The principle of an international 
organisation operating on a matter of concern, envisages that all states, or 
at least an overwhelming majority, act together against a single (or few) 
transgressor states. Actions by such an international body is preferred to 
unilateral or regional action, since it is likely to be more readily 
legitimised. Moreover, the norms of the UN come as close to any universal 
code of behavi our as may be expected, and thus it may not be out of place to 
use their principles as a point of reference. Relevant measures, which must 
be passed unanimously by the executive organ of the UN, the Security Council, 
are mandatory for members in terms of the UN Charter, and are usually referred 
to as mandatory sancti ons. A potenti a 1 shortcomi ng of the organi sati on is 
that unanimity in the Security Council may not be forthcoming, in which case 
the General Assembly can recommend to individual members that they voluntarily 
apply sanctions. The practical failure, in many respects, of sanctions at an 
international level can be traced back to the imposing organisation and the 
concomitant problem of international co-operation. 
Contemporary regional authority structures are effectively dominated by the 
bipolar political system under the leadership of the United States of America 
(USA) on the one hand, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) on 
the other. There are, in addition to these networks, other groups of nations 
which constitute similar authority structures, SUCh as the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU), the European Economic Community (EEC), and the Organisa-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Regional (or non-universal) 
authority structures suffer from limited legitimacy, since the principles or 
norms on whi ch they act may not, and often are not, un i versa 11 y ack nowl edged. 
With the pre-eminence of the USA and the USSR in international relations, any 
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regional set of sanctions that does not have either of these states' support 
is severely handicapped, though OPEC and the EEC may well have the means to 
make certain actions effective. Regional sanctions may be applied within the 
bloc concerned, for example US sanctions against the Dominican Republic 
(1960-62) and Cuba (1960-), and USSR sanctions against Yugoslavia (1948-55) 
and West Berlin (1948-49). Where there is little or no conflict of interest 
between these two superpowers in their respective spheres of influence, there 
is a tendency for each to give the other a free hand, which may leave regional . 
sanctions unchallenged. 
Sanctions imposed by single states acting uni laterally suffer from lack of 
legitimisaton even more than regional action. But as MacDonald points out "it 
is well recognised that, as long as collective measures remain undeveloped, 
individual enforcement is often the only way that a state can protect ana 
vindicate what it conceives to be its rights and liberties. However, the 
disadvantages of allowing an individual state to enforce the law are obvious: 
the single state sanctioner produces a situation in which we have 
auto-determination of the law, of the delict, and of the gui lty party, and 
where, since the effectiveness may often depend on the relative strengths of 
the states involved, the law is enforced against the weak, but not agaist the 
strong states."18 This last point is especially relevant since interstate 
relationships, no less than interregional relationships, are liable to 
domination by the superpowers and more often than not economic sanctions, when 
applied unilaterally, are persuant to the policies of the USA and USSR. 
THE OBJECTIVES OF SANCTIONS 
The authority structures identified above may find in economic sanctions an 
expression of a number of objectives. The relationship between the various 
authority structures discussed in the previous section and the objectives of 
sanctions set out below, are summarised in Table I (Page 8), with reference to 
a number of hi storical examples of sanctioning. The present section itself 
illustrates the objectives of economic sanctions by concentrating mainly on 
the Rhodesian, Italian and Cuban cases . Most analysts of sanctions are agreed 
that sanctions have not been successful in terms of the objective of making 
the receiver compliant to the aemanas of the sender. In this connection 
Wallensteen found that in eighteen cases of sanctions studiea, only two were 
successful, and this was evidentl y due to extraneous influences. 19 However, 
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the objective of sanctions must not, and cannot be seen as a single, but 
rather as a multiple one. In each case where sanctions have been applied in 
recent times, the diversity of objectives is evident. Barbour has identified 
three categori es of aims: "There are 'primary objectives' wh i ch are concerned 
with the actions and behaviour of the state or the regime against whom the 
sanct ions are directed - the' target state'. There are 'secondary objecti ves ' 
relating to the status, behaviour and expectations of the government(s) 
imposing the sanctions - the 'imposing state'. And there are 
objectives', concerned with broader international considerations, 
either to the structure and operation of the international system as 
or to those parts of it which are regarded as important by the 
states,,20 Therefore, if, as seems the case, sanctions have 
'tertiary 
relating 
a whole, 
imposing 
numerous 
objectives, it is facile to state that sanctions are a success and/or a 
fai lure. It may be that some of the objectives are met whi 1st others are not, 
and it is possible that they may compete with one another. Moveover, when 
economic sanctions are applied over a lengthy period of time, the relative 
weights of individual objectives may shift. 
The primary objecti ve in sanctioning Rhodesia was to return her to the British 
Crown and constitutional legality . The secondary objective was for the 
British government to counter attacks from opposition parties, and the 
tert i ary object ive was to protect Bri t ish status with i n the Commonwealth and 
United Nations . The Labour government under the then Prime Minister, Harold 
wilson, recognised that the Southern Rhodesian unilateral declaration of 
independence (UOI) created a situation which cal led for a positive reaction. 
Military action was ruled out, but the British government was 'expected' to 
indicate its disapproval somehow, even if its options were clearly limited. 
The decision to opt for economic coercion was not essentially quixotic, as 
many British politicians, wilson amongst them, evidently believed in the 
efficacy of economic sanctions. Nonetheless, a significant symbolic element, 
which transcends all three posited categories of objectives, was present in 
this decision. Although this had occasionally been derided, symbols are 
significant in political relationships. As Galtung has noted, "There is the 
value of at least doing something, of having the illusion of being 
instrumental, of being busy in a time of crisis. When military action is 
impossible for one reason or another, and when dOing nothing is seen as 
tantamount t o complicity, then something has to be done to expre ss morality, 
something th at at least serves as a cl e ar signal to everyo ne that what the 
rec e i ving nat io n has done "is disapproved of.,, 21 
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It is more difficult to identify secondary and teriary objectives than primary 
objectives in the context of dynamic internal and " external relationships. 
Harry Strack, for example, cites no 
Rhodesian sanctions. 22 Many of 
1 ess than seven secondary objectives of 
Rhodesia's 'former' trading partners 
recognised that the Rhodesian crisis had some, albeit minor, significance for 
their respective domestic politics. For example, the attempts by the American 
Secretary of State, Kissinger, to secure a settlement in 1976 were made in the 
light of the then forthcoming American Presidential elections. 23 However, 
it was mainly in Britain that the Rhodesian issue had any tangible impact on 
domestic politics. As the United Nations were drawn into the crisis the 
tertiary objectives of sanctions became more important. Initially, Britain as 
the leader of the Commonwealth, and with a commitment to decolonisation could 
have been expected to reso 1 ve the confl i ct. It became a tert i ary objective 
for Britain to sustain her status in the international system, and for the 
United Nations to demonstrate its utility in resolving international crises. 
Since Britain was eventually instrumental in organising a settlement of the 
problem, it could be argued that she gained her main tertiary objectives", 
although the role of economic sanctions per se is unclear. The Commonwealth 
remained intact despite the strains placed upon it24, and by initiating and 
supporting UN sanctions, Britain enjoyed the external effects of the latter's 
programme. (Whether these should be regarded as positive or negative, depends 
on one's personal perspective). 
Whereas the pri mary object i ve in the Rhoaes i an case was, to all intents and 
purposes, straightforward, this is not true in the Italian case, where the 
ostensible issue of halting the Italian invasion of Abyssinia was complicated 
by a set of factors operating at all three objective levels. Britain, as the 
leading sanctioner and the guiding hand in European politics at the time, was 
involved in many conflicting policy decisions. Apart from the professed 
objective of shielding Abyssinia from Italian aggression, the primary 
object ive is said to have been to demons trate the ut il ity of the League of 
Nations as a deterrent against German revisionism25 and to avoid involving 
Europe and the world in a very serious crisis. 26 Britain did not want to 
alienate Italy, but she felt oblig~d to indicate disapproval of Italian 
aggression. As a result mild economic sanctions, more as a token than 
anything, were imposed on Italy. In such a case of sanctions, the distinction 
between primary and tertiary objectives is vague. As Barber notes, "It was 
important to settle the dispute, among other reasons, because of Britain's 
obI igations to the league; in order to safeguaro British interests on the 
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Upper Nile; to retain Britain's frienaship with Italy - which was important 
in guaranteei ng the Medi terranean route for Brit ish communi cat ions with the 
Middle and Far East; to avoid a rupture with France, and to make it 
unnecessary for France to keep an army on the Italian border; to ensure that 
Mussolini was not thrown into Hitler's arms; and because there was an 
increasing threat of war in the Far East arising from Japanese 
aggression.,,27 t>'loreover, public opinion, particularly in Britain, demanded 
that positive action be taken without recourse to arms. The Abyssinian Crisis 
became an election issue in Britain, and as Lloyd-George said of sanctions 
against Italy: "They came too late to save Abyssinia, but they are just in 
the nick of time to save the government.,,28 
In the case of sanctions against Cuba, they were instituted on a regional 
basis by the Organisation of American States (uAS), but the OAS was so heavily 
dominated by the United States, that this example of sanctioning has all the 
features of unilateral action. It was the Cuban attempts in the late 1950s to 
break completely with her historical, political and economic domination by 
America that precipitated American sanctions. If the OAS hao an objective of 
its own as regards its anti-Cuban activities, it was probably the prevention 
of political subversion in the region. The United States' objectives were 
offi ci ally stated to be four in number. "Fi rs t 1 y, to reduce the wi 11 and 
ability of the present Cuban regime to export subversion and violence to the 
other American states. Secondly, to make plain to the people of Cuba, and to 
elements of the power structure of the regime that the present regime cannot 
serve their interests. Thirdly, to demonstrate to the people of American 
Republics that Communism has no future in the western Hemisphere; and 
fourthly, to increase the cost to the Soviet Union of maintaining a Communist 
outpost in the western HemisPhere.,,29 
These objectives present a conglomerate of primary and tertiary motives, to 
which can be added secondary domestic US reasons for pursuing sanctions. The 
Cuban crisis came to a head during the American election year of 1960, and the 
strong public outcry against Cuban expropriation of American assets and 
anti-American rhetoric, was bound to have an effect on domestic US policies. 
The announcement of the ban on US exports to Cuba was timed by President 
Eisenhower to help the presidential campaign of Richard Nixon, whilst Nixon's 
opponent, J F Kennedy, criticised the "weak" administration response and 
promised to "do something about Fidel Castro.,,3D Both presidential 
candidates and the incumbent Repub1 ican administration attempted to capture 
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public support which swung against the "speck of a country" which was 
"spitting in our face".31 
These three cases of sanctions clearly indicate the diversity and complexity 
of motives for pursuing economic coercion. Difficult though it may be, it is 
necessary to critically and consciously analyse the objectives of sanctions 
programs, especially at a primarY level since primary objectives are 
presumably the raison d'etre of sanctions. Both the senders and the receivers 
of sanctions must be aware of these objectives, and they must be specified as 
the standard(s) in terms of which sanctions are initiated and conducted, if 
the sanctions are to be effective. However, Anna Schreiber suggests that, "It 
is mainly its symbolic function that makes economic coercion a tempting policy 
to governments ,,32 and conc 1 udes that if th is is true, then, regard less of 
concrete results, governments will continue to use sanctions as a ' tool of 
foreign policy. 
THE NAIVE THEORY OF SANCTIONS 
Despite their many and varied objectives, there are certain common features of 
economic sanction programs that should be analysed to determine their 
effectiveness. The first and possibly most cogent of these features is that 
postulated by Johan Galtung in his useful work on the theory of 
sanctions. 33 The failure of sanctions to achieve their primary objectives 
is, Galtung maintains, founded on the failure of the sender to anticipate 
fully the response to sanctions on the part of the receiver. Galtung thus 
postulates a "na"ive" theory of sanctions in the following terms: "The na"ive 
theory of the relation between economic warfare •.• and political disinte-
gration sees some kind of roughly proportional relation; the more 
value-deprivation, the more political disintegration. The idea is that there 
is a limit to hO~1 much value-deprivation the system can stand, and that once 
this limit is reached .•. then political disintegration will proceed very 
rapidly and will lead to surrender or willingness to negotiate.,,34 This 
viewpoint is supported by Strack, who also writes: "The effectiveness of a 
sanction ••. is dependent not only on its economic characteristics but also 
upon the social characteristics of the target population. The reaction to 
economic attack is a function of personality, culture, and social 
organisation . ,,35 Galtung further pOints out that, "the na"ive theory 
disregards the principle of adaptation and fai ls to take into account the 
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possibility that value-deprivation may initially lead to political 
integration, and only later - perhaps much later, or even never - to political 
dis integra ti on. ,,36 As Curt i n and Murray assert, thi s theory depends on the 
belief that threatening peoples' economic livelihood is as effective as 
threstening their lives. 37 Doxey also notes that "the ideological 
orientation of the target may prove an additional strength in its ability to 
resist sanctions.,,38 
Attempts by the sanctioner to effect changes in the political policies of the 
sanctionee will obviously be resisted by the sanctionee. The link between 
economic deprivation at the most basic level, and political change is far from 
clear. This supposed link is based on the idea that if the incomes and 
welfare of the target group are depressed sufficiently, this wi 11 cause 
discontent, eventually leading to some political change. Obviously, the 
political change which may follow, need not be that which the sanctioner 
necessarily desires, as was the case when US sanctions were applied on the 
Dominican Republic. 39 • 
Short of direct military involvement, the desired political change cannot be 
guaranteed. The nature of this link is well summed up by Doxey who writes 
that in the Rhodesian case British civil servants at the Department of 
Economic Affairs advised that when the national income declined to a point, 
that they believed could roughly be assessed, Rhodesia would accept that the 
game was no longer worthwhile . 40 
Self-preservation is a natural reaction of any target state. This applies not 
only to economic counter-responses but also to social and psychological 
factors that constitute the national character . Senders of sanctions have in 
the past anticipated some defensive mechanism on the part of receivers, but 
they have al so seriously underestimated the extent of the response. Judging 
from past cases, it appears that when a nation finds its own legitimised value 
system under attack, latent forces are activated within that nation aimed at 
protecting that value system. This force can also be supplemented by official 
dissemination of propaganda . A siege mentality may aevelop, and, certainly in 
the long term, this is a s{)urce of political cohesion rather than 
disintegration; this was, for example, the case in Cuba, Italy and Rhodesia. 
Nationalism, patriotism and xenophobia may be kindled and become a major 
source of strength within the 
businessmen vehemently opposed 
system. In Rhodesia, prior to UDI, most 
the unilateral severance of the British 
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connection but after UDI they were more than prepared to secure the economic 
future of the "newly independent nation". As Galtung notes, "The goals of the 
system may not only be maintained but even reinforced; the sending nation(s) 
not only may fail to achieve their goals, but may even contribute to exactly 
the opposite of what they hoped for.,,41 
In the case of Cuba, Schreiber concluded that US sanctions had a perverse 
effect, as the Castro regime was strengthened, and its isolation aided Russian 
involvement. 42 In the case of Italy, Baer concluded; "What was meant to be 
only instrumental economic pressure to elicit internal protest was transformed 
by the Italian government into a cause for rapid intensification of integral 
economic and political nationalism. Far from imposing on the Italian people a 
des i re to reverse the i r government's po 1 icy, sanct ions made the Ethopi an war 
popular.,,43 Strack writes on Rhodesia that, "Not only did sanctions fail to 
achieve their major goal, but they may have been a contributory factor to the 
deterioration of a situation which they were designed to alleviate. 44 A 
s imil ar sentiment is ex pre sed by Kapungu; "i n no way can the Rhodes ian 
rebe 11 i on be said to have been weakened by economi c sanctions; in fact 
economic sanctions have welded together the Rhodesian conservative element in 
support of the survival of the regime.,,45 
A further misconception engendered by the so-called nalve theory is that which 
sees the target state as an amorphous whole. Sanctions are designed to alter 
government policy, but they are aimed, not specifically at the government but 
at the citizens at large, regardless of whether or not they are instrumental 
in the formulation of government policy. In countries such as Rhodesia and 
the Dominican Republic, significant proportions of the population had little 
say in the formulation of government policy. The utility of imposing economic 
deprivation on people who cannot 
debatable, as the incidence of 
control government policy is, at best, 
sanctions cannot be expected to fall 
collectively within the target state on an equal basis. 
SOME PROBLEMS OF SANCTIONS 
The nalve theory of sanctions suggests that if the receiver's foreign trade is 
distributed among few trading partners and a small number of goods its 
vulnerability to economic sanctions should be great. But the theory overlooks 
the i nfl uence of time and the associ ated nature of trade it se 1 f. It is not 
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possible to halt trade immediately, and forward contracts may be honoured for 
years after the impos it i on of sanctions . Traders may a 1 so take steps to 
circumvent sanctions in which they may be assisted by the local government. 
Moreover, not all states may adhere to, or comply with, sanctions. The 
problem of securing universal adherence to sanctions policies is highlighted 
in both the cases of Italy and Rhodesia. The sanctions program against Italy 
was comp 1 i cated because the USA and Germany were not members of the League of 
Nations, and thus did not apply sanctions. Action against Italy was also 
avoided by, amongst others, Austria, Hungary, Albania and Switzerland. In the 
Rhodesian case both South Africa and Portugal (and her colonies) amongst 
others, continued to trade with the target state. 
A further problem is the distribution of costs amongst the senders in terms of 
trade losses, and the enforcement and policing of sanctions. The distribution 
of costs may not be pro port i ona 1 to the des i re for change in each sanct i onee. 
Galtung has also argued that frequent resort to economic sanctions will 
promote a decrease of interdependence and i ntegrat i on among states, and an 
increase in their adoption of isolationist pol icies. 46 As Doxey has 
indicated; "Economic impoverishment of any state is undesirable unless there 
are very compelling reasons for it; the world is already beset with economic 
difficulties. Development, not retardation, is a prime goal and long term 
harmful economi c effects cannot be readily expunged when sanctions end. 47 
Economic sanctions are not susceptible to 'fine tuning': they are blunt 
instruments which may miss their true target and can also have a boomerang 
effect.,AB As the application of sanctions impinges on the international 
division of labour, sanctions may not only (directly) harm the economy of the 
target state, but may also have indirect negative consequences on the 
international economy, including the sender itself; for example, the ban on 
Rhodesian chrome exports adversely affected US industry and led to the Byrd 
Amendment by which, in terms of US law, this ban was repealed. Sanctions 
programs may also run counter to world economic conditions. In a recession 
imposi ng states may oppose the loss of trade with the target country, and 
during a boom input markets may be under-supplied. 
Commi tment a 1 so vari es. The mach i nery for imp 1 ement i ng sanct ions set up by 
the League of Nations and the United Nations both depend(ed) almost 
exclusively on information supplied to them by member states. The longer the 
sancti ons progr am runs, the greater are the strains and tensions among the 
senders. The suspi c i on and distrust which can thu s be generated is 
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illustrated by American and Dutch complaints of British behaviour over 
Rhodesian sanctions. Dn the one hand the Americans accuseCl Britain of being 
lax in her efforts, and on the other the Dutch complained of being unfairly 
singled out in British reports on sanctions breaking. 49 As Galtung has 
remarked, "the diversity of motives for not making sanctions complete is 
impressive. ,,50 Such diversity is a factor on which ski lful government in a 
receiving nation can base policies designed to demoralise the sending 
nations. A target' nation has the advantages of internal lines of communi-
cation and unity of purpose, whereas a multinational sanctioning body has no 
such advantages, and the sanctions apparatus will only be as effective as the 
information flow allows. 
Not only do tensions aris i ng from limited commitment to sanctions increase 
with time, but they are exacerbated when commitment was not complete to begin 
with. Those governments who impose only token sanctions may serve to break 
down the collective will to ensure an effective campaign. Moreover, nations 
who may have the least to lose materi ally are often the loudest advocates of 
sanctions, and those nations which impose sanctions most stringently may 
actually have to do little beyond maintaining the status quo ante. The 
effectiveness of sanctions is likely to rest upon those few states who have 
the most to lose economically, and are therefore least 1 ikely to pursue a 
stringently enforced campaign. The goals of sanctions cannot be isolated from 
other national and international issues and may be given a comparatively low 
priority in the imposing states. 
A further problem associated with sanctions is the regional perspective. 
Strack and Brown-John stress the geopolitical factors in the organisation of 
effective sanctions. Rhodesia, for example, was dependent on contiguous 
states for access to sea-transport routes, and Strack concludes that, ceteris 
paribus, if Mozambique and South Africa had applied sanctions, the campaign 
would have been effective. 51 Brown-John makes a similar point when he 
stresses that transportation routes and geographical factors are significant 
ingredients in any sanctions campaign and concludes, "future considerations of 
sanctions programs must devote considerably more effort to reconciling 
interests of contiguou s states, especially if they claim neutrality, or are 
hostile to the intent of sanctions.,,52 Moreover, the British (or League of 
Nations) failure to close the Suez Canal in 1935, meant unhindered Italian 
supply t o their Abys s inian invasion force. However, the idea of sanctioning a 
whole region purely for the delinquency of one of it s member s is hardly a 
practic a l proposition . 
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Both national governments and multinational organisations have to face the 
organisational difficulties of administering and supervlslng sanctions 
programs. Many countries may, however, be unable to accurately monitor 
international transactions, and are, therefore, not in a position to detect 
sanctions violations or to halt them. Many national frontiers are capable of 
penetration and some governments may not have the legal authority to maintain 
control. 53 Although governments may not have the control to enforce 
sanctions, Shepherd has questioned whether this is a necessary condition for 
their success. 54 He maintains that non-governmental organisations can exert 
pressure which has a greater impact than official policy. Multilateral action 
by such non-government organi sations as churches, bus i ness fi rms and trade 
unions can also exercise a form of pressure on official policy. 
It would emerge from past experience that, for maximum impact, sanctions 
shou 1 d be imposed comprehens i ve ly rather than se lect i ve 1 y, and immedi ate ly 
rather than gradually. As Taubenfeld notes, the "experience of both the 
League and the United Nations appears to warrant the ••. conclusion that, to 
have a substantial chance of success, any form of international measures would 
have to be promptly applied, all-inclusive, effectively administered, and 
maintained in force for whatever length of time was necessary to bring the 
sanctioned state into compliance.,,55 However, creeping and/or selective 
sanctions have political and diplomatic appeal, even if they do not represent 
tools of optimal economic coercion. Similarly the threat to use sanctions 
against a target state gives her time in which to make provision for any 
anticipated adverse effects. The need to implement immediate sanctions raises 
problems . for multilateral enforcement agencies as their nature predicates 
against swift consensus. In this respect unilateral action is more effective, 
as the decision-making process is obviously simpler. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Despite the problems of organlSlng it, an effective santions program can be 
successful, as is illustrated by the campaign against Uganda during 1978 and 
1979 where the object of the exercise was to brin9 down the regime of Idi 
Ami n. The sender of sanct ions was the United States wh i ch, act i ng 
unilaterally, legislated immediate mandatory and comprehensive sanctions. 
Although Uganda was heavily reliant on one export commodity, namely coffee, it 
was not the boycott of this specific crop that made sanctions succeed, as 
alternative markets for it existed . However, the US trade ban on oil and its 
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derivatives, machine spare parts and computer technology, combined with the 
ineptitude and corruption within Uganda provided the necessary ingredients for 
success. J Miller notes on this point that, "while the coffee boycott failed, 
the Ameri can sanctions proved devastat i ng to the Ugandan economy and they 
helped set in motion the events that led to the fall of the regime. In that 
respect the US boycott can appropriately be called a success.,,56 
Clearly, there is no universal control model for the theory of sanctions on 
which to draw. Nonetheless, by learning from past experiences, it is possible 
to construct a general framework within which the phenomenon of economic 
sanctions may be analysed. The general methodology, as distinct from the 
theory, of economic sanctions essentially falls into a familiar pattern, 
namely, the ends-means schema encountered virtually throughout economics. lhe 
"ends" of the exercise is to achieve a pre-determined objective (which may 
well be a multiple one) by the allocating and manipulating of available 
"means" towards this purpose by the imposing state(s). lhe ultimate ends are 
more than likely bound to be of a political (or ethical) nature (e.g. the 
reversal of an act of territorial aggrandisement, the adoption of 
internationally demanded electoral norms, etc.), while the immediate means may 
also have a strong political or quasi-legal colour (e.g. boycotts, embargoes, 
confiscations, etc.) The ' "economic" aspect of sanctions is essentially an 
intermediate one, where economic variables may be viewed as either "ends" or 
"means", at least from a methodological point of view. As the immediate aim 
of boycotts, embargoes, etc. is to infl ict damage on the economy of the 
sanctionee, economic variables may thus be seen as the "ends" of sanctioning. 
However, they are only ends in an intermediate sense, as the ultimate aim of 
sanctions is to achieve a political objective, in which case economic 
variables again emerge as the "means" of the exercise. 
This methodological complication need not, in prinCiple, unduly complicate the 
"efficiency" of a sanctions program. The comparative lack of success on the 
part of economic sanctions is probably rather more due to such "practical" 
considerations as the reluctance to invoke seemingly-efficient policy measures 
on normative grounds, imperfect understanding of the links between the ends 
and means of the exercise, and, especially, the negative external effects of 
sanctions on the sanctionee itself or the international system at large. SUCh 
constraints are, of course, greatly weakened when "economic warfare" is only 
one aspect of a total war, that is, when the national interest of the 
sanctioner is pursued to the virtual exclusion of other considerations. 
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Economi c s ancti ons in times of peace, however, 1 ack such a sense of purpose 
and, by trying to reconcile too many conflicting elements, they ten a to be 
reduced to an inefficient and, therefore, ineffectual exercise. In principle, 
there seems little functional difference between "economic warfare" and 
"economic sanctions"; in practice, however, they are likely to be vastly 
different in their respective impact and outcome. 
22 -
NOT E S 
1. J Barber, "Economic Sanctions as a Policy Instrument", International 
Affairs, Vo1.55, No.3, July, 1979, p.367. 
2. S Stiege1er and G Thomas, A Dictionary of Economics and Commerce, Pan 
Books, London, 1976, p.113. 
3. M S McDougall and F P Feliciano, "Law and Ninimum World Public urder", 
quoted in R St J MacDonald, "The Resort to Economic Coercion by 
International Political Organisations", University of Toronto Law Journal 
Vo1.17 No.1, 1967, p.86. 
4. P Wa11ensteen, "Characteristics of Economic Sanctions" in ~ D Coplin and C 
W Kegley, (eds), Multi-method Introduction to International Politics; 
Observation, Explanation and Prescription, Markham, 1971, pp.128-154. 
5. R Arens and H Lasswell, "Toward a General Theory of Sanctions", Iowa Law 
Review Vo1.19, 1964, pp.239-265. 
6. J Wellhausen, "Israe1itische und judische Geschichte" p.26 in F H Russel, 
The War in the t1idd1e Ages, Cambridge University Press, 1975, p.1. 
7. R St J ~lacDona1d, "Economic Sanctions in the International System", 
Canadian Yearbook of International Law, Vol.?, 1969, p.68. 
8. M P Doxey, "International Sanctions: A Framework for Analysis with 
Spec i a 1 Reference to the Uni ted Nati ons and Southern Afri ca", 
International Organisation, Vo1.26, No.3, 1972. p.528. 
9. M P Doxey, "Economic Sanctions: benefits and costs", The world Today, 
Chatham House, Royal Institute of International Affairs, December, 1980, 
p.484. 
10. R St J MacDonald, "Economic Sanctions" op. cit. p.69f. 
11. Ibid p.67. 
12. M P Doxey, "International Sanctions" op. cit. p.535. 
13. R Fisher, Basic Negotiating Strategy, Harper & Row, 1969, p.64. 
14. ~l P Doxey, "Sanctions Revisited" International Journal, Vol. 31, No.1, 
Winter 1975/76, pp.53-78. 
15. J Barber, op.cit. p.367. 
16. A W Baer, "Sanctions and Security : The League of Nations and the 
Ita1 ian-Ethopian War, 1935-36", International Organisation, Vo1.27, No.2, 
Spring 1973, pp.165-179. 
17. H Strack, Sanctions: The Case of Rhodesia, Syracuse University Press, 1978. 
18. · R St J MacDonald, "Economic Sanctions" op. cit. p.69. 
23 -
19. P Wallensteen, op. cit. p.130. 
20. J Barber, op. cit. p.370 
2l. J Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions", World 
Politics, Vol.19, No.3, 1967, p.4ll. 
22. J Barber, op. cit. p.3BO. 
23. R W Johnson, How Long Will South Africa Survive?, Macmillan, 1977, p.243. 
24. J Barber, "The Impact of the Rhodesian Crisis on the Commonwealth", 
Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol.7, No.2, July, 1969, 
pp .B3-95. 
25. A W Baer, op. cit. p.369. 
26. S Hoare, "Nine Troubled Years", Collins 1954, p.152, quoted in J Barber, 
"Economic Sanctions" op. cit. p.369. 
27. Ibid. 
28. H Macmillan, "Winds of Change 1914-39, Memoirs VoL I", quoted in ibid, 
p.380. 
29. Dept. of State Bulletin, ~Iay 11, 1964, 741, in R St J ~'lacDonalo, "The 
Resort ••• " op. cit. p.147. 
30. J Slater, "The OAS and US Foreign Policy", quoted in A P Schreiber, 
"Economic Coercion as an Instrument of Foreign Policy", World Politics, 
VoL25, No.3, April 1973, p.393. 
3l. Statement by G Sokolsky, spokesman for National Conservatives, quoted in 
Szulc and Meye~, "The Cuban Invasion: Chronicle of a Disaster", quoted in 
ibid. p 391. 
32. Ibid. p . 413. 
33. J Galtung op. cit. pp378-416 
34. Ibid. p.388. 
35. H Strack, op. cit. p.13. 
36. J Galtung, op. cit. p.389. 
37. T Curtin and 0 Murray, Economic Sanctions & Rhodesia, Institute of 
Economic Affairs, London, 1967, p.12. 
38. M P Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, OUP, 1971, 
p.10l. 
39. A P Schrieber, op. cit. p.405. 
40. M P Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement, op. cit. 
p . 130. 
41. J Galtung, op. cit. p.409. 
42. A P Schreiber, op. cit. p.404. 
43. A Haer, op. cit. p.179. 
44. H Strack, op. cit. p.237. 
- 24 -
45. L Kapungu, The United Nations and Economic Sanctions Against Rhodesia, 
Lexington, Mass. : Heath, 1973, p.128. 
46. J Galtung op. cit. p.413. 
47. See also: D G Clarke, "Zimbabwe's Economic Position and Aspects of 
Sanct ions Removal" Journal of Commonwealth and Comparat i ve Pol it i cs 
Vol.18, 1 March 1980, pp .28-54. 
48. /II P Doxey, "Economic Sanctions : Benefits and Costs", The World Today, 
December 1980, p.488 . 
49. J Barber, op. cit. p.378. 
50. J Galtung, op. cit. p.382. 
51. H Strack, op. cit. p. 241. 
52. C L Brown-John, Multilateral Sanctions in International Law, Praeger, New 
York, 1975, p.357. 
53. H Strack, op~ cit. p.244. 
54. G Shepherd, Anti-Apartheid: Transnational Conflict and western Policy in 
the Liberation of South Africa, Greenwood Press, 1977, p.4. 
55. R Taubenfeld and H Taubenfeld, "The ' Economic Weapon': The League and the 
United Nations", quoted in R St J MacDonald, "Economic Sanctions" op. cit. 
P·84. 
56. J ~Ii ller, "when Sanctions worked", Foreign Policy, No. 39, Summer 1980, 
p.1l9. 
- 25 
CHAPTER II 
SANCTIONS AND THE ECONOMY 
As stated at the end of the previ ous chapter, the immediate target of a 
sanctions campaign is the national economy of the sanctionee. After a brief 
statement of the nature of the impact that sanctions are designed to achieve 
on economic welfare, this chapter outlines the observed effects on the South 
Afri can economy, as seen by vari ous observers. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of different approaches to the economic effects of sanctions and the 
corresponding policy implications. 
SANCTIONS AND WELFARE 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the potential loss of economic welfare to a society 
which is deprived of its foreign trade by means of sanctions, by conventional 
static analysis. Figure 1 assumes a hypothetical target country that produces 
and consumes two commodities and initially trades freely at exogenously 
determined prices. It displays the usual concave production possibility 
frontier, a convex community indifference curve, and the optimising terms of 
trade or price ratio, tangent to both curves. For maximum welfare (Wo), the 
country produces Xo and Yo, exports X and imports Y, and consumes Xl and 
Yl . Trade enables the country to consume outside its production possibility 
frontier, i.e. it can achieve a higher community indifference curve. In 
Figure 2, a dashed community indifference curve(wl ) is added which shows the 
highest welfare the country can attain if it is unable to trade. It therefore 
produces and consumes X2 and Y2 at a consequently lower welfare level wl 
rather than WOo This reduction in welfare can be stated in terms of X and 
Y, i.e. the real income level of the country. If the target country's 
community indifference curves are homothetic, then it wi 11 be indifferent 
between the autarchic consumption bundle, X2 and Y2, and the bundle X3 
and Y3, that it would rather consume at the given world relative price ratio 
but at a reduced real income level. Therefore, a possible measure of the 
welfare loss due to sanctions that preclude trade, is the relative loss of 
real income imposed on the target country, which can be stated as 
(Y l -Y3)/Y l or (X l -X3)/X l . It is apparent from Figure 2 that the 
size of this loss is determined by three features; namely, the steepness (or 
concavity) of the production possibility frontier; the steepness (or 
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convexity) of the community indifference curve; 
trade. The steeper the production possibility 
indifference curves, the more successful wi 11 
sanctions, ie, the more inflexible production and 
and the greater the initial dependence on trade. 
and the size of initial 
frontier and community 
be the trade-stoppi ng 
consumption patterns are, 
Apart from such direct welfare loss that import and export sanctions may 
achieve, the economy of the sanctionee would experience further similar losses 
if sanctions also succeed in reducing its rate of economic growth, for 
example, by depriving it of the necessary capital goods and causing 
unemployment of labour. l In terms of Figures 1 and 2, the effective 
production frontier would then shift towards the origin of the diagram, and 
relegate the economy to an even lower level of social welfare (lower-order 
community indifference curve). 
SANCTIONS AND THE RHODESIAN ECONOMY 
The mos t ana lyt i ca 1 work in th is context undertaken by i ndi genous Rhodes ian 
economists is that of A M Hawkins, who, with an intimate knowledge of the 
Rhodesian economy, offered a succinct account of the state of that economy in 
August, 1967, after twenty months of sanctions, twelve of which were voluntary 
and eight mandatory.2 Writing on the period he concluded that sanctions had 
failed to depress economic activity to the extent that was intended. Hawkins 
also discussed the recession experienced in Rhodesia between 1961 and 1965, 
and pi npoi nted prob 1 em areas such as investment, emp 1 oyment, immi grat i on of 
non-whites, the balance of payments and foreign trade. Data are provided to 
illustrate the initial decline and recovery after sanctions were imposed . He 
maintaineo that sanctions had till then been ineffectual, due to 
inconsistencies in their application and Rhodesian counter-responses, which 
included stockpiling, judicious monetary and fiscal policy, foreign exchange 
and manpower controls, import substitution and agricultural diversification 
(exports) . He conc 1 uded that the short term prospects for the Rhodes ian 
economy were better than could have been expected, but that long term 
prospects depended on the maintenance of steady and high rates of growth in 
all sectors of economic activity. The main reservation held about Hawkins I 
analysiS woulo appea 
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convexity) of the community indifference curve; 
trade. The steeper the production possibility 
i ndi fference curves, the more successfu 1 wi 11 
and the size of initial 
front i er and community 
be the trade-stopping 
sanctions, ie, the more inflexible production and consumption patterns are, 
and the greater the initial dependence on trade. 
Apart from such direct welfare loss that import and export sanctions may 
achieve, the economy of the sanctionee would experience further similar losses 
if sanctions also succeed in reducing its rate of economic growth, for 
example, by depriving it of the necessary capital goods and causing 
unemployment of labour. l In terms of Figures 1 and 2, the effective 
production frontier would then shift towards the origin of the diagram, _ and 
relegate the economy to an even lower level of social welfare llower-order 
community indifference curve). 
SANCTIONS AND THE RHODESIAN ECONO~lY 
The most analytical work in this context undertaken by indigenous Rhodesian 
economists is that of A M Hawkins, who, with an intimate knowledge of the 
Rhodesian economy, offered a succinct account of the state of that economy in 
August, 1967, after twenty months of sanctions, twelve of which were voluntary 
and eight mandatory.2 Writing on the period he concluded that sanctions had 
failed to depress economic activity to the extent that was intended. Hawkins 
also discussed the recession experienced in Rhodesia between 1961 and 1965, 
and pinpointed problem areas such as investment, employment, immigration of 
non-whites, the balance of payments and foreign trade. Data are provided to 
illustrate the initial decline and recovery after sanctions were imposed. He 
maintained that sanctions had till then been ineffectual, due to 
inconsistencies in their application and Rhodesian counter-responses, which 
included stockpiling, judicious monetary and fiscal policy, foreign exchange 
and manpower controls, import SUbstitution and agricultural diversification 
(exports). He concluded that the short term prospects for the Rhodesian 
economy were better than could have been expected, but that long term 
prospects depended on the maintenance of steady and high rates of growth in 
all sectors of economic activity. The main reservation held about Hawkins' 
analysis would appear to be his comparison of Khodesian post-sanctions 
economic experience with pre-1965 performance which was itself subject to the 
abnormal conditions of the Central African Feaeration. 3 
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Hawkins followed up his initial research with a re-evaluation in 19764 and 
his conclusions were much the same despite the ten year time interval. In 
this later study the post-'sanctions growth of the economy was divided into two 
distinct periods viz.; 1963-1968, during which time Gross National Product 
(GNP) rose at the average rate of only 2,8 percent per annum, and real income 
per capita fell; and 1968-74 during which time real GNP rose at the much 
higher rate of 8,3 percent per annum. Despite the comparatively impressive 
performance duri ng the 1 atter peri od, he argues that growth wou 1 d have been 
greater in the absence of sanctions. 
A more recent and less detailed- economic analysis of the Rhodesian experience, 
again by an indigenous economist, is that of E G Cross, who explains in 
aggregate terms why it was expected in 1965 that sanctions would be 
successful. 5 He stresses the relative smallness of the Rhodesian economy, 
its lack of diversification and its openness to the world economy. The 
sanctions era is divided into three distinct phases, 1966-1967/8; 
1967/8-1974/5; and 1975 to 1979. The first phase is characterised by a fall 
in output in many key sectors but GNP remained approximately constant at real 
1965 levels. There was, of course, a decline in per capita income. The 
second phase is characteri sed by unprecedented growth due to import 
subsitiution and diversification, which was aided by government policy. In 
phase three, a number of internal and external factors in addition to 
sanctions were brought to bear on the economy. The escalation of the civil 
war and border closures with Zambia and ~\ozambique compounded the effects of 
sanctions, and income per capita fell by almost 25 percent between 1975 and 
1979. 
Thi s study contains some disaggregation by analysing the impact of sanctions 
on the manufacturing, mining, agricultUre and foreign trade sectors. Cross 
notes that one of the major reasons for the deep Rhodesian economic recession 
after 1975 was the decl ine in world commodity prices. Moreover, Rhodesian 
producers also found it increasingly difficult to sell their output in world 
markets because of deficient demand, apart from sanctions. In conclusion, 
Cross points out that the management of the Rhodesian economy under sanctions 
holds a valuable lesson for other lhird World countries faced with problems of 
the interaction of foreign trade and domestic activity in generating 
deve lopment. 
One of the first major external evaluations of sanctions on the Rhodesian 
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economy was undertaken by T Curt in and [) ~iurray, under the auspi ces of the 
Institute of Economic Affairs in London, and published in 1967 only two years 
after sanctions were imposed. 6 An input-output analysis of the economy was 
used to show that the effects of sanctions had been overestimated, which was, 
in the opinion of the authors, because most white Rhodesians (the intended 
target group) were employed in the manufacturing, distributive and other 
relatively insulated sectors of the economy. Also the scope for local 
production of manufactured imports largely neutral ised the loss of export 
markets. They concluded that the possibilities for import substitution were 
such that the longer sanctions continued, the less their effects would be. 
A s i mil ar conc 1 us i on was reached by P B Sutcl iffe, though he emphas i sed the 
difficulties inherent in organising an effective sanctions campaign. 7 He 
also noted the costs to Britain of imposing sanctions on Rhodeisa, and the 
vital role played by South Africa in the regional context. Moreover, he saw 
the failure of sanctions, in part, in the ability of Rhodesian whites to pass 
on the major impact of sanctions to the black majority. 
FUrther research by R T McKinnell notes the success of Rhodesi an 
counter-measures in the short run, despite the probabil ity that average real 
income per capita declined by some 15 percent during 1966, the first full year 
of sanctions. 8 He, too, shows how the burden of sanctions, in terms of 
income loss and unemployment, was shifted onto the rural majority and foreign 
migrant workers. Although Curtin and Murray intimatea that the longer 
sanctions continued the less impact they would have, McKinnell disagreed. He 
stressed the role of investment and noted that the initial impact on Rhodesia 
was greater than first appearances indicated when the long run growth 
prospects were examined. The true economic costs of sanctions only appeared 
as capital goods depreciated and no replacement was forthcoming from imports. 
Margaret Doxey is in broad agreement with f''icKinnell. 9 She contends that 
sanctions created severe long term problems for the Rhodesian economy, 
exacerbating unemployment, discouraging immigration of skillea personnel, and 
diverting economic resources into unprofitable and less efficient channels. 
Economic models of the Rhodesian sanctions experiment implicitly infer that 
the absence of success for the campaign (a subjective issue) does not imply 
absence of welfare loss. Though it is no easy matter to separate the economic 
consequences of sanctions per se from the effects of other extraneous 
politi cal and economic factors, it would appear that sanctions exacerbatea the 
31 
problems facing the Rhodesian government. Two such sanctions-generated 
problems were the earning of foreign exchange and the importation of capital 
goods: sanctions prevented the free marketing of Rhodesian goods, which often 
had to be sold at a discount. Therefore foreign currency was limited and less 
goods could be imported. This was particularly significant for the 
importation of capital goods, as, given technological and market-size 
constraints, no significant import 
possible. Therefore, as capital goods 
sUbstitution of capital goods was 
wore out they cou 1 d not be rep 1 aced. 
As long as sufficient foreign currency was available to service the needs of 
capital replacement, the economy could be sustained indefinitely, but the 
increasing capital depreciation and dwindling reserves of foreign currency 
placed the economy under increasing pressure. 
SANCTIONS AND THE SDUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
There is now a considerable literature on the debate over economic sanctions 
against South Africa, which is reviewed in the following and subsequent 
chapters. Since sanctions have not yet been generally applied, much of the 
debate focuses on their potential significance and possible impact. The trend 
in the literature, towards arguments either for or against sanctions, may, 
from the viewpoint of the economist, seem somewhat irrelevant, as the basic 
decision to implement sanctions is likely to be essentially political; 
commentators often have a political axe to grind and information is selected 
to fit specific preconceived opinions. 
Active periods of discussion about sanctions on South Africa occurred between 
1963 and 1965, and during 1977 and 1978, when it may have appeared that 
sanctions were imminent. 10 An international conference met in London in 
1964 to discuss the implications of applying sanctions against South 
Africa. ll The conference focused mainly on the legal, moral and political 
indictment of South Africa, but it did include some economic discussion. 
Selective sanctions on trade, oil and gold were considered. It was recognised 
that South Africa has an open economy and therefore may be vulnerable to 
economic sanctions. South African input-output tables for 1956/7 were 
examined, and the large contribution of imports to consumer, intermediate and 
especially capital goods was noted. No financial or investment analyses was 
undertaken; not were potential losses in income and employment estimated. 
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Response from South African commentators was muted 12 unti 1 the late 1970s, 
partly because much foreign literature on the subject of economic sanctions is 
banned in South Africa. One of the first detailed South African studies of 
this nature was that of Arnt Spandau, which, partly due to its anti-sanctions 
bias, and partly due to its relative novelty was given widespread local 
prominence13 • Considering both "normative" and "factual" issues, Spandau 
argued that there was no economic basis for sanctions, and that social and 
pol it i cal change in South Africa could be achieved by economic growth. The 
application of sanctions would be followed by a short term boom related mainly 
to import substitution. Spandau investigated the current and capital accounts 
of the balance of payments, the potential for import substitution and 
selective sanctions on oil and oil derivatives. However, the study implicitly 
glossed over the long term prospects for growth under sanctions. There are 
also technical shortcomings in Spandau's work, as for example, his analysis of 
the effects of investment and trade boycotts by means of an input-output 
model. As the construction of and predictions yielded by such models relies 
on fixed co-efficients, they are poor instruments of anything but static 
economi c ana lys i s. Spandau' s mode 1 ignored the mu lt i p 1 i er effects of trade 
and investment boycotts beyond the first year of sanctions, and he evidently 
paid little attention to the time lag between sanctions and economic variables 
like Gross Domestic Product, disposable income and employment. Spandau also 
treats the effects of trade and investment sanctions autonomously, whereas 
they are functionally related rather than independent variables. The analysis 
is also inconsistent, in that the crucial mining, agricultural and services 
sectors are included in the investment analysis but excluded in the trade 
analysis. 
o G Clarke has commented on Spandau's work as follows: "Impl icitly, questions 
over the Spandau model raise the problem as to how best to conceive of trade 
sanctions effects. Is it reasonable to derive results from a static model 
which traces the impact of a once-off cut in export values? Are there not 
other better and more realistic models which could be used - to incorporate, 
for instance, the probability of a sharp once-off effect (which occurred in 
Rhodesia in 1966), a declining (X-M)/GDP ratio over the years, and the 
possibility of a constant (or even rising) discount on traded commodities and 
services? If so, the latter approach would better represent the dynamic 
'costs' of sanctions in terms of lost income and foreign exchange; and they 
would make the potential costs high er than nornl ally estirroated.,,14 
Nonethele s s, Spandau's wor k is the longest and most comprehensive publication 
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on economic sanctions from within South Africa to date. In the main, the 
criticisms that can be levelled at his research are, perhaps, technical issues 
which, rather than indicating inadequate analysis, s-ignify the complexity of 
the problem. 
Further South African research into the sanctions issue has been undertaken by 
T Malan. 15 He emphasises the limited efficacy of economic sanctions as a 
means to achieve political ends. His approach rests on the relationship 
between foreign trade and domestic income, rather than on a static model, and 
he stresses the countervailing potential of the South African economy. As is 
typical of some other South African studies, ~alan perhaps underestimates the 
potential economic impact that even a badly organised campaign may have. For 
example, research into the sanctions issue by both Geldenhuys16 and 
Hamersma17 accentuates the difficulty of organising and implementing 
sanctions, especially in the face of South Africa's geopolitical position and 
her strength in countering sanctions. A seemingly more balanced appraisal of 
the probab 1 e economi c consequences of sanct ions is conta i ned in the San 1 am 
Economic Review18 , which, though it draws heavily on Spandau's estimates, 
also addresses itself to broader perspectives. 
several sectors of the economy as being 
comprehens ive sanct ions. The sectors of 
export-ori entated or markedly dependent upon 
In particular, it identifies 
vulnerable to selective and 
concern are either largely 
imports for their inputs. The 
survey also considered the possible regional impact of sanctions, and found 
that there were certain areas which could suffer badly under sanctions, e.g. 
Western Cape in respect of fruit growing and fishing. This review infers that 
although South Africa may weather the sanctions storm, the cost would be high, 
particularly in respect of long term growth. 
South African commentary in general stresses points like the innate strength 
of the country; her ability to retaliate; her importance to the West as an 
ally; the difficulties in organising an effective sanctions campaign; the 
belief that at the extreme only selective sanctions will be instituted, and 
that the impact of sanctions will fall most heavily on the non-white 
majority. Whether these assumptions are realistic or not, cannot of course be 
proven. However, even if they were to be correct, the economy wou 1 d be 
adversely affected. This point is reflected in comment made by Bethlehem: "I 
do not believe that we can take comfort in examining our raw materials, our 
export potenti al, our importance as trading partners, and therefore take 
comfort in the belief that economic boycotts or sanctions will not hurt us. I 
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think we face tremendous dangers.· 19 
Whilst internal debate did not pick up in South Africa until the late 1970s, 
much international concern was being expressed on the subject of South Africa 
and sanctions in the interim period since the 1964 London Conference referred 
to above. Although official policy abroad before 1976 did not visualise 
sanctions as an instrument to achieve political change in South Africa, many 
non-government groups did advocate economic sanctions. The early 1970s were 
characteri sed by internati ona 1 pol ari sati on on the issue of economi c 
disengagement from the South African economy, emphasis often being placed on 
investment. This prompted a number of studies on the economic and political 
implications of economic disengagement, which are described more fully in the 
following and subsequent chapters. However, in this connection, more recent 
research by R Porter has claimed that South Africa's foreign trade would have 
to decl ine by as much as 30 percent before sanctions would have a material 
short term effect on the level of economic production. 20 
As sanctions became a more lively political issue in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, a major study of American policy towards Southern Africa was undertaken 
by the Foreign Policy Study Foundation,(21) under the auspices of the 
Rockefeller Foundation and the University of ,California. This publication deals 
with bilateral relations between South Africa and the United States, and 
concentrates mainly on the wider policy implications of these relations, both 
in a regional and global perspective. It does not provide a thorough study of 
sanctions per se, but they are discussed from a general policy viewpoint. The 
authors recommended that under present circumstances neither sanctions, nor 
disinvestment should be ventured as they would be neither feasible nor 
effective. The International University Exchange Fund also compiled a series 
of research papers which cover a broad spectrum of the case for sanctions and 
related issues,22 and thus represent a comprehensive and detailed study of 
the implications of sanctions on South and Southern Africa. The general 
thrust of the arguement in this series is that, ·It is now widely accepted 
that economic sanctions could be made effective, and have a serious impact on 
South Afri ca .• 23 Si nce the seri es is the work of many commentators the 
accuracy and character of the economi c ana lys i s vari es from paper to paper. 
However, the economic framework of the discussion if not the conclusion 
generally appears sound, providing sectoral disaggregation of the economy, the 
expected impact on the region as a whole, potential welfare loss, and both 
trade and financial relations with the rest of the world, although it appears 
- 35 
deficient on the organisational side of sanctions. However, these and other 
recent publications will be discussed in greater detail in the remainder of 
the thesis. 
ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO SANCTIONS 
With reference to the introductory remarks at the beginning of this chapter, 
Porter has i dent ifi ed fi ve a lternat i ve vi ews about how sanct ions work. 24 
The different analytical approaches to the question about to be discussed 
below, are also summarised below in Table 2. The first view stresses the 
flexibility of consumption and production patterns. The less flexible these 
patterns are, the greater impact economic sanctions will have. Those sectors 
of the economy which are least flexible will be most affected. If 
inflexibility is apparent in only some sectors the policy implication is that 
partial or selective sanctions are potentially fairly effective. The second 
view is that even if the static real income deprivation is not large, it is 
significant, because it represents losses at the margin which will appear as 
increasing inefficiency in the use of labour and capital, reduced saving and 
investment rates, and therefore a lower rate of growth of output. This view 
emphasises the dynamic costs of sanctions whiCh implies that sanctions are a 
long term instrument. 
A Keynesian approach would presumably view lost exports as lost aggregate 
demand, which would, via the multiplier, cause recession and unemployment. 
Thi s model focuses on the loss of aggregate demand rather than supply. The 
policy implication is therefore that exports are the critical factor, whereas 
the previous two approaches above emphasise the importance of imports. A 
further approach to the issue of sanctions and South Africa sees the problem 
in terms of dualistic development, where an "unlimited" supply of black labour 
is available to the white-controlled industrial and agricultural sector of the 
economy at a low, constant irreducible cost. According to these assumptions 
the impact of sanctions cannot be shifted onto the black people so any 
potential loss of welfare will affect only the white people . 
The last view identified by Porter is based on the ideas of Myrdal, Singer and 
Prebisch with regard to economic development. They believe that a developiong 
country must free itself of "dependence" on the export of primary products if 
it is to successfully pursue economic development. The necessary pol icies 
APPROACH 
DEMAND 
vs 
SUPPLY 
SHORT TERM 
vs 
LONG TERM 
COMPREHENSIVE 
vs 
SELECTIVE 
AGGR E GA TI VE 
vs 
DISAGGREGA-
TIVE 
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TABLE 2 
SOME ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
FGCUS 
A Keynesian approach which dwells on the 
impact of lost exports as being a loss of 
aggregate demand and hence a cause of 
recession and unemployment. 
A neo-classical approach which emphasises 
the loss of imports as a factor in the 
loss of economic welfare. 
An analysis of the flexibility of the 
economy in a static sense. 
Also looks at stockpiling and other 
precautionary moves. 
Focuses on growth and therefore a 
dynamic approach. Emphasises the 
possibilities for flexibility in the 
economy and critical losses at the 
margin in the capital and investment 
sectors. 
Stresses the need to halt all trade 
investment flows between the target 
nation and the rest of the world to 
achieve success. 
and 
Points to the vulnerability of certain 
sectors of the economy which are highly 
dependent on the free flow of trade. 
Emphasises the factor of "dependence"; 
usually re~resented as the proportion of 
foreign trade to GDP 
Focuses on the sectorial breakdown of 
the economy to identify the more 
vulnerable sectors. This is a relative 
concept since some aggregation is still 
necessary. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Stop the target 
country exporting 
Stop the target 
country importing 
Short, sharp 
sanctions 
The need for 
patience and 
persistence. 
Stop all imports, 
exports and capital 
flows 
Sanction specific 
commodities only. 
Halt all trade and 
investment 
Apply selective 
sectoral sanctions. 
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include official encouragement of agricultural self-sufficiency and protection 
of industrial production. Within the parameters of this model, and ignoring 
the preceding arguments about sanctions, the intended effect of economic 
sanctions is perverse because the conditions generated by sanctions will 
defeat their objectives. Whether or not the objectives of sanctions are met, 
there are bound to be some important economic adjustments as a result of the 
sanctions campaign. Yet, as Porter has pointed out, "Although economists have 
written extensively about universal economic sanctions, the precise mechanism 
is not always clear, and several quite different mechanisms can be discerned 
in the reviewed literature."35 
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CHAPTER II I 
THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA 
Whi le the preceding chapter discussed the economic implications of sanctions 
in fairly general terms, this chapter outlines the salient features of a 
strategy of economic sanctions specifically aimed at South Africa as a 
potential target case. 
As the decolonisation of Africa proceeded, the threat of economic sanctions on 
South Africa has been gathering momentum. The main forum for the 
pronouncement of this threat has been, and continues to be, the United Nations 
Organisation. T. Malan, for example, writes: "As early as 1952 several Third 
World and Communist countries in the General Assembly were calling for a trade 
embargo against South Africa - a move which has since developed into an 
over-whe lmi ng demand for extens i ve sanct ions, especi ally since Sharpv i 11 e. " 
Additionally, "Since its inception on 25 May 1963, the Organisation of African 
Unity has left no stone unturned in efforts to exert pol itical and economic 
pressure against South Africa and its main overseas trading partners.,,(l) 
The United Nations' initially phrased 'requests', 'urgings', and 'invitations' 
directed at South africa gradually made way for increasingly radical demands, 
amounting to what one observer termed "a crusade for the overthrow of the 
South African political system.,,2 
The United Nations-sponsored International Conference on Sanctions Against 
South Africa held in Paris in May 1981 noted five aims for the recommendation 
of sanctions: 
"(a) to force South Africa to abandon its racist policy of apartheid and 
to put an end to its illegal occupation of Namibia; 
(b) to demonstrate, by action, the universal abhorrence of apartheid and 
solidarity with the legitimate aspirations and struggles of the 
people of South Africa and Namibia; 
(c) to deny the benefits of international co-operation to the South 
African regime so as to oblige it and its supporters to heea world 
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opinion, to abandon the policy of racist domination, and to seek a 
solution by consultation with the genuine leaders of the oppressed 
people; 
(d) to undermine the ability of the South African regime to repress its 
people, commit acts of aggression against independent states and pose 
a threat to international peace and security; 
(e) to remove economic support from apartheid so as to mitigate suffering 
in the course of · the struggle of the people of South Afri ca and 
Namibia for freedom, and thereby promote as peaceful a transition as 
Possib1e.,,3 
The legal (as against political or ethical) rationale for the application of 
sanctions against South Africa is found under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter 
which posits three situations that may prompt collective action, namely a 
threat to peace, a breach of peace, or an act of aggression. Those who 
advocate sanctions have attemptea to frame the South African situation in 
terms of each of these categori es to persuade the UN Security Council to 
formulate such collective action. Those nations which have little or nothing 
to lose from the severance of South African economic connections, and most to 
gain politically, have generally been the most vociferous advocates of 
sanctions. However, this attitude has recently spread to even (as South 
Africans view them) the country's political and economic allies. This has 
given rise to a long and divisive debate in the 'West' over economic 
sanctions, and one which is likely to continue in the foreseeable future. 
Many nations concerned with South Africa have periodically applied some form 
of restriction or sanction on economic intercourse. Most multinational 
companies are subject to either the Sullivan Code (of American origin) or the 
Code of Conduct (of European Economic Community origin), with regard to their 
modus operandi. South Africa has been subject to a voluntary arms embargo 
since 1963, and a mandatory arms embargo since 1977. Official trade credit, 
as in the case of the US Export-Import bank facilities, had been curtailed, as 
has the transfer of technology that could have military application. Many 
multinational corporations have curtailed new investment, and some banking 
groups have withdrawn their loans and other facilities to South Africa. 
However, aespite these moves - and their effects remain difficult to evaluate 
- most countries economically involved with South Africa and their nationals 
have to date ba1kea at introducing major or comprehensive sanctions. 
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Despite the reasonably well observed arms embargo, South Africa is not 
militarily incapacitated, and has a thriving indigenous arms industry. The 
oil embargo instituted by OPEC, at the request of the Organisation of African 
Unity, has resulted in little more than some inconvenience in the procurement 
of oil and its derivatives, and has boosted the development of indigenous 
'synthetic' oil-from-coal production. The OAU had officially banned 
commerci a 1 transact ions with South Afri ca, but most Afri can states overlook 
this ban. The ' west' has shied away from a major sanctions campaign 
principally because of the costs involved, the ensuing disruption to the world 
economy, and doubts as to the effi ci ency of sancti ons in general, and in 
particular in the South African context. 
Those who advocate a boycott of trade with South Africa maintain that it would 
cause serious disruption and dislocation to her economy if it were effectively 
imposed, since she is highly dependent on a comparatively small number of 
foreign suppliers of finance, technology and capital goods. It is held that 
the impact on economic growth, employment, and productivity would be 
substantial. While others agree that South Africa's reliance on trade renders 
her vulnerable to damage, they also stress the ability of the South African 
economy to meet the challenge of sanctions, especially through import 
substitution. This has been highlighted by the development of the arms and 
oil-from-coal industries, though at the cost of at least some economic 
efficiency and an evidently growing core of inflation. However, given the 
creeping and selective nature of sanctions so far, the ability of the South 
African economy to adjust is commensurately enhanced. Opponents of sanctions 
also point out that given the likely loopholes in any sanctions program, the 
crucial consideration for South Africa's economy is not so much the 
availability of supplies, but rather the ability to pay for them. 
Furthermore, since most of South Africa's foreign exchange is obtained through 
exports of easily disguised and highly marketable products, she should not 
have a serious problem in paying for imports. Anti-sanctions commentators 
agree that sanctions would admittedly impose higher economic and non-economic 
costs in South Africa and that economic growth, employment and productivity 
would suffer, but they stress that these increased costs may be acceptable to 
the South African government in the maintenance of apartheid. 
The controversy then focuses on the 1 inkage between economic deprivation and 
the likel y politi cal and /o r psychologi cal effects of sancti ons. 4 Advocates 
of sanctions clai m that this linkage will result in political change as a 
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result of reform or revolution. Opponents of sanctions disagree on the nature 
of this linkage. Some pOint out that cultural, social and ethnic factors 
specific to South Africa may unite the white community in the face of a common 
external threat. 5 Indeed, in the Rockefeller Foundation Report it is 
maintained that: "Sanctions would also probably strengthen the reactionary 
elements in South Africa and weaken the reformers, as well as dry up resources 
that could have been used to implement reforms. Whites who found the hardship 
brought by sancti ons unacceptab 1 e, wou 1 d probably 1 eave the country, but the 
majority would stay and accept a reduced standard of living as the inevitable 
price of survival. The government would ensure that the white community was 
adequately cushioned against severe economic effects of sanctions. The black 
population would have to bear the brunt of the assault.,,6 
This view is in accordance with that of Doxey, who in applying her framework 
for analysing the role of international sanctions on South Africa, concludes, 
"that the deterrent and coercive force of sanctions is weak in almost every 
count; non-legitimacy of the (international) system ana its norms; low 
probability of enforcement, both as regards motivation and capability; 
serious but not intolerable impact of economic measures; very high values 
attached to norm-violation by the target regimes and their supporters."l 
Problems associated with implementation and organisation provide opponents of 
economic sanctions with their strongest case . At present it is very unlikely 
that South Africa's main trading partners would agree to a multilateral 
embargo against her. The previously cited Rockerfeller Report has, for 
example, pointed out that "The British government has made it clear that the 
political and economic costs are far too severe. Without their co-operation, 
as even the supporters of boycott concede, the un il atera 1 Ameri can embargo 
would have little more than a symbolic effect that would quickly dissipate as 
South Africa filled the gap by increasing its trade with the other industrial 
nations."B 
Doxey, among others, has stressed that a necessary condition of effective 
sanctions woud be a physical blockade of the sanctionee. 9 The cost of a 
physical blockade of South Africa both by sea and air would be very 
considerable: a 1965 study estimated that "such a naval and air blockaae 
would cast approximately $165 672 000 for a six month period."lO Allowing 
for inflation and the increased volume of trade to and from South Africa it 
does not seem unreasonable to estimate that present day costs of such a 
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physical blockade might be, say, ten times greater. Costs aside, it is 
unlikely that any such blockade will be implemented due to political and 
military factors. 
Advocates of sanctions against South Africa often support the use of selective 
me as ures because of the problems of organi sing a comprehens i ve embargo. One 
such measure is the halting of oil supplies to South Africa. A variety of 
commentators, including Bailey and Rivers,ll claim that an oil embargo would 
be feasible and effective: "An oil embargo, its supporters contend, is easier 
to implement than comprehensive trade sanctions because oil is a Single 
product, and can be monitored from its points of origin outside South Africa. 
Oil is delivered by sea, making Shipments susceptible to identification and 
confiscation. Deterrent action by naval forces can be taken as tankers are on 
their way to South Africa or on their way back.,,12 
Opponents of the envisaged oil embargo point out that South Africa has already 
successfully circumvented two seri ous attempts to cut off her oi 1, the OPEC 
boycott in 1973 and the Iranian embargo imposed in 1979. (Prior to 1979 Iran 
supplied South Africa with ninety percent of her oil imports and ignored the 
OPEC ban). Moreover, oil has no national identity or accountability in 
free-tradi ng war 1 d markets, and crit i cs of an oil boycott contend that if 
South Africa has the foreign currency to continue paying top pri ces, short of 
SDuth Africa's 
as stockpiles 
a costly naval blockade, oil is likely to get through. 
susceptibility to an oil embargo is meanwhile diminishing 
accumulate and domestic oil-from-coal production increases. 
A further selective tool of economic sanctions that has been suggested is 
foreign investment. The issue of disinvestment has given rise to many 
exhaustive studies and much acri moni ous debate. 13 Advocates of 
disinvestment claim that continued economic engagement illustrates a lack of 
concern about apartheid in those nations which export capital to South 
Africa. For example, the presence of branches, subsidiaries and multinational 
companies in South Africa, it is argued, provides moral and political support 
to the South African government, apart from such economic support as the 
payment of taxes and providing directly or indirectly foreign currency to 
finance South African imports, and thus aiding her economic growth. The 
presence of foreign capital is seen as a form of insurance for South Africa, 
sheltering it from the postulated adverse effects of international economic 
sanctions. Furthermore, it is argued that the flow of foreign investment has 
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not improved cond i t ions for black peop 1 e in South Afri ca and the wage gap 
between racial groups has not significantly altered. Indeed, foreign 
investment is perforce held to be political since it directly benefits the 
economy and thus facilitates the maintenance of apartheid. 
However, the issue of foreign investment is more complex than the above 
arguments imply. The Rockefeller investigation of black South African opinion 
conducted in 1977 concluded: "()ur impression is that Blacks who reflect on 
foreign investment as an issue are now roughly divided between those favouring 
disinvestment and those who would like to see it remain in instances where it 
contributes to black aspirations directly and in the near term.,,14 
The disinvestment argument is countered on three levels. Firstly, some oppose 
disinvestment on purely pragmatic grounds since it is not feasible, given the 
legal authority to prevent repatriation of capital. Secondly, others have yet 
to be convinced of the causal connection between disinvestment and pol itical 
or social change. Thirdly, many people reject disinvestment outright, on the 
basis that foreign investment is beneficial to South African blacks, and thus 
withdrawal of capital would harm them more than the whites. Investment and 
economi c growth, it is argued, are bound to open up new opportun i ties for 
black people, and in time bring about a more equal distribution of income and 
also change the apartheid system. The Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward 
South and Southern Africa (Rockerfeller Report) recommended against 
disinvestment for three main reasons. Firstly, there appeared little 
immediate likelihood of a concerted multilateral movement to disinvest. 
Secondly, there was no guarantee that any changes brought about by 
disinvestment would be desirable from the point of view of black people and 
the United States. Thirdly, the impression gained by the commissioners was 
that those black people supporting disinvestment only did so because they 
15 believed US companies were insufficiently committed to change. 
Barber and Spicer have suggested that there exist five broad policy 
alternatives for the West in respect of South Africa: (i) intensified 
economic development; (ii) communication; (iii) disengagement; (iv) graduated 
pressure; and (v) comprehensive sanctions. 16 The first option represents 
the antithesis of sanctions. The ultimate political objective is, however, 
said to be the same as that claimed by the advocates of sanctions, namely, 
change in or breakdown of apartheid; only it is envisaged that this can best 
be achieved by rapid economic expansion. This economic expansion would rest 
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at least partly on the sponsorship of the west, which would in turn gain more 
influence to control events in South africa. In this "liberal" argument (in 
the classical sense), the principle of economic self-interest tends to 
undermine the traditional system of racial segregation. 1? 
The second option above, that of communication, represents a more balanced 
"carrot and stick" approach to apartheid. It stresses the role of "positive 
sanctions", which offer actual or promised rewards, as well as the role of 
"negative sanctions", which offer actual or threatene~ punishment. 18 The 
communication option is based on the idea that greater political change can be 
achieved in South Africa if she is coaxed along the road to reform than if she 
is forced into a polarisation of opinion. 19 It emphasises marginal and 
evolutionary change rather than radical immediate change. "In terms of 
political change this approach implies that the west should neither lay down a 
precise blueprint, nor join the chorus calling for 'one man, one vote' as the 
panacea for all South Africa's problems. The western states might, however, 
give quiet encouragement to the exp10raton of constitutional arrangements for 
sharing and distributing power."ZO 
The third option, that of disengagement, is based on the assumption that it is 
inimical to the interests of the West to become embroiled in the complex South 
African situation. South Africans must be left alone to settle their own 
issues, since Western interference could destabi1ise a large number of 
international relations, particularly since the political climate affecting 
South Africa is so unpredictable. Although this option of reduced contact 
with South Africa is increasingly oiscussed, it is not always apparent what 
precisely is to be the extent of the disengagement. Presumably social, 
political and economic intercourse will be 1imitea to "essential ties", for 
example, protecting supplies of raw materials. 
A fourth option, graduated pressure for reform, envisages that South Africans 
can be persuaded to instigate reform by Western nations, who are unable to 
ignore or distance themselves from South Africa. This approach assumes that 
the present constitutional arrangements in South Afri ca wi 11 undergo 
fundamental change, and in order to limit socio-po1itica1 instability and 
violence, concerted pressure must be exerted on South Africa to bring about 
evolutionary change. Advocates of this option visualise the extension of the 
1977 United ~ations mandatory arms embargo by a graduated set of measures 
short of comprehensive economic sanctions,21 including: (i) diplomatic 
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options; (ii) military options; (iii) options with respect to refugees and 
the non-military support of guerilla movements and adjacent African states; 
(iv) "mild" and (v) "tough" economic measures. 22 
The 1 ast opti on is that of comprehens i ve sanctions, wh i ch Barber and Spi cer 
maintain is based on the assumption that apartheid will be short-lived, and 
the best interests of the West will be served by supporting the "revolutionary 
forces.,,23 The imposition of comprehensive, mandatory sanctions by the west 
would supposedly weaken the short term resistance of the South African 
government and illustrate the West's solidarity with the cause of Black 
Africa. In the medium and long term, when the revolutionary forces are 
thought to be in power, they would favour those who supported their rise to 
power. Such a view is articulated by the United Nations Centre Against 
Aparthei d, the Ant i -Aparthei d ~Iovement and a vari ety of neo-Narx i st 
commentators. 24 In particular, the neo-Marxists claim that continued 
economic growth and industrialisation, in the existing South African context, 
will not lead to a breakdown of apartheid, but indeed reinforce it. Although 
advocating sanctions, such organisations and individuals are exceedingly vague 
about the economic linkages with the surmised "revolution". 
The choice of different sanction strategies (including the option 
sanctions) with regard to South Africa as a target state depends 
of considerations, ranging from economic self-interest to 
commitment. The choice of specific measures of sanctioning would 
not to apply 
on a variety 
ideological 
also seem to 
be governed in a high degree by individual motivation in many cases. What has 
not been considered in any detail up to this stage, is the potential impact of 
sanctions on individual forms of economic activity in South Africa; this will 
now be investigated in the following chapters. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TRADE AND SANCTIONS (1) 
INTRODUCTION 
At the conclusion of Chapter I it was pOinted out that the end of sanctions is 
likely to be of a political nature. This would certainly seem to apply to the 
South African case, where the purported aim of sanctions is to abolish the 
policy of Apartheid. The means of a sanctions policy are in turn of an 
economic nature. Given the international character of the exercise, the 
institution through which sanctions conceived abroad are to be transmitted to 
the South African economy is essentially the country's Balance of Payments. 
Accordi ngly, Chapters I V and V di scus s target areas re 1 evant to economi c 
sanctions within that of the capital account of South Africa'a Balance of 
Payments. In this sense Chapter 5 is merely a continuation of Chapter 4; the 
distinction is simply one of convenience. 
GENERAL TRADE PATTERN 
The distinction between trade and investment is contained both within the 
traditional National Income Accounting Equation 
Y = C+I+G+(X-M) 
and within the record for a country's international transactions, viz., the 
bal ance of payments, where (X-M) refers to the bal ance on current account. 
Although some forms of functional relationships do exist between trade and 
investment, this interaction does not concern us directly here. 
Foreign trade is vital to South Africa. It is, for example,. stated in the 
introduction of the Reynders' Report; "South Africa always has been and still 
is heavily dependent on foreign trade for its economic development and 
growth."l In 1981 South Africa ranked fourteenth in the world in terms of 
export value and twentieth in the world in terms of import value. 2 The 
proportion of foreign trade (X+M) to South Arica's Gross Domestic Product has 
fluctuated over time, but consistently remained at a high level; for example, 
in 1960 it was 64,7 percent; in 1970 55,4 percent; and in 1980 73,7 percent 
(see Table 3). Fluctuations in this figure are primarily oue to fluctuations 
- 51 
in domestic economic activity, with exports being largely exogenously 
determined. It has been reported that the average comparable ratio for Europe 
is 57 percent, for Latin America 57 percent, for Asia 47 percent, while in 
some African countries it is as high as 102 percent, though no dates or 
. 4 
sources are glven. 
As the South African economy is relatively open, it exhibits a close 
relationship and interaction between foreign trade and economic growth. It is 
therefore useful for the purposes of the present discussion to analyse the 
pattern of forei gn trade in re 1 at i on to the phases of South Afri can economi c 
development. The Reynders' Report identifies three commonly distinguished 
phases: (il Agricultural phase, 1652-1868; (ii) Agricultural-mining phase, 
1868 - 1938/39; and (iii) Agricultural-mining-manufacturing phase,1939 to the 
present time5• The first phase was characteri sed by self-sufficiency, with 
economic activity dominated by agriculture. The .second phase saw the 
discovery of diamonds and major gold deposits which led to the rapid 
development of the mining sector and its subsequent dominance over the 
TABLE 3 (3) 
SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN TRADE AND GDP AT FACTOR COST: 1975-1981 
(R Million at current prices) 
YEAR IMPOkTS EXPORTS GOP If'IPORTS % GDP EXPORTS % GOP TRADE % GDP 
INCL.GOLD 
1975 9 544 7 593 25 846 36,9 29,4 66,3 
1976 10 449 8 732 29 108 36,1 30,0 66,1 
1977 10 310 10 683 31 964 32,3 33,4 65,7 
1978 12 029 13 262 37 029 32,5 35,8 68,3 
1979 14 343 17 150 44 176 32,5 38,8 71,3 
1980 19 963 22 668 57 817 34,5 39,2 71,3 
1981 25 215 21 144 65 531 38,5 32,3 70,8 
economy. In the third phase the manufacturing sector expanded alongside the 
mining and agricultural sectors until it became the most important single 
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contributor to the GOP. The amount of foreign trade during the first phase 
was not significant but the discovery of minerals which underpinned the second 
phase of development entailed an important increase in foreign trade. During 
this time exports were essentially limited to raw materials of agricultural 
origin , diamonds and gold whilst imports constituted mainly consumer goods 
and capital goods. The last phase has not seen a decrease in the overall 
rat i 0 of fore i gn trade to GOP, a lthough the process of i ndustri ali sat i on has 
led to corresponding changes in the underlying pattern of foreign trade, 
particularly in respect of imports. 
Thus total imports in 1910 were 28 percent of national income6, in 1970 23 
percent, and in 1980 35 percent of the corresponding figure. (See table 3) . 
The pattern of imports has been historically aetermined largely by the 
protective tariff structure, and consequent import replacement, which has, in 
the third phase of economic development, been the main "engine of growth" in 
the economy. Domestic industry presently provides the vast majority of 
Consumer goods, and whereas the mining sector was previously dependent on 
imports of capital goods this relationship is now reduced. The major 
obstacles at present in reaucing dependence on imports (mainly in the area of 
capital and intermediate goods) are the the limited opportunities remaining 
for viable import-replacement, current GATT regulations, the limited domestic 
market and constraints posed by limited foreign currency reserves. 
South Africa's export mi x is liable to change due to varying world demand and 
prices of raw materials, and she has in recent times exhibited a greater 
dependence on the primary sectors. Minerals accounted for 67 percent of South 
Africa's total export earnings in 1980 as against 57 percent in 1979. Gold on 
its own contributed more than 50 percent to merchandise export earnings in 
1980, the first time since 19457• Even in 1980, which was a particularly 
f avourab 1 e year for mi nera 1 exports, agri cu ltura 1 products still contri buted 
some 9 percent towards South Africa ' s export earnings . South Africa's export 
performance may usefully be compared with others in the so-called 
semi-industrialisea group of countries - for example, Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Finland, Hong Kong, Ireland, Israel, South Korea, Spain and Taiwan -
where on average, exports of raw materials and food constitute only about 42 
percent of total exports, while exports of manufactured goods account for some 
54 percent, as compared t o approxi mate l y 20 percent i n So uth Afri ca8. 
Table 4 presents the value and compositi on of South Afr i ca's foreign trade in 
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1980. The various commodity groups are classified according to the Brussels 
Tariff Nomenc 1 ature, the convent i on employed by the Department of Customs and 
Excise. As from 1980, these figures include gold coin and bullion under 
"unclassified" exports, while petroleum products and military goods appear 
under "unclassified" imports (Prior to 1980, these items were excluded from 
these trade figures). Services are not included in the statistics. 
Accordi ng to Tab 1 e 4, (group 16) Machi nery and (group 17) Veh i cl es were the 
two most significant South African imports in 1980, which is also in agreement 
with historical trading patterns. As mentioned above, the "unclassified" 
group (group 21) includes petroleum imports, which should be comparatively 
large: before the separate publication of petroleum statistics was 
di scont i nued th is item amounted to some 6 percent of South Afr i ca' s total 
imports at a time when the oil price was actually falling. Other prominent 
import products are chemicals, base metals, textiles and plastics. 
Export earnings were mainly derived from (group 14) Gems and Jewellery, which 
includes precious and semi-precious stones and articles of precious metals, 
(group 15) Base metals and metal products, and (group 5) Mineral products, 
while gold is included in the "unclassified" group (group 21). This order of 
magnitude, of course, stresses the importance of the mining sector in South 
Africa's export trade. Agricultural products (groups 1 to 4) together 
contributed some 9 percent towards merchandise exports in 1980; traditionally 
the corresponding figure has been significantly higher. 
The economic consequences , of sanctions on South Africa's export trade are 
obviously a matter of conjecture. Arnt Spandau is one of the few economists 
who has produced certain estimates of the possible effects of hypothetical 20 
percent and 50 percent cuts in the total value of South Africa's exports on 
employment and economic growth. In brief, under the former assumption, 
unemployment was expected to rise (from a stated level of 14,6 percent) to the 
1 eve 1 of 19 percent, whil st economi c growth was expected to dec 1 i ne by 5 
percent annually; under the latter assumption, the corresponding figures were 
23 percent and 12,5 percent, respectively. These estimates were based on data 
for the year 1976. However, apart from the Doubtful suitabi 1 ity of the 
input-out-put model used for these calculations, one may have reservations 
about some of the basic data employed in the exercise; for example, the size 
of the South African labour force in 1976 was taken to be 10 million persons, 
a figure not confirmed by other statistical sources . 10 
- 54 -
TABLE 4(9) 
SOUTH AFRICAN IMPORTS AND EXPORTS (BY COM~iODITY GROUPS): 1980 
CONt>',ODITY GROUPS EXPORTS I~iPORTS 
R million % R million % 
1. Animals & animal proaucts 185,3 0,9 44,0 0,3 
2. Vegetable products 88,8 4,1 198,7 1,4 
3. Animal, vegetable fats & oils 36,9 0,2 62,8 0,4 
4. Prepared foodstuffs 720,4 3,6 15~ ,3 1 , 1 
5. Mineral products 552,8 7,8 242,2 1,7 
6. Chemicals & chemical products 391 ,0 2,0 026,1 7,1 
7. Plastics, resins & rubber products 75,7 0,4 477 ,4 3,3 
8. Hides, skins and leather 143,4 0,7 41,7 0,3 
9. Wood & wood proaucts 53,7 0,3 95,1 0,7 
10. Pulp, paper and paper board 179,8 0,9 321,9 2,2 
11. Textiles 358,9 1,8 535,2 3,7 
12. Footwear & millinery 16,9 0,1 52,3 0,4 
13. Non-metallic mineral products 55,4 0,3 119,8 0,8 
14. Gems & Jewellery 2 846,0 14,3 60,5 0,4 
15. Base metals and metal products 580,1 7,9 698,6 4,9 
16. Machinery 263,4 1 ,3 3 528,7 24,6 
17. Vehicles & transport equipment 132,0 0,7 1 846,5 12,8 
18. Optical & other instruments 24,3 0,1 468,7 3,3 
19. Miscellaneous manufacturea products 27,1 0,1 101,7 0,7 
20. Works of art, collectors'pieces & antiques 6,6 16,3 0,1 
21. Unclassified 10 417,8 52,4 4 265,0 29,7 
19 879,6 100,0 14 362,7 100,0% 
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TRADING PARTNERS 
The geographic and regional pattern of South Africa's disclosed trade 
relations is shown in Table 5 below. In recent years South Africa has become 
progressively more reliant for imports on six main trading partners; the 
United Kingdom, West Germany, the United States, Japan, Italy and France. In 
1972 they supplied 68 percent of disclosed merchandise imports, in 1975 this 
proportion rose to 75 percent and even in 1980, when the gold price was 
historically at a record level, this figure was 54,6 percent. The same six 
nations took 29,3 percent of disclosed South African exports in 1980, however, 
the desti nation pattern of South Afri can exports has undergone si gnificant 
change in recent years. In 1970 Britain was the destination of 30,2 percent 
of South African exports 12 However, by 1980 this pattern was quite 
different. According to Table 5 Britain took only 7,0 percent of disclosed 
South Afri can exports in 1980, and had been ec1 ipsed by the United States as 
the main export market. The main feature of the 1980 geographical export 
pattern, then, is its relative diversification with no one market 
predominatin9· 
In 1980 the most important export markets for disclosed trade were, in rank 
order, the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Japan. 
Tab 1 e 6 be low i nd i cates the general nature of the trade mi x between South 
Africa and her major trading partners. The most significant South African 
imports in 1980 were mach i nery, transport equ i pment, chemi ca 1 products, and 
p1 asti c and rubber products. These four product groups together constituted 
47,8 percent of total imports in 1980 (See Table 4). In the same year the 
six main trading partners indicated contributed 84,3 percent to machinery 
imports, 95,3 percent to transport equipment imports, 72,4 Percent to Chemical 
product imports and 74,5 percent to plastic and rubber imports. These 
countries together thus represent the source of 40,6 percent of total South 
African imports in 1980, taking into consideration ~ the above four product 
groups. This implies that South Africa's import trade is Significantly 
concentrated in respect of sources and products. 
It is widely acknowledged that there is in South Africa a functional 
relationship between imports of capital and intermediate goods, and economic 
growth. Table 7 helps to illustrate this relationship and shows that growth 
may therefore be vulnerable to import sanctions. 
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TABLE 5(11) 
SOUTH AFRICAN GEOGRAPHIC FOREIGN TRADE PATTERN: 1980 (in R million) 
TRADING PARTNER It'IPORTS % OF TOTAL EXPORTS % OF TOTAL BALANCE OF TRADE 
AFRICA 
EUROPE 
France 
West Germany 
Great Britain 
Switzerland 
Italy 
ASIA 
Japan 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan 
AMERICA 
USA 
Canada 
Braz i 1 
AUSTRALASIA 
& OCEANIA 
228,1 
5 711,9 
541,8 
1 860,2 
1 738,7 
238,9 
439,4 
1 807,5 
1 290,7 
101,3 
109,5 
2 223,1 
1 952,1 
138,8 
77 ,5 
215,5 
TOTAL FOR 1980 14 355,8 
1,6 
39,8 
3,8 
13,0 
12,1 
1,7 
3,1 
12,6 
9,0 
0,7 
0,7 
15,5 
13,6 
1,0 
0,5 
1 ,5 
1 098,0 
5 151,4 
407,1 
799,8 
1 384,5 
1 239,9 
382,3 
992,2 
205,8 
223,8 
167,1 
2 146,8 
1 648,0 
205,2 
133,0 
189,8 
19 798,8 
TABLE 6(13) 
5,5 
26,0 
2,0 
4,0 
7,0 
6,3 
1,9 
10,1 
6,1 
1 , 1 
0,8 
10,8 
8,3 
1,0 
0,7 
1,0 
869,9 
-560,5 
-134,7 
-1 060,4 
-354,2 
1 001,0 
-57,1 
184,7 
-84,9 
122,5 
57,6 
-76,3 
-304,1 
66,4 
55,5 
-25,7 
5 443,0 
MAJOR IMPORTS FROM MAJOR TRADING PARTNERS IN 1980 
COUNTRY MACHINERY TRANSPORT 
EQUIPMENT 
CHEMICAL 
PRODUCTS 
PLAST ICS 
AND RUBBER 
% of R % of R % of R % of R 
Total million Total million Total million Total million 
FRANCE 
!TAL Y 
JAPAN 
UK 
USA 
8,3 
4,9 
11 ,2 
18,6 
19,6 
292,4 
174,1 
396,3 
657,9 
690,5 
GERt'IANY 21,6 76 2,2 
REST OF 
THE WORLD 15,7 555,3 
TOTAL 100,0% 3 528,7 
3,4 62,8 
5,1 93,5 
24,3 449,8 
15,0 277,6 
19,9 367,4 
27,5 507,6 
4,7 87,8 
100,0% 1 846,5 
3,8 39,2 
2,9 30,2 
4,0 40,9 
20,8 213,9 
23,0 236,0 
17,8 182,3 
27,6 283,6 
100,0% 1 026,1 
4,7 22,6 
3,8 18,2 
9,1 43,3 
20,7 98,9 
19,2 91,7 
16,9 80,8 
25,5 121,9 
100,0% 477,4 
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TABLE 7(14) 
COMPARISON BETwEEN RATE OF ECONomc GROwTH AND GROwTH OF It'IPORTS 
IN SELECTED CATEGORIES: 1975-80 
I 
YEAR RATE OF ECONOMIC I RATE OF GROwTH % (at current ~rices) 
GROwTH (PERCENTAGE) IfilACHINERY 
I 
TKANSPORT CHE~IICALS PLASTICS ALL EQUIPMENT I~iPORTS 
1975 1,6 
1976 1,4 6,5 14,0 8,1 14,4 5,7 
1977 0,0 -15,5 -19,5 3,8 -11 ,6 -13,1 
1978 2,2 28,2 35,5 28,7 21,2 22,2 
1979 3,8 5,4 0,0 22,5 37,7 12,1 
1980 7,9 60,0 36,8 28,4 30,5 104,8 
As far as exports from South Afri ca are concerned, the major four revenue 
earning categories in 1980 were either minerals or mineral products. Together 
categories 5, 14, 15 and 21 (see Table 4) accounted for over 80 percent of the 
tota 1 value of merchandi se exports in 1980. The des t i nat i on of go 1 d exports 
is not revealed and is often unknown, but this is of little practical 
relevance since it is highly marketable. The Monthly Abstract of Trade 
Statistics merely records gold sales under the unclassified section. However, 
the breakdown for the three other major export categories is given in Table 8. 
TABLE 8(15) 
MAJOR EXPORTS TO ~lAJOR TRADING PARTNERS 1980 
COUNTRY GE~IS & JEwELLERY/ BASE METALS & METAL PRODUCTS/ MINERAL PRODUCTS 
% of R % of R % of R 
Tota 1 million Total mi 11 ion Total million 
SwITZERLAND 42,0 196,7 1,0 14,3 0,1 1 ,9 
ITALY 0,2 7,3 115,5 8,6 134,0 
JAPAN 1,0 26,5 9,2 145,7 20,0 311 , 1 
UK 16,5 470 , 6 4,8 76,0 2,1 33,4 
USA 24,5 697,5 22,4 354,8 6,0 92,7 
GERMANY 5,8 164,5 8,1 128,0 11 ,2 174,3 
FRA NC E 0,2 0,9 13,9 17 ,7 275,1 
REST OF 
TH E wORLD 10, 2 289, 8 46,3 371,9 34,1 530,3 
TOTAL 100, 0% 2 846,0 100,0% 580,1 1CJ O,0% 55L,8 
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MINERAL EXPORTS ANO POTENTIAL COSTS TO SANCTIONERS 
In weighing up the costs and benefits of imposing trade sanctions, one of the 
factors that these industrially developed countries have to take into account 
is South Africa's effective control over huge mineral reserves: the country 
has often been described as the 'treasure chest' of the wor1d 16 . 
The seven countries identified in Table 8 take the vast majority of these 
major indicated South African exports, whilst the three product groups 
constitute 39,2 percent of the value of total South African exports in 1980 
(excluding category 21). 
Thus South African foreign trade is highly concentrated in the hands of a 
relatively small group of industrially developed countries, namely, West 
. Germany, the United States, Britain, Japan, France, Italy and Switzerland. 
Potentially effective economic sanctions on South African trade would thus be 
contingent on the policies pursued by these countries. 
Apart from gold, the platinum group metals, uranium and precious stones, 46 
different minerals are currently mjned in South Africa. 17 The President of 
the South Afri can Chamber of Mi nes in 1976, is quoted as sayi ng: "There seems 
little doubt that South Africa is entrenching itself as one of the principal 
sources of supply of minerals in the Free World, and in the case of certain 
important minerals, the only substantial alternative to countries of the 
Eastern Bloc". 18 Over the past few years there has been a growi ng awareness 
of the problems involved in the world's future mineral requirements. Alarmist 
reports about impending shortages of natural resources have been lent credence 
by the oil crisis,19 whilst the nature of industrialisation in the West is, 
to a greater or lesser extent, bound to continue to depend on imported sources 
of raw materi also The essential details of South Africa's relevant mineral 
resources are given in Table 9. 
It can be seen in lable 9 that South Africa supplies a large proportion of the 
West's mineral resources, the demand for which is often related to strategic 
considerations, either in a broad or a narrow sense of the term, for example, 
the use of platinum metals for fuel emission control, and the use of chrome in 
the production of industrial machinery and military goods. The potential 
problems for the West in avoiding South Africa as a source of supply may 
therefore be considerable, albeit not insurmountable; while sanctions may, 
therefore, be feasible, they would also be costly. 
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TABLE 9(20) 
SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE IN WuRLD MINERAL SUPPLY, 1976 
MINERAL 
PLATINUt'1 GROUP 
GOLD (meta 1 ) 
VANAlJIUM 
CHROME ORE 
MANGANESE ORE 
ANTIMONY (metal) 
DIAMONDS (carats) 
ASBESTOS 
URANIUN (U308) 
COAL 
SOUTH AFRICA'S SuPPLY AS RANK 
AND % OF WESTERN WORLD SUPPLY 
RANK 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
5 
PERCENT 
86 
75 
58 
41 
40 
33 
23 
18 
13 
6 
SOUTH AFRICA'S 1'iI NERAL 
RESERVES IN RELATION TO 
WESTERN WORLD RESERVES 
VOLUME(Metric tons) PERCENT 
30 646 
(Metal 600m deep) 
16 500 
7 760 000 
(Metal 30m deep) 
3 096 830 000 
(300m oeep) 
3 000 000 000 
300 000 
51 000 000 
8 500 000 
276 000 
32 340 000 000 
(300m deep) 
89 
64 
90 
84 
77 
12 
7 
8 
14 
4 
There is, however, a danger, particularly amongst indigenous South African 
commentators, in over-estimating the value of South Africa, in mineral 
resource and strategic terms, to Western industrial nations. while it is true 
that these factors are important and strong bargaining counters in economic 
anCo political terms, they are only a facet of a very complex political 
situation. 
Depending on one's political inclinations, different interpretation can be put 
on such statistics; moreover, different figures are sometimes 'conjured up' 
by misrepresentation and half-truths, in order to 'prove' a particular point . 
For example, Table 10 below is drawn from figures quoted by a representative 
of a multi-national corporation with vested interests in South Africa, and it 
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gives a misleading impression of European Economic Community (EEC) dependence 
on South African minerals, mainly because it over-simplifies a complex issue. 
Additionally, statistics pertaining to a particular year should not 
necessarily be projected into the future wi thout qua 1 ifi cati on. Thi s tradi ng 
re 1 at i onshi p between South Afri ca and the Wes t, and the as'soci ated costs of 
ending it have thus sometimes given rise to some dubious claims and 
counter-claims, which often disregard the essentially dynamic nature of 
trade. A useful, if somewhat acrimonious, study of the costs of sanctions to 
some potential sanctioners has been published by B Rogers and B Bolton22 • 
They focus on trade relations between Britain and South Africa since this link 
has traditionally been the most significant in economic and political terms: 
the reasoning being that Britain would incur the heaviest costs amongst the 
potentially effective sanctioners, and if these costs were relatively light, 
this would apply a fortiori to the lesser trading partners. The validity of 
this reasoning is, however, impaired by the redistribution, at least in 
relative terms, of South Africa's trade among its major trading partners. 
TABLE 10(21) 
SOUTH AFRICAN MINERAL EXPORTS TO THE EEC 1977 
MINERAL % OF SA EXPORTS IN TOTAL EEC IMPORTS 
MANGANESE ORE 
MANGANESE ~lETAL 
FERRO-MANGANESE 
ANTIMON YORE 
CHROMIUM ORE 
FERRO-CHROME 
PLATINUM AND ALLOYS UNWROUGHT 
PLATINUM GROUP AND ALLOYS UNWKOUGHT 
VANADIUM 
52 
78 
29 
9 
28 
46 
40 
18 
42 
The issue 
Spanuau23 
of costs to sanctioners was raised at a comparatively early stage by 
and the United Kingdom -South Afri ca Trade Association 
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(UKSATA)24. Such costs are often quoted in terms of lost employment, and 
both Spandau and UKSATA quote a figure of 70 000 lost jobs in Britain, though 
Rogers and Bolton have cast grave doubt on the validity of this figure: "As 
regards the jobs involved in exports to South Africa, a number of alleged 
'estimates' turn out on examination to be based on little or no analysis, at 
least any that might be subject to independent scrutiny. The British Foreign 
Office, for example, is frequently mentioned as the source of such estimates, 
but we have been informed by them that no such figures are being published due 
to the uncertainties about alternative markets and other circumstances at the 
time. A pamphlet produced by UKSATA and a paper by Dr Arnt Spandau in South 
Africa itself, both put forward confident estimates of job losses, but it 
turns out that each is (inaccurately) citing the other, and there is no trace 
of any detailed calculations to support the figures produced."25 Spandau, 
quoting "Newsweek" as the source, also puts forward a figure of 160 000 
Britons out of work if Britain were to withdraw half of her capital in South 
Africa. 26 UKSATA also posits a figure of 250000 lost jobs if South African 
raw materials are denied to British industry, but gives no meaningful 
indication- of how this figure was derived. 27 The conclusions of Rogers and 
Bolton in respect of costs to sanctioners are generally supported by Charles 
Elliot. 28 Depending on the severity and completeness of sanctions Rogers 
and Bolton estimate the number of jobs "at risk" i n Britain to be between 
13 000 and 14 000. Elliot estimates that "the employment loss was thought to 
be 26 000 under extreme assumptions, and 2 500 under more realistic 
assumptions"29. However, both studies emphasise that such quantification is 
a 'paper exerci se', wh i ch cannot capture the essent i ally dynami c nature of 
trade. They conclude that exaggeration is made of the potential costs to 
Britain and sanctioners in general, though obviously it is not a costless 
exerci se. 
As far as costs to the EEC (excluding britain) are concerned, these are 
claimed to be in approximate proportion to the volume of trade involved. 
Rogers and Bolton include a chapter generally discussing the costs in terms of 
lost jobs to the EEC countries on a national basis, but they quote only one 
figure for the number of jobs "at risk", that for Holland, which seems 
ridiculously low at 38930 . They conclude that South African reliance on the 
EEC as a source of imports far exceeds the EEC's dependen ce on South Africa as 
a market for exports. 
Below, in Table 11, are some other f i gure s f or the pot enti al number of jo bs 
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claimed to be at risk, which have appeared in the anti-sanctions literature; 
not ·because they are likely to be accurate, well-researched or independent of 
vested interests, but rather because they make "good press" on some definition. 
COUNTRY 
GERMANY 
GERt'IANY 
GERf>W'lY 
SWEDEN 
EEC 
TABLE 11 
SOME CLAI~iED COSTS TO POTENTIAL SANCTIONERS 
COSTS IN TERMS OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
80000 - 85 000(31) 
70 000 - 200 000(32) 
7 000 000 (sic) (33) 
1 100(34) 
250 000(35) 
Estimating costs in terms of lost work p1 aces is, however, only one indicator 
of the potential costs to sanctioners. Although most commentators focus on 
employment, which obviously has great social implications, ensuing price rises 
must also be taken into consideration. Increases in prices have most 
significance for those industries abroad which are dependent to some aegree on 
South African raw materials. Gold aside, this applies in the main to platinum 
group minerals, manganese, chrome and vanadium. The cessation of South 
African exports of these minerals would obviously entail both price rises and 
some dislocation of industry. However, Elliot comments: "The short run 
effect would be certainly inconvenient, possibly serious in a very small 
number of highly specialist uses, but in general substitutability as between 
uses and as between mi nera 1 s, combi ned with the sma" proportion of cos ts 
directly attributable to raw material prices, suggests that even in the short 
run the cessation of South African supply would be undramatic"35. This 
conclusion is at odds, however, with Rogers and Bolton's thesis that the EEC 
is a victim of an "enforced dependence" forced on them by multinational 
companies, because this argument tacitly admits that at present the EEC is 
"dependent" on South African trade. This obviously also reflects a 
circularity in the commentary of Rogers and Bolton, who sometimes appear 
confused. For example, they try to argue that a high extraction rate and the 
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relatively low quality of some South African minerals are two reasons for the 
EEC importing them37 , although the i~sues are unconnected. 
The somewhat hysterical attack of Rogers and Bolton on multinational companies 
illustrates a preoccupation of many commentators with . politics rather than 
economics, and a concomitant relative lack of understanding of the nature of 
trade. Table 12, which is taken from the book by Rogers and Bolton, and for 
which they give no date, shows that the EEC countries generally import South 
African minerals to a greater than proportionate extent of the South African 
share of corresponding world output, the situation which Rogers and Bolton 
term "enforced dependence". However, the ex i st i ng arrangement whereby 
mult i nat i ona 1 compan i es operat i ng from the EEC show a comparat i ve preference 
for South African raw materials, reflects a convenient rather than an 
immutable state of affairs. 
Those countries which have traditionally purchased South African minerals have 
a 1 ready taken some pre-empt i ve act i on to reduce any impact of sanct ions by 
stockpiling 38 . No real diversification of source of supply is being 
undertaken yet, mainly, it is said, because this trade is controlled by 
multinationals who have little present incentive to seek alternative suppliers 
market for South African Gems and Jewellery, and has become an important buyer 
of minerals. However, in the event of sanctions, increased political pressure 
may 1 ead these compan i es to fi nd other supp 1 i ers, but ei ther un il atera 1 or 
multilateral action by South Africa's major trading partners still appears a 
highly unlikely prospect at present. The effect of multilateral sanctions, 
say, by the EEC could of course be enormous, and given the significant 
worldwide links of the multinational companies, it should be possible for them 
to locate alternative supplies of the boycotted products or to find usable 
substitutes for them. Rogers and Bolton suggest that in the event of 
multilateral action a common policy on sanctions is likely to emerge in the 
EEC in respect of such matters as organising and servicing of stockpiles, 
short term red i stri but i on of the scarce commoait i es between different users, 
and the development of new sources of supply in the longer term. 
So far no reference has been made to South African traae links with Japan or 
the United States. Unlike Britain and the other EEC countries, the prominence 
of South Arica's trade links with the United States and Japan is of more 
recent origin, and on which there does not exist a comparably wide literature 
at present. In 1980 the US market for South African exports of Base ~ietals 
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TABLE 12(39) 
SOUTH AFRICA'S CONTRIBUTION TO wORLD PRODUCTION AND EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE 
ON SOUTH AFRICA AS A SOURCE OF SELECTED MI~ERAL PRODUCTS 
PRODUCT % WORLD EEC FOR UK FRANCE HOLLAND ITALY BELGIUM EIRE 
PRODUCT- TOTAL LUXEM-
ION IN SA BURG 
GOLD 60 48 33 51 66 
DIAMONDS 17 68 
PLATINUM 
GROUP 47 30 90 
SILVER 1 1 
ALU~iI NI UM 
SILICATES 30 32 94 
GRANITE n.a. 56 28 
ASBESTOS 10 15 
FLUORSPAR 5 24 
VERMICULITE 40 17 30 30 
COAL 2 19 22 18 18 19 
IRON 2 4 7 9 4 5 
MANGANESE 23 38 71 59 25 62 
URANIUM 12 50 
ZINC 8 11 
COPPER 3 5 12 8 
TIN 2 8,5 25 4 42 
CHROME 26 49 60 63 30 99 30 100 
SI LI CA 14 10 64 31 
FERIWCHROt'IE 12,5 ** 44 62 30 39 
(direct **) * 26 44 65 15 26 
(indirect *) 
ANTI~'IONY 22 23 14 
ZIRCONIUM n. a. 4 
VANADI UM 47 78 74 
NICKEL 3 15 15 43 15 
LEAD 18 6 12 
TITANIUM 5 
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and Metal Products was nearly three times as large as the next biggest market, 
namely Japan (see Table 8). Additionally, she was th,e second largest export 
of other South African exports too. If the United States were to act in 
concert with the EEC on any future sanctions programme, then the outlook for 
South African exports is gloomy indeed. Broadly, similar considerations with 
regard to sources of supply apply to both the USA and EEC, although the former 
may be regarded as less "dependent" on South African commodities. 
In 1 980, Japan was the 1 arges t market for South Afri can mi nera 1 exports, 
tak i ng 20 percent of the tot a 1 (see Table 8), and was overall the fourth 
largest trading partner of South Africa in terms of both exports and imports. 
Although it would appear at first that Japan is rather vulnerable to a boycott 
of mineral supplies from South Africa, this impression must be qualified. The 
main constituents of Japan's mineral imports from South Africa are coal, iron 
ore and chrome. It certainly cannot be maintained that there exists a 
seller's market in any of these products, and it should therefore not present 
an insurmountable problem to Japan to secure alternative sources of such 
mineral supply. South Africa, on the other hand, would be hard pressed to 
find a comparable export market if Japan stopped importing South African 
products. 
To summarise the main argument of this chapte~, an examination of the effects 
of halting exports to South Africa indicates that the consequences of this 
market loss need not cause economic disruption which could not be adjusted in 
the long run by the potential sanctioners. Adjustment to halting imports, 
especially of minerals, from South Africa would be more aifficult, but given 
precautionary action and multilateral co-operation it is likely that the 
resulting inconvenience would be of a short term nature in this case too. It 
seems na i ve to be 1 i eve that South Afri ca 's trad i ng partners are i rrevocab ly 
dependent upon her minerals for strategic reasons, whilst much of the 
pro-sanctions literature deals with the physical availability of minerals and 
other products that South Afri ca exports, and tends to underestimate the 
economi c cons i derat i on of cos t and the pract i ca 1 cons i derat i on of a re 1 i ab 1 e 
source of supply, ie the reasons why trade with South Africa has reached its 
present proportion. From South Africa's point of view the loss of imports may 
be softened by further import substitution, although the scope for this is 
limited because of the narrow domestic market, especially for capital goods. 
The loss of exports mqy be more serious, as no such possible compensating 
alternative appears viable; for example, the domestic market would be unable 
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to absorb the quantity of presently exported minerals, and stockpiling of the 
resulting surplus would only be a short term solution. Given the vertical and 
horizontal economic linkages of the export-oriented sectors, an effective 
boycott of South African exports could have a significant impact on the 
economy. This and related issues are, however, further investigated in the 
following and subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER V 
TRADE AND SANCTIONS (2) 
AGRICULTURE 
It appeared from the previous chapter (Table 4) that the agricultural sector 
contributed some 9 percent towards the value of South Africa's total 
merchanoise exports (including gold) in 1980. In view of the generally high 
mineral prices which prevailed in that year, this figure tends to understate 
the relative (albeit declining) contribution of agricultural exports to South 
Africa's foreign trade in the past. During 1975-80, for example, agricultural 
products represented 14 percent, on average, of South Africa's total exports, 
as defined above. 
The agricultural sector in South Africa consists of commercial agriculture and 
sUbsistence farming . Essentially, the former is located in those areas farmed 
and owned by white South Africans, and the latter in those areas occupied by 
black South Africans. (Some subsistence agriculture is also pursued by black 
people living on white-owned farms.) The aggregate land area of the 
commercial sector consists of 89 million hectares, and the subsistence sector 
covers 15 million hectares. 
Commercial agriculture is responsible for over 90 percent of total farming 
output, and approximately the same percentage of produce from this sub-sector 
is marketed. In the sUbsistence sector only about 15 percent of output is 
marketed. The contribution of agriculture, forestry and fishing to Gross 
Oomestic Product in South Africa is given below in Table 13. 
The average contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP for the years 1975-
1981 was 7,4 percent, as compared with 16,7 percent for mining and 23,3 
percent for manufacturing. In conformity with "Engel's Law" this contribution 
is declining,as th e economy becomes more sophisticated and 
primary economic activity in relative terms. However, 
moves away from 
in relation to 
employment, commercial agriculture has traditionally been, ana continues to 
be, the leadi ng employer of labour, accounting for 30,6 percent of all 
emp l oyees in 1970 compared with 12,6 percent for ;manufacturing, and 8,4 
percent for the mining sector2. 
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TABLE 13-( 1 ) 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY AND FISHING TO GOP: 1975-81 
(R million at current prices) 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY 
AND FISHING 2 192 2 275 2 578 2 792 2 974 4 051 4 921 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
AT FACTOR COST 25 846 29 014 32 167 36 970 44 179 58 514 66 071 
% CONTRIBUTION 8,2 7,8 8,0 7,6 6,7 6,9 7,4 
In 1980/81, the gross value of agricultural production was R6 642,1 million. 
Of this R3 159,8 million (48 percent) originated in field crops, R2464,2 
million (37 percent) in livestock products, and Rl 018,1 million (15 percent) 
i n horticultural products. South Africa also has one of the biggest fishing 
industries in the world, and certainly the biggest in Africa. In 1978 its 
turnover was valued at R250 million3• 
Commercial agriculture is closely linked with other economic sectors. Food 
processing is the most important single manufacturing sector, accounting for 
12,8 percent of total manufacturing production and sales in 1981. In the same 
year the val ue of sales of proces sed food exceeded R7 000 mill ion, and the 
food industry employed about 200 000 peoPle4• According to one measure, 
inputs from the commercial agricultural sector in manufacturing in 1975 
totalled Rl 882,32 million5• The value of agricultural outputs used as 
inputs in manufacturing sub-sectors in 1975 is given in Table 14 below. 
In addition to the above forward links between commercial agriculture and 
manufacturing, farmi ng also depends heavily on inputs from the manufacturi ng 
sector, ie, backward links. This information is conveyed in Table 15 below. 
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TABLE 14(6) 
THE VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL INPUTS IN SOME SELECTED ~IANlJFACTURING 
SUB-SECTORS IN 1975 
SUB-SECTOR 
Meat, dairy products and fish processing 
Grain, sugar and animal feeds processing 
Other food processing 
Beverage industries 
Tobacco products 
Wool scouring, cotton ginning and dyeing of wool and cotton 
Pulp, paper and paperboard 
Wood and wood products 
Rubber products 
TABLE 15(7) 
EXPENDITURE ON FARMING REQUISITES: 1980 
I T E M 
Vehicles, machinery and implements 
Stockfeed 
Fertilizer 
Fuel 
Maintenance of Machinery 
R mill ion 
659,88 
654,28 
237,67 
86,04 
56,36 
52,26 
39,40 
38,53 
21,17 
R mi 11 i on 
554 
504 
482 
371 
299 
Commercial agriculture is highly integrated into the structure of foreign 
trade. As far as exports are concerned, in 1980 they were valued at Rl 787,4 
million or 18,4 percent of total merchandise exports, excluding gold. The 
figures for agricultural exports for the period 1975-80 are presented in Table 
16. 
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TABLE 16(8) 
AGRICULTURE"S CONTRIBlJTION TU TOTAL ~I ERCHANDISE EXPORTS, 
EXCLUDING GOLD: 1975-1980 
R million at current prices 
YEAR AGRICULTURAL EXPDRTS: TOTAL TOTAL MERCHANDISE % AGRIClJLTURAL 
Processed Unprocessed EXPORTS (Excl.gold) EXPORTS 
1975 606,9 642,1 249,0 3 983,2 31,4 
1976 650,8 586,6 1 237,4 4 532,1 27,3 
1977 726,2 611 ,3 1 337,5 5 863,2 22,8 
1978 767,6 776,2 543,8 7 333,3 21 ,1 
1979 866,4 825,9 692,3 9471 ,4 17,9 
1080 800,9 986,5 787,4 9 717,4 18,4 
Of more significance than these exports are the agriculturally-related imports 
of machinery and fertilizers which accounted for 3,3 percent of total 
merchandise imports in 1976. This is shown in Table 17. 
TABLE 17(9) 
I~iPORTS OF AGRICULTURAL REQUISITES AND TOTAL MERCHANDISE I~IPORTS: 1971-1976 
US$ million at current prices 
I T E M 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Crude fertilizers 5,5 5,5 7,2 11 ,7 23,2 15,4 
Manufactured fertilizers 2,5 11 ,3 3,6 18,2 13,4 7,6 
Pesticides 13,5 14,0 17,3 35,2 47,0 31,7 
Agricultural machinery 86,6 89,5 87,9 146,6 275,6 171,9 
Total Agricultural Requisites 108,1 120,2 116,1 211,7 359,1 226,7 
Total Merchandise trade 4024,23649,14 717,87225,9 7 597,4 6 769,3 
Agricultural requisites as a 
% of total imports 2,7 3,3 2,5 2,9 4,7 3,3 
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This brief sketch of commercial agriculture shows that it is an important 
sector of the South African economy, that it is closely integratea with other 
sectors, and is a major source of foreign exchange. It is likely to be 
sensitive to sanctions because of its import dependence and export orientation. 
As an employer of labour, the commercial agricultural sector is of much 
greater importance to the black population than to other racial groups. In 
1970, 6,5 percent of whites were employed in the sector, compared with 16,3 
percent of coloureds and 39,6 percent of blacks. 10 Despite the ongoing 
controversy about unemployment in South Africall , it is obvious that any 
sanctions policy leading to a fall in commercial agricultural output would 
have serious implications for employment. Table 18 indicates the approximate 
provincial distribution of employment by race and work category in the 
agricultural sector in 1973. 
TABLE 18(12) 
APPROXIMATE PROVINCIAL DISTRIBUTION OF COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURAL 
EMPLOYEES BY RACE AND WORK CATEGORY: 1973 
PROVINCE TOTAL EMPLOYEES BLACK COLOURED ASIAN WHITE 
TRANSVAAL 550 000 545 000 
CAPE PROVINCE 435 000 235 000 200 000 
ORANGE FREE STATE 257 500 231 000 
NATAL 257 500 
TOTALS 1 500 000 260 000 223 000 4 000 13 000 
of which: 
Regular 735 000 
Casual 645 000 526 967 95 120 237 867 
Domestic 120 000 
NOTE: The classes of farm employees distinguished are: 
(a) REG ULAR EMPLOYEES - employees normally engaged in farm work in 
agriculture and in forestry and sugar cane plantations, and 
include managers, foremen ana other regular farm employees. 
(b) CASUAL Ef'lIPLOYEES - seasonal and occasional employees, excluding 
contractor s and their empl oyees . 
(c) DOME STIC E~iPLOYEES - employees who ar e mainly or exclusively 
engaged in domestic work. 
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If the demand for commercial output oeclines then retrenched labour would fall 
back on the subsistence sector - the so-called "homeland" agricultural sector 
- which suffers increasingly from over-use of land and over-population. The 
consequences of sanctions on the potential repatriation of labour to the 
"national states" are thus significant, whereas, since agriculture does not 
depend heavily on foreign migrant workers, little effect would be felt beyond 
South Africa of a drop in such employment. Table 19 shows the origin and work 
place of South African blacks who are employed in commercial agriculture. 
Judging from these (incomplete) figures, reductions in employment in the Cape 
would affect mainly Transkei and Ciskei, both of which (in addition to Qwaqwa) 
would be similarly affected by unemployment in the Orange Free State (OFS). 
Lebowa would be affected by employment opportunities in the Transvaal. 
ORIGIN 
TRANSKEI 
AND CISKEI 
QWAQI-IA 
LEBOWA 
VENDA 
TABLE 19(13) 
COMt'IERCIAL AGRICULTURE : ORIGIN AND PROVINCE OF E~iPLOYMENT 
OF BLACK SOUTH AFRICANS: 1973 
NO. OF WORKERS PROV INCE OF E~,PLOYMENT NO. OF WORKERS 
) 455 000 Cape Province 304 850 
) Orange Free State 72 800 
364 000 Orange Free State 291 200 
299 000 Transvaal 281 060 
130 000 
On the other hand, not all agricultUre is of the same labour intensity. 
Therefore, reductions in output in commercial agricultural sub-sectors will 
have a varying impact on labour employment of regular, as well as, casual and 
seasonal employment. The 1 abour input requi rements of different types of 
production in 1973 are given below in Table 20. 
It therefore follows that in those areas where production of agricultural 
output is most sensitive to sanctions, and where labour input is relatively 
high to capital, the most unemployment will occur. It now remains to explain 
in greater detail why the commercial agricultural sector would be sensitive to 
sanctions. As f ar as commercial output is con cerned, approximately 
three-qu arters of the total value in 1980/81 was accounted for by the eleven 
items in Tabl e 21 be low. 
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TABLE 20(14) 
AVERAGE NUM~ER OF REGULAR AND CASUAL wORKERS PER 100 HECTARES 
BY TYPE OF PRODUCTION IN 1973 
TYPE OF PRODUCTION 
SUGAR CANE 
VEGETABLES, PIGS AND POULTRY 
DEC IDUOUS FRUIT 
OTHER FRUIT 
fllAllE 
CATTLE 
SHEEP 
CEREALS 
TABLE 21 (15) 
NUMBER PER 
REGULAR 
125,9 
84,9 
11,7 
24,1 
17,8 
12,0 
3,1 
14,2 
100 HECTARES 
CASUAL 
75,3 
28,9 
10,7 
14,7 
18,0 
23,1 
3,4 
10,3 
SELECTED MAJOR AGRICULTURAL ITEMS BY PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION 
TO OUTPUT VALUE: 1980/81 
I T E M % 
MAIZE 25 
CATTLE AND CALF SLAUGHTERING 12 
FOwLS SLAUGHTERED 7 
WHEAT 5 
SUGAR CANE 5 
SHEEP AND GOAT SLAUGHTERING 5 
HAY 4 
wOOL 3 
DECIDUOUS FRUIT 4 
VEGETABLES 4 
FRESH MILK AND OAIRY PRODUCTS 6 
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These items are included, in the main, in Table 22, which shows the data for 
total production in relation to exports, thus indicating the degree of foreign 
orientation, and therefore vulnerability to sanctions. The most 
export-orientated sub-sectors are wool, sugar, hides, citrus fruit and 
deciduous fruit. 
TABLE 22 (16) 
PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS: 1976/77 
PRODUCT TOTAL PRODUCTION 
MAIZE 9 350 000 tons 
WHEAT 1 750 000 tons 
SUGAR 294 000 tons 
DECIDUOUS FRUIT 448 000 tons 
CITRUS FRUIT 652 000 tons 
TOBACCO LEAF 39 000 tons 
POTATOES 740 000 tons 
WINE 486 100 000 1 i tres 
WOOL 92 100 000 Kgs 
KARAKUL PELTS 2 157 000 
HIDES (sheep, 
goats, calves) 29 200 000 Kgs 
TOTAL EXPORT 
513 000 tons 
240 000 tons 
1 070 000 tons 
249 000 ton s 
385 000 tons 
7 000 tons 
8 000 tons 
19 400 000 litres 
82 890 000 Kgs 
1 833 
18 286 000 Kgs 
% OF EXPORTS/ 
PRODUCTION 
16 
14 
83 
56 (1972 figures) 
59 
18 
1 
4 
90 
62 
Thus several products which constitute a high proportion of the total value of 
agricultural production, especially those which are heavily export orientated, 
are highly vulnerable to sanctions. If a comparatively high labour input is 
required, as for example in the 'case of sugar, then there may be serious 
implications for employment. Several minor crops are specifically 
export-orientated such as sorghum, dried fruit and pineapples, and a 
successful boycott of them could have severe repercussions in localised areas, 
for example, East London in the case of pineapples. This is also true of the 
fishing industry which is highly export orientated in fishmeal production and 
lobster catches 17 . In aggregate, those products which could render the 
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economy most vulnerable are then maize, sugar, deciduous and citrus fruit, and 
wool, since they all contribute heavily to total production value, and are 
largely export orientated. 
However, what are the possibilities 
products? To attempt an answer we must 
of a successful poycott of these 
look at world markets in general. In 
no commodity does South Africa approach domination of world markets as can be 
seen in Table 23. However, the elasticity of demand in the maize and fresh 
fruit markets is important. The former because of destination ie, mainly 
Africa, and the latter because of seasonal variations. In both instances, 
demand tends to be relative inelastic, in respect of both price and income. 
It is unlikely that the importing states would boycott South African maize, by 
virtue of its position as an essential staple food. The inelasticity in 
connection with fresh fruit is due to South African output being "in season", 
when the export markets concerned cannot eas ily fi nd a lternati ve supp 1 i es 
(domestic or foreign). Even tentative efforts by EEC nations to institute 
boycotts of South African fruit have been marginal and largely symbolic. This 
is especially significant in view of the fact that in 1975 Europe tool 56 
percent of all South African agricultural exports. 18 The remainder was 
distributed as follows: Japan 19 percent, United States and Canada 11 
percent, West and South East As i a 6 percent, Afri ca 5 percent, deve 1 opi ng 
America 2 percent and OPEC countries 2 percent 19 . So far, there is no 
tangible evidence of a food or agricultural boycott of South Africa by 
importers outside Europe. In the case of Africa (see Chapter 7) the opposite 
may be inferred. 
From a regional perspective, sanctions could create serious problems in the 
Western Cape for producers of fresh and canned fruit. The West Coast fishing 
industry would also be adversely affected. Natal would suffer in that 
difficulties might be faced in marketing sugar exports. The central upland 
areas of the Transvaal coula be affected by maize and citrus fruit boycotts, 
whilst the OFS is likely to be little affected, except by reductions in maize 
and wheat exports. 
severe ly affected. 
Country-wide production of wool and hides could be 
Both output and employment would be reduced, with black 
labour bearing the brunt of the reduction. 
Much would depend on how widespread and well enforced the boycott would be. 
For example, it is unlikely that the maize sector woula suffer severe 
dislocation as exports are in inelastic demand. Even so, if sanctions are 
plausible, then the stockpiling of maize and aeclining productivity due to 
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TABLE 23(20) 
SELECTED SOUTH AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AS A PROPORTION OF 
WORLD EXPORTS BY PRODUCT: 1976 
I T E M 
MEAT, FRESH/FROZEN 
MEAT, BOVINE FRESH 
MEAT, SHEEP FRESH 
MEAT, CANNED 
MILK, CONDENSED, FRESH AND DRY 
CEREALS 
WHEATFLOUR, WHEAT EQUIVALENT 
MAIZE 
ORANGES, TANGERINES, CLE~jEtmNES 
OTHER CITRUS FRUIT INCLUDING PINEAPPLES 
APPLES 
GRAPES 
PEARS 
SUGAR, TOTAL RAW EQUIVALENT 
SUGAR, RAW CENTRIFUGE 
WINES AND VERMOUTH 
TOBACCO, UNMANUFACTURED 
wOOL, GREASY 
WOOL, OEGREASED 
SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF WORLD EXPORTS 
0,77 
1,20 
0,12 
0,60 
0,12 
1 ,10 
0,25 
3,50 
3,50 
3,60 
2,90 
3,90 
4,80 
3,30 
4,50 
0,20 
0,40 
7,20 
2,90 
lack of suitable inputs, may keep output and employment levels artificially 
high in the maize sector. Similar analysis may apply to other crops and/or 
agri cultura 1 sub-sectors, whil st the effect on the subs i stence sector woul d 
presumably be negligible. Moreover, the experience of Rhodesia indicates 
possibilities for agricultural diversification, and the masking of the origin 
of agricultural exports. Were this practice largely applied in South Africa 
-
too, the availability of imported inputs would be crucial rather than the 
marketing of output. However, as in the case of Rhodesia, the South African 
Government is committed to maintain and support the agricultural sector, from 
where it draws much political support. To this end it is likely that high 
- 79 -
producer prices would continue to be paid to farmers, and additionally, 
schemes to stockpile output, quotas to restrict output, and tax incentives to 
diversify production would be introduced. These moves would increase the 
burden of the non-agricultural sectors in supporting a thus ai 1 ing 
agricultural sector. 
GOLD 
It is difficult to overstate the significance of gold in the South African 
economy generally; its specific importance in foreign earnings is evident 
from Table 24 below, from which it appears that the contribution of net gold 
output to tota 1 forei gn earn i ngs f1 uctuated between 26,2 and 45,0 percent 
during the period 1975-1981. 
TA8LE 24(21) 
SOUTH AFRICAN BALANCE OF PAYMENTS : CURREtiT f{E.CEIPTS: 1975-1981 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
MERCHANDISE EXPORTS 3 653 4 889 6 293 7 449 8 813 9 643 9 328 
NET GOLD OUTPUT 2 540 2 346 2 795 3 864 6 003 10 141 8 338 
SERVICE RECEIPTS 1 400 1 497 1 595 1 949 2 334 2 761 3 117 
% OF GOLD TO TOTAL 
CURRENT ACCOUNT RECEIPTS 33,5 26,9 26,2 29,1 35,0 45,0 40,1 
South Africa mines about half of all the current world production of gold, and 
more than 70 percent of the "non-communist" output. Non-monetary uses of gold 
include industrial application in electronics and dentistry (about 12 percent 
of annual world production22 ) and jewellery. As far as these applications 
are concerned, substitutes are as a rule available in the industrial field, 
possibly at some small cost to the electronics industry, but at reduced cost 
to dentistry. It is not these applications of gold that are really 
significant fro m the South African point of view; in contrast with the 
monetary role of or "asset" demand for gold. 
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The asset demand for gold falls essentially into two parts: a reserve demand 
by monetary authorities and a (more or less speculative) demand by private 
buyers. This role is to an important extent derived from the historical 
function of gold as an important form of money. For more than 2 000 years 
coins were the main means of payment, of which gold coins were either the main 
component or the most high ly val ued 23 . In sp ite of the abandonment of the 
international gold standard at the outbreak of the First World War, gold 
retained an important place in international trade and finance. Thus, a 
modified gold standard was adopted by the IMF in 1944, which officially lasted 
until 1978, when gold was formally "demonetised". (lhis policy was 
persistently pursued by the United States Treasury, which also has strong 
influence in the IMF). This does not, however, mean that 901d no longer has 
an international monetary significance or function, For example, the IMF has 
retained two-thirds of the gold quotas originally supplied by member 
countries, central banks still keep gold as part of their foreign reserves, 
gold is used a collateral in international credit transactions, its 
si gnificance is expl ici ty recogni sed in the European monetary system, and 
central banks have, at least recently, been sell ing gold in order to obtain 
foreign currency. 
Although there is at present no extensive literature on the place of gold in a 
sanctions campaign against South Africa, some commentators have addressed 
themse 1 ves to the question. For examp 1 e, Rogers and Bo lton write: 
"Logically, sanctions against South Africa would have to include a ban on gold 
imports from there, which in turn would mean a drastic reduction in the amount 
of newly-mined gold available to the world market. We need to consider ways 
and means of preparing for this t o happen without either making sanctions a 
mockery by wide-spread evasion, or causing the gold price on the world market 
to sky-rocket,,24. From a practical point of view, it is, however, aifficult 
to see what stabilising steps could be taken in the private gold market, if it 
were to be deprived of future South African gold supplies. In principle, 
these authors are on firmer ground when they point out that: "There is no 
shortage of proposal s for improving the international monetary system along 
rational lines, and removing the residual role of gold".25 
Another pro-sanctions author, Charles Ell iot, presents an argument in respect 
of a consensus which he considers a prerequisite to a successful boycott of 
South African gold output: "It is a scenario which envisages the acceptance 
by both the demonetisers and the gol d or th odoxists of the proposition th at 
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their case would be strengthened by a more orderly gold market. For the gold 
orthodoxists this proposition poses little difficulty since any return to an 
official gold price, and a regime of fixed exchange rates must involve much 
greater stability in the free market price of gold. For the demonetisers, a 
slowly falling price of gold would be a very useful weapon in their struggle 
to convince the orthodoxists that their interests would be better served by 
the substitution of SDRs for gold in their reserves, since there are a variety 
of ways of ensuring that the real value of SDRs is maintained in a way that 
there is not at present for gold. In this scenario, then, both groups would 
seek to off-load monetary gold on to the free market with a view to 
stabilizing the price for the orthodoxists and reducing the price, albeit 
slowly and in a relatively orderly fashion for the demonetisers. In either 
case, substant i a 1 monetary go 1 d wou 1 d be re 1 eased on to the free market and 
both groups would welcome the loss of newly mined gold".26 
The points raised in the above quotation may well be relevant to some of the 
recent controversy surrounding the academic debate concerning the position of 
gold . However, both historical evidence and universal practice would indicate 
that the demand for gold rests on a far broader consideration. The 
ineffectiveness of the official demonetisation of gold is, of course, 
illustrated by the fact that the trend of the gold price has been strongly 
upward since "demonetisation", in spite of marked short term fluctuations. 
(Perhaps the major source of instability in the gold market lies in the 
potential role which existing stocks, rather than current production, does 
play from time to time.) Perhaps even to a greater extent than the so-called 
strategic minerals discussed in the previous chapter, South Africa's position 
as the world's leading gold producer would render a comprehensive sanctions 
campaign difficult indeed to implement. 
The exclusion of gold from a set of comprehensive economic sanctions against 
South Africa would evidently make the failure of sanctions a foregone 
conclusion, as the foreign currency needed to pay for essential imports would 
still be available. 
Apart from its crucial role in financing imports, gold also influences the 
domestic economy in other ways. For example, although virtually all the gold 
output is exported ana its forward linkage is therefore weak, the backward 
linkages are considerable. A successful boycott of gold would have serious 
consequences for the South African economy in terms of labour, industrial, 
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commercial, agricultural and other inputs. Table 25 gives an indication of 
the input structure of gold mining, ie, the extent to which it purchases 
outputs from other sectors of the economy. 
TABLE 25(27) 
SELECTED MAJOR I~PUTS IN THE GULD MINING INDUSTRY: 1975 
SEC TOR R million 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY & FISHING 36,39 
BASIC CHEMICALS, PETROLEUM & COAL PRODUCTS 18,61 
PAINT & OTHER CHEMCAL PRODUCTS 31,43 
RUBBER PRODUCTS 22,88 
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 39,65 
MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 58,64 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 13,46 
ELECTRICITY 72,39 
WHOLESALE & RETAIL TRADE, MOTOR TRADE & REPAIR SERVICES 24,21 
TRANSPORT, STORAGE & COMMUNICATIONS 13,88 
GOODS & SERVICES NOT CLASSIFIED BY DESTINATION 71,22 
OTHER INPUTS 64,35 
TOTAL INTER'~EDIATE INPUTS 467,11 
REMUNERATION OF EMPLOYEES 731,33 
GROSS OPERATING SURPLUS 1451,35 
NET INDIRECT TAXES 8,03 
LESS: PRODUCTS TRANSFERRED 
TOTAL VALUE 
23,32 
2634,51 
% 
1,4 
0,7 
1 , 2 
0,9 
1 ,5 
2,2 
0,5 
2,7 
0,9 
0,5 
2,7 
2,4 
17,7 
27,8 
55,1 
100,0 
Apart from still being an important contributor, both directly and indirectly, 
to national income in South Africa, the major single source of foreign 
exchange earnings and a significant employer of labour in the broader regional 
context, a rising gold price has also in recent times served to cushion the 
South African economy against sudden increases in the international oil 
price. Much of South Africa's recent economic growth performance has also 
obviously been associated with the forunes of gold. In general, the authors 
of the current Economic Devel opment Progranroe state that: "The important role 
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played by gold in the South African economy has been reaffirmed to such an 
extent that any substantial decline in the gold price can change the short 
term economic climate from optimism to pessimism,,28. 
MANUFACTURING 
Historically, the manufacturing sector in South Africa has experienced 
significant growth relative to the rest of the economy. This is evident from 
the figures in Table 26 below. 
TABLE 26(29) 
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBuTION OF GOP AT FACTOR COST BY KIND 
OF ECONO~iIC ACTIVITY 1911-1981 (at current prices) 
YEAR AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY MINING & QUARRYING 
& FISHING 
1911 21 , 1 27,6 
1920 22,2 18,3 
1930 14,2 15,6 
1940 12,7 18,8 
1950 17,7 13,5 
1960 12,3 14,2 
1970 8,2 10,2 
1980 6,9 22,9 
1981 7,4 16,7 
The structure of manufacturing industry in terms 
contribution of individual sectors to the total value of 
MANUFACTURING 
3,8 
7,3 
9,3 
12,4 
16,4 
18,7 
23,6 
22,6 
24,4 
of the respective 
output as well as the 
percentage of the total labour employed, is given in Table 27 below. 
It is well known that the composition of South Africa's manufacturing output 
has undergone significant changes in the long term; broadly speaking, the 
proportion of capital equipment and intermediate products has risen relative 
to consumer goods. 30 However, this relative trend should not be allowed to 
- 84 -
TABLE 27(31) 
VALUE OF OUTPUT AND E~iPLOYMENT IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR: 1981 (R '000) 
VALUE OF % EMPLOYMENT % 
OUTPUT 
1. TOTAL MANUFACTURING 56 047,029 100,0 1 468,400 100,0 
2. FOOD 7 146,233 12,7 174,600 11,8 
3. BEVERAGES 2 517,916 4,5 35,700 2,4 
4. TOBACCO PRODUCTS 596,819 1 ,1 5,500 0,3 
5. TEXTILES 2 271,082 4,1 118,400 8,0 
6. WEARING APPAREL EXCEPT FOOTWEAR 1 378,644 2,5 115,900 7,8 
7. LEATHER & LEATHER PRODUCTS 222,816 0,4 10,700 0,7 
8. FOOTWEAR 547,805 1,0 27,200 1,8 
9. WOOD & WOOD & CORK PRODUCTS 857,487 1,5 53,200 3,6 
10. FURNITURE (wOOD) 715,245 1,3 34,500 2,3 
11. PAPER & PAPEAR PRODUCTS 1 777,362 3,2 36,300 2,5 
12. PRINTING, PUBLISHING & ALLIED 
INDUSTRIES 089,255 1 ,9 45,600 3, 1 
13. INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS 3 217,240 5,7 103,000 7,0 
14. OTHER CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 5 972,099 10,7 
15. RUBBER PRODUCTS 679,877 1 ,2 19,300 1 ,3 
16. PLASTIC PRODUCTS, n.e.c. 762,762 1,4 27,100 1,8 
17. POTTERY, CHINA & EARTHENWARE 55,032 0,1 ) 
18. GLASS & GLASS PRODUCTS 328,716 0,6 )- 94,300 6,4 
19. OTHER NON-METALIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 1 839,644 3,3 ) 
20. IRON & STEEL BASIC INDUSTRIES 4 054,428 7,2 ) 123,300 8,4 -
21- NON-FERROUS METAL BASIC INDUSTRIES 1 196,487 2,1 ) 
22. FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 
EXCEPT MACHINERY 7 720,981 13,8 139,000 9,5 
23. MACHINERY, EXCEPT ELECTRICAL 
MACHINERY 3 147,413 5,6 84,500 5,8 
24. ELECTRICAL MACHINERY,ETC 2 256,919 4,0 79,900 5,4 
25. MOTOR VEHICLES, PARTS & ) 
ACCESSORIES 4 208,320 7,5 ) 
- 115,800 7,9 
26. TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT, EXCEPT MOTOR ) 
VEHICLES 505,555 0,9 ) 
27. PROFESSIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC 
EQUIPMENT,E1C 103,641 0,2 4,500 0,3 
28. OTHER INDUSTRIES 880,253 1,6 20,100 1,4 
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obscure the fact of deliberatley cultivated growth in the field of consumer 
goods' output in South Africa32 , by means of tariff protection and other 
forms of import control, ie., collectively known as the policy of import 
sUbstitution or replacement33 • It is generally thought that any significant 
extension of this policy would in future have to take place in the fields of 
intermediate and capital goods, as the scope for additional import 
substitution of consumer goods has been almost exhausted34 • At the present 
time, however, South Africa remains a heavy net importer of capital and 
intermediate goods, a state of affairs which contains some fundamental 
economic problems, as is for example indicated in the Reynders Commission 
Report: "At the present stage of South Africa's development the main 
potential of a programme of import replacement has been realised. The still 
large propen~ity to import especially capital and intermediate goods, the much 
greater difficulties involved ' in further import substitutions and the lagging 
behaviour of exports are bound to become major factors in the future.,,35 
These developments and prospects in the South African manufacturi ng sector 
also have certa i n implications for the potential application of sanctions, 
although these are not always clear-cut. This is presumably the main reason 
why authors on the subject have contributed comparatively little to this 
particular aspect of (the discussion on) sanctions against South Africa. What 
1 iterature there does exist, often tends to present import substitution as a 
measure to counter sanct ions on exports to South Afri ca36 . However, th i s 
approach is not usually helpful, as the policy of import substitution was 
instituted as far back as the 1920s, in order to deliberately foster local 
manufacturing and solve the unemployment aspect of the "Poor White" problem; 
while economic sanctions were simply not an issue until the 1960s. Since 
then, the South African government has of course deliberately cultivated 
certain industries considered to be "strategic" (in a narrow sense) to the 
performance of the economy in general, and the armed forces in particular: 
for example, Armscor (armaments), Soekor (oil exploration), the extension to 
Sasol (oil-from-coal), the Atlantis Diesel Engine plant, and enriched uranium. 
However, the ability of the private sector to apply import substitution to 
capital goods is obviously affected by such considerations as economies of 
scale, the size of the market, unit cost of proauction, and efficiency and 
competitiveness, to a far greater extent than in the case of the examples 
mentioned above , wh ere recourse to public f unds is the rule rather than the 
exception. Tabl e 4 in the first section of the previous chapter shows that 
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(apart from oil and military equipment) the major items comprising South 
African imports are: Machinery, Vehicles and transport equipment, Chemicals 
and chemi ca 1 products, and Base metals and metal products. Together they 
accounted for virtually half of the total value of imports in 1980, or almost 
80 percent if oil and military goods are included. From a purely practical 
point of vi ew, the effective app1 ication of a boycott of exports to South 
Africa must therefore lie in this direction. 
Those local industries which would be most affected by a boycott of exports to 
South Africa tend to be capital-intensive: for example Basic industrial 
chemicals (inc1uoing crude oil), Machinery (excluding electrical machinery), 
Motor vehicles, Electrical machinery and equipment, and Basic iron and steel 
37 with the partial exception of motor vehicles these industries 
themselves produce capital 900ds and intermediate products . An effective 
boycott of South Africa in the field of manufacturing would therefore 
concentrate on denying foreign inputs to the local industry, which would then 
curtail the scope for development in the South African capital goods industry. 
The implications of such a boycott for employment in South Africa are not 
necessarily obvious. Although the industries that would be most affected tend 
to be capita1- rather than labour-intensive, they also have relatively strong 
forward and even cons i derab 1 e backward 1 i nkage. The net potential impact on 
employment would therefore seem greater than at first sight. However, at the 
same time, scarcity of foreign-produced capital inputs might give rise to a 
substitution of labour for capital in the affected i.Qdustries, as well as a 
possible shift from capital-intensive to labour-intensive industries in 
general. A boycott of capital goods exports to South Africa may thus, ceteris 
paribus, have the end result of actually reversing the recently observed trend 
of capital deepening in the economi8 , and the resulting increase in the 
rate of (especially less-skilled) unemployment. The practical difficulty here 
is, of course, derived from the fact that the ultimate consequences of 
sanctions on virtually any aspect of economic activity requires a general 
rather than partial approach, ie, a comprehensive input-output model of the 
economy. The estimation of such a model is, however, beyond the scope of this 
thesis, if it is a feasible exercise at all. 
Perhaps it would be sensible to asess the potential impact of an embargo on 
imported capital gooos precisely as such: unavailability of certain 
product i on factor s. The immed i ate consequence of such a boycott on 
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employment, economic growth, etc, may, then, not necessarily be severe. 
However, as the Rhodesian example has shown (see Chapter 2 above), the 
inability to replace depreciating and obsoiete capital goods is, in the long 
term, indeed, 1 ike ly to cause wi despread unemployment and negat i ve economi c 
growth. 
These considerations, of course, as reasoned above, dO not preclude factor 
substitution ie, the adoption of production methods suited to a condition of 
sanctions. Thus, Dr H J J Reynders is reported to have said: "If we had to, 
we could make just about everything we need, even if we have to make it by 
hand,,39. However, improvised production techniques are not always efficient 
and may serve to increase the un it cost of product i on. Th is phenomenon is 
already evident in the case of at least some of the "strategic industries" 
referred to above, where South Afri ca is manufacturi ng products in wh i ch she 
does not have a comparative advantage, as an anti-sanctions precaution. In 
other words, progressive import replacement in the capital goods industries 
would also render the structure of South African manufacturing less efficient 
and competitive, thus entrenching an inflationary bias in the economy 
generally. The ultimate consequences of sanctions on exports to South Africa 
would therefore be a misallocation of resources and secular inflation. 
Agriculture, in particular, is vulnerable to sanction on two counts: its 
position with regard to South Africa's export trade was discussed in the first 
section of this chapter; the remainder of this section outlines the broad 
relationship between sanction and the importation of agricultural inputs. The 
position in this respect may be briefly summarised as follows: "Of the four 
major inputs into the agricultural sector - agricultural machinery and 
vehicles, fertilizers and pesticides, fuel and stockfeeds - South Africa is 
only totally self-sufficient in stockfeeds. Most oil-based fuels, the bulk of 
(and all heavy) agricultural machinery and certain essential fertilizers and 
pesticides have to be imported,,40 
As far as agricultural machinery is concerned, over 75 percent of annual 
purchases are imported or some R225 million in 197841 . All tractors used in 
1979 were imported directly or indirectly42, but local production of tractor 
components at the Atlantis Diesel Engine plant has marginally affected this 
figure since then. However, this plant still has a high import input content, 
and is unable to manufacture the heavier tractors on which the sector is 
becoming increasingly reliant. Moreover, as identified above, it represent s a 
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case of comparatively high cost and an erosion of international 
competitiveness. 
Table 28 below gives the sales of tractors, in 1977 and 1978, according to 
manufacturer. Vetsak and Ma1comess are local companies which produce some 
equipment, but import tractors for resale. Ford, John Deere and International 
Harvester are American, Massey Ferguson is Canadian and Deutz is German. 
TABLE 28(43) 
TRACTOR SALES IN SOUTH AFRICA: 1977 AND 1978 
MANUFACTURER 1977 1978 
UNIT SALES % OF MARKET UNIT SALES % OF MARKET 
FORD 3 500 24,1 2 702 22,S 
MASSEY FERGUSON 3 106 21,4 2 585 21,S 
VETSAK 2 609 18,0 2 213 18,4 
JOHN DEERE 2 055 14,2 1 676 14,0 
MALCOMESS 805 5,5 715 6,0 
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER 837 5,8 622 5,2 
DEUTZ 621 4,3 465 #,9 . 
OTHERS 971 6,7 023 8,5 
TOTALS 14,504 100,0 12 001 100,0 
A broader perspect i ve of the country of ori gi n of agri cu1 tura 1 mach i nery 
imports in general is obtained by summing the contribution by country to 
imports of the following items: tractors, combine harvesters, ploughs, 
harvesting and threshing machines, dairy machines, straw anD fodder presses, 
egg grading machines and sprayer/sprinkler equipment. lhis gives the figures 
in Table 29 below . 
Of the three main groups of fertilizer, namely, nitrogen, phosphate and 
potash, South Afri ca is se If-suffi ci ent in the fi rst two, but dependent on 
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TABLE 29(44) 
PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION BY VALUE OF MAIN EXPORTERS TO SOUTH AFRICA 
OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY, 1980 
COUNTRY PERCENTAGE 
USA 25 
WEST GERMANY 22 
UK 19 
ITALY 11 
BELGIU~i 3 
CANADA 2 
SwEDEN 2 
NETHERLANDS 1 
FRANCE 
OTHER 14 
TOTAL 100 
imports for potash. Fertilizer is an imortant input in maize, sugar, wheat 
and cotton production. Maize and sugar farming constitute the major 
components of potash consumption, circa 60 percent. The mai n suppl iers of 
potash, in 1976, were France (48 percent), Wes t Germany (20 percent), Canada 
(18 percent) and Israel (14 percent)45. Potash import replacement would be 
costly and uneconomic. In addition to importing fertiliser, South Africa 
imports about 40 percent of its pesticide inputs for use in the fruit, wine, 
tobacco, and sugar sub-sectors. These imports increased in value by some 250 
percent between 1972 and 1976, and were largely made up of brands which cannot 
be made locally due to patents or technology. However, the ICI- and Anglo-
American-controlled company, African Explosives & Chemical Industries and also 
Fedmis are increasing local pesticide output. 
In summary, then, it appears that South African manufacture in general (and 
agriculture in particular) is not only vulnerable to sanctions in terms of a 
boycott of (commerc i a 1 agri cu ltura 1) exports, but also because of the high 
import dependence on many (agricultural) inputs such as oil fuels, machinery 
and spare parts, which are almost exclusively supplied by USA, Canada, the 
EEC and Japan. 
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OIL 
The literature on sanctions usually refers to South African dependence on oil 
imports as the "Achilles Heel" of her economy46, although South Africa's 
energy requirements are met from coal to a greater extent than from oil, and 
plans for produci ng nucl ear energy are comparat i ve ly advanced47 • However, 
oil is still an essential input in many vital sectors of the economy, and 
desp i te extens i ve oil exp 1 orat i on backed by the 90vernment no commerci ally 
viable natural oil deposits have (as yet) been located48 • Vulnerability to 
international sanctions has been reduced in recent years by strategic 
stockpiling, import substitution and fuel conservation methods . 
Several features of the South African energy sector are worth noting. 
Firstly, South Africa is not nearly as reliant upon oil for energy 
requirements as most other industrialised or semi-industrialised nations. 
Secondly, the bulk of energy needs is provided by coal which is abundant ana 
accessible, and therefore relatively cheap. It is used mainly to generate 
electricity which is the most important form of energy. Table 30, which 
shows energy consumption by sector, suggests that only the transport and 
household sectors are 1 ikely to suffer disruption in the short run in the 
event of sanctions on oil. 
TABLE 30(49) 
CONSUMPTION OF USEFUL ENERGY BY MAJOR CONSUMER SECTORS IN 1968 and 1974 
SECTOR 
MANUFACTURING 
MINING 
HOUSEHOLD 
TRANSPORT 
ALL SECTORS 
YEAR ELECTRICITY 
% 
1968 20,0 
1974 22,9 
1968 66,9 
1974 87,9 
1968 32,6 
1974 49,3 
1968 10,8 
1974 14,6 
1968 27,1 
1974 32,6 
COAL 
% 
31,9 
25,6 
31,7 
9,4 
31,7 
22,9 
14,2 
6,0 
29,2 
. 20,9 
01 L GAS 
% % 
7,0 16,7 
8,4 26,0 
1,4 
2,7 
34,5 0,9 
27,6 0,3 
75,0 
49,4 
20,5 9,5 
19,6 16,2 
COKE & GAS COKE 
% 
24,4 
17 , 1 
0,2 
0,1 
13,7 
10,7 
TOTAL 
% 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
100,0 
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Martin Bailey, the most prolific author on the subject of an oil boycott and 
South Africa, estimated in 1979 that South Africa's total demand for oil was 
approximately 320 000 barrels per day50. Together with Bernard Rivers, he 
also estimated that daily imports in 1978 were over 400000 barre1s 51 , which 
thus suggests that approximately 80 000 barrels per day were being 
stockpiled. Estimates of the extent of this oil stockpile, measured in terms 
of how long the stockpile would last at "present" rates of consumption, vary 
from 18 months 52 to 3 years53. This period could obviously be extended by 
fuel conservation measures. Additionally, the production of local "synthetic" 
oil by the Saso1 plants will cushion the economy against an oil embargo. 
Spandau estimated in 1979 that the Saso1 plants could be producing 25 percent 
of South Africa's oil demand (at current levels) in 1981_254 , and it is 
predicted that the Saso1 project could be supplying 60 percent of consumption 
by 1984,55 though this seems somewhat optimistic. 
As a complement to this pioneering work in oil-from-coa1 extraction, the 
possibil ities of manufacturi ng fuel additives such as methanol and ethanol are 
being investigated. Some experts bel ieve that these fuels could eventually 
s upp 1y about 20 percent of South Afri ca' s 1 i qu i d fue 1 needs56 . Therefore, 
it appears that, technically speaking, the country is becoming increasingly 
independent of foreign energy supplies. 
Since 1973 OPEC states have maintained an unofficial oil boycott of South 
Africa. Iran, however, initially disregarded this boycott and, until the 
Shah's overthrow in 1979, was supplying as much as 90 percent of South African 
crude imports. The new Iranian administration stopped this trade and South 
Afri ca is now 1 arge 1y conf i ned to the i nternat i ona 1 spot market for oil 
supplies. Thus the OPEC boycott has not halted the flow of oil to South 
Africa, though it has increased the costs of procurement. In a recent article 
Bailey reported comprehensively on the supply of oil to South Africa between 
January 1979 and March 198057 • In this period about 150 tankers off10aded 
oil at either Cape Town or Durban. Bailey attributes the breaking of the oil 
boycott to "unscrupulous companies", though he does state that "it is possible 
that the governments of some of these countries (OPEC) are aware that their 
oil is being shipped to South Africa,,58. 
It would appear, then, that even in the face of a mandatory oil embargo some 
considerable oil supplies may still be shipped to South Africa59 . 
Commentators in favour of a mandatory oil boycott argue that it is a selective 
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economic action which would be directed mainly at the white population of 
South Africa; The counter-argument stresses that whilst this may be true, the 
economic links in the sub-continent are such that the populations of 
neighbouring countries would have to endure hardship. Whilst this conflict of 
interest continues the chances of a mandatory oil boycott remain slim. 
A lthough oil stockpil i ng and the supp ly of essent i a 1 goods to South Afri ca' s 
neighbours, in the event of sanctions on South Africa, were discussed at the 
recent Paris conference, little action has been initiated60 • The logistics 
and costs of policing a mandatory oil boycott present a formidable hurdle to 
sanctionists. 
In the event of such a boycott the rationing function of high prices would be 
probably supplemented by administrative controls. The government would 
attempt to keep pri ce increases withi n "acceptable 1 imits" as i nfl at i onary 
pressures, induced by costs of recovery from wi despread oil stockp il es and 
. administrative costs, built up, and it is likely that a significant 
blackmarket in fuel would develop. Generally it appears unlikely that the 
agri cu ltura 1, manuf acturi ng and mi n i ng sectors wou 1 d be affected severe ly in 
the short term. However, the product i v i ty of the transport sector may be 
affected since it is the most reliant on fuel inputs (see Table 30), and 
consumers in the household sector may bear the brunt of oil sanctions, 
particularly in the short run. In the medium term, stockpiles would diminish 
and a greater premium placed on obtaining oil supplies. Employment and output 
in the motor industry of the Port El i zabeth/Uitenhage/Eas t London comp 1 ex 
WOUld probably decline61 . Measures to reinforce fuel conservation are 
1 i k 1 ey to be adopted. The long term effects of an oi 1 boycott wou 1 d be 
dependent on the flow of demand and especially supply. Some loss in the 
qua 1 i ty of 1 ife of consumers in genera 1 wou 1 d be entai 1 ed, and the transport 
system in particular could be severely pressured. 
are that no severe dislocation would occur in the 
However, the indications 
long run, unless an oil 
boycott was policed effectively, and even this may not be a sufficient 
condition, as loss of 
40 to 50 percent62 • 
imported oil would only curtail supply by an estimated 
This reduction could be apportioned between military, 
agricultural, transport and household use without bringing the country to an 
economic standstill. 
Many advocates of an oi 1 boycott stress that the mil itary sector is the most 
reliant on oil supplies (this is obviously not reflected in Table 30 above). 
However, given the top pol icy priority accoraed to mi 1 itary fuel needs, a 
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genera 1 of shortage of 0 il is un 1 ike ly to affect the South Afri can Defence 
Force directly. The purported attraction of an oil boycott is that it is said 
to represent the least cost option to sanctioners and an effective form of 
press ure on the South Afri can government. Vari ous more-or-l ess soph i st i cated 
calculations have been made in the attempt to estimate how long South Africa 
could "survive" under an oil boycott. Table 31 below gives Bailey's estimate 
of South Africa's requirements in this respect. 
TABLE 31(63) 
SOUTH AFRICA'S OIL IMPORTS; 1979-86 ; TwO SCENARIOS 
(figures in thousand barrels per day) 
19791980198119821983198419851986 
A. "GROwTH" (4,4 ~) SCENARIO; 
TOT AL DE~lAND 320 334 349 364 380 397 414 433 
MINUS EXPORTS TO NEIGHBOURS 24 25 26 28 29 30 31 33 
MINUS 10% REDUCTION IN 
CONSUMPTION 29 31 32 34 35 37 38 40 
MINUS OIL-FROM-COAL PRODUCTION 5 28 50 50 95 95 95 95 
NECESSARY IMPORTS 262 250 241 252 221 235 250 265 
B. "NO GROWTH" (0,0%) SCENARIO 
TOTAL DH1AND 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 320 
mNUS EXPORTS TO NEIGHBOURS 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
MINUS 10% REDUCTION IN 
CONSUMPT ION 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
MINUS OIL-FROM-COAL PRODUCTION 5 28 50 50 95 95 95 95 
NECESSARY IMPORTS 259 236 214 214 169 169 169 169 
Bailey postulates two scenarios; one assumes zero growth and the other an 
average annual growth of 4,4 percent (until 1986), for the South African 
economy. Each growth scenario has its associated (linear) oil requirements. 
Bailey assumes that it would be possible to reduce consumption by 10 percent 
without severe dislocaton and that South Africa would cease supplying oil to 
her neighbours. He then postulates that the country could "survive" for 
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roughly 2,7 years depending on what the energy requirements were, and when the 
embargo was introduced. The broad outline of his conclusions appear in Table 
32 below. 
TABLE 32(64) 
PERIOD OVER WHICH SOUTH AFRICA COULD "SURVIVE" AN OIL EMBARGO 
YEAR EMBARGO INTRODUCED "GROWTH" SCENARIO "NO-GROWTH" SCENARIO 
1981 2,3 YEARS 2,6 YEARS 
1983 2,5 YEARS 3,2 YEARS 
1985 2,2 YEARS 3,2 YEARS 
The accuracy of Bailey's "calculation" depends critically on the size of the 
present oil stockpile and the future flow of oil supplies, both of which are 
presently a matter of conjecture. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
From the present and the previous chapter it emerges that the fields of 
mineral and agricultural exports, gold sales, as well as the imports of 
agricultural and capital inputs in general, and that of petroleum products in 
particular, represent the target areas which are most vulnerable to economic 
sanctions on South Africa. In theory, at least, the comparatively small 
number of partners wi th whom South Africa conducts the bulk of her foreign 
trade may appear to make the application of sanctions feasible. However, the 
countries and/or organisations that advocate sanctions are as a rule quite 
distinct from the trading partners practically equipped to apply sanctions. 
In a sense, a successful sanctions program would involve one group (South 
Afri ca' s trad i ng partners) doi ng the work of another group (the sanct i oners) 
at their own expense. Realistically speaking, it simply seems too much to 
expect the former "to do the dirty work" of the latter, and themselves suffer 
a loss in the process. Another functional shortcoming of sanctions advocated 
so far, is that they mostly represent short term measures, usually aimed at 
certain balance of payments items, whilst their ultimate aim is professed to 
be a structural or long term one. As the effects of short term measures can 
often be neutralised or countered by a process substitution, the whole 
methoaology underlying the sanctioning process seems questionable. This point 
is taken up in the following chapter on the subject of foreign investment in 
South Africa. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND SANCTIONS 
"South Africa could never have become what it is today without foreign 
investment. At every stage in its history foreign investment has played the 
central role in its economic development"l. This is a view expressed by a 
pro-sanctions writer, which is also widely echoed by economic commentators of 
all shades of opinion. D Hobart Houghton in his book The South African 
Economy wrote "Prior to 1865 South Africa was a poor country with 1 ittle to 
attract capital from abroad. The diamond discoveries of 1865 and the gold 
discoveries of 1886 altered the situation profoundly, for they provided the 
attrection to put South Africa suddenly in the forefront of the world's 
investment market,,2. The subsequent inflow of foreign capital transformed 
the country into a modern exchange economy, providing the basis for economic 
growth. Associated with this inflow has been an influx of skilled labour and 
technical knowledge without which the economy could not have developed. 
Foreign investment though initially associated with the mining sector has 
taken on a far more diversified look, and an Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut 
report is quoted as stating that as much as 80 percent of industrial 
production is controlled, directly or indirectly, by foreign caPita1 3. 
Foreign investment deserves a special place in this analysis because it is a 
highly visible and important form of overseas economic involvement in South 
Africa. The term "foreign investment" is often used in the literature on 
sanctions in a global sense, and also treated as an amorphous contept, which 
can be difficult to break down into individual parts that are functionally 
valia. Some such disaggretation is, however, necessary and will be attempted 
below. The most comprehensive analysis of the pattern of foreign investment 
in South Africa, in the context of economic sanctions, has to date been Simon 
Clarke's paper "Financial Aspects of Economic Sanctions on South Africa,,4. 
For the sake of convenience this chapter follows his classification of foreign 
investment into direct investment, portfolio investment, and direct lending. 
This is done to enable some analysis of direct lending, which would not be 
possible if the traditional classification into direct investment and 
non-direct investment was adopted 5. After examining the sources and uses of 
foreign 
namely: 
capi ta 1, some further aspects 
the qualitative impact of 
of the matter are also discussed, 
fore i gn i nves tment; the policy 
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implications for potential sanctioners; and the surmised effects of foreign 
investment sanctions on the South Africa economy. 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 
For the purposes of thi s study, even though we are us i ng Cl arke' s 
classification of foreign investment, direct investment can be defined 
according to the South African Reserve Bank aefinition because, as Clarke 
"direct lending from parent companies to their overseas himself notes, 
affiliates is included within direct investment"6. For obvious practical 
reasons it is not possible to distinguish between types of intra-company 
financing, one of which will be direct lending. Thus direct investment is 
defined as "the total investment of foreigners who had a controlling interest 
in organisations in South Africa and. the investment, in these organisations, 
of their affiliates or allied organisations or persons in foreign 
countries"? Furthermore, the Reserve Bank generally deems a "controll ing 
interest" to exist where an individual or group of individuals have 20 percent 
or more of the voting rights in a company8. 
Although most countries adopt the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
classification of foreign investment into direct and non-direct investment, 
international comparison of data is complicated by differing national 
definitions of 
Additionally, the 
thus it must be 
what, for 
compilation of 
expected that 
example, constitutes direct investment. 
data also varies from country to country, and 
disparities will exist between each nation's 
published figures. Such issues are not of purely technical significance, as 
such definitions are relevant to any programme of restriction on 
investment. Moreover, the fact that subsidiary companies are 
incorporated in South Afri ca, and therefore 1 ega lly independent of 
fore i gn 
legally 
foreign 
control, could militate against the monitoring of sanctions where conflicts of 
interest arise, since South African companies are subject to legislation 
preventing the disclosure of "sensitive information". 
The position and significance of direct foreign investment in South Africa is 
summarised by Clarke: "The major trans-national mining, manufacturing, oil, 
commercial and financial corporations with a significant stake in South Africa 
hold their assets in the form of direct investment. For various reasons of 
company law, taxation and of dividend and exchange control it is consiaerably 
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more advantageous to establish a subsidiary in South Africa, rather than to 
establish a branch. Thus over 95 percent of British direct investment in 
South Afri ca is channelled through subsidi ary and associ ate companies rather 
than branches, and the figures for other countries are not significantly lower 
'" Until recently well over half the foreign investments in South Africa 
were in the form of direct investments made by foreign companies in their 
South African branches and their associates. Almost three-quarters of British 
investment was in the form of direct investment in 1972, and until recently 
Britain was by far the largest investor in South Africa, British investors 
having as large a stake in 1972 as all other countries put together. Then 
British companies accounted for almost two-thirds of the direct investments in 
South Africa whilst South African investments made up almost 10 percent of all 
British direct investment overseas·9• 
The foreign liabilities (ie, foreign investment) of South Africa by creditor 
. for the period 1956-1976 are shown in Table 33. Britain's share of total 
foreign investment has declined significantly since 1979 mainly because the 
non-di rect investment of the Un ited States, Germany, Swi tzer 1 and and France 
has increased considerably. As far as direct investment in South Africa is 
concerned, the average annual percentage increase between 1972 and 1977, as 
shown in Table 34 indicates that Germany's stake increasea most rapia1y, 
although the US and Britain were not far behind. 
Thus despite short term fluctuations in both 91oba1 and South African economic 
performance foreign direct investment has continued to grow at a rapid rate in 
current prices, evidently sufficient to maintain its real value over time. 
The increase in South Africa's total foreign liabilities under the heading of 
direct investment is shown in Table 35 for 1973-1979. 
When studying these figures certain pertinent factors must be borne in mind. 
Firstly, the majority of direct investment is financed out of unremitted 
profits and to this extent new injections of capital are reduced. Therefore 
direct investment is likely to increase even in the absence of new capital 
flow. Secondly, despite the relative slump in business confidence in the 
mid-1970s, direct foreign investment continued to increase. Thirdly, the 
figures do not reveal the extent to which international companies have 
financed local expansion from local sources, ego borrowin9 from the local 
banks, and may therefore understate the growth of foreign direct investment. 
YEAR 
1956 Rm 
% 
1950 Rm 
% 
1965 Rm 
% 
1970 Rm 
% 
1971 Rm 
% 
1972 Rm 
% 
1973 Rm 
% 
1974 Rm 
% 
1975 Rm 
% 
1976 Rm 
% 
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TABLE 33(10) 
SOUlH AFRICA'SA FOREIGN LIABILITIES BY CREDITORS, 1956 TO 1976 
(R million and percentage values) 
UNITED USA FRANCE SWITZER- GER~iANY INTER- OTHERS TOTAL 
KINGDO~I 
1 731 342 147 
62 12 5 
1 815 347 168 
60 11 6 
2 100 454 200 
62 13 6 
3 202 812 442 
55 14 8 
3 696 033 454 
53 15 6 
4 126 1 348 467 
53 17 6 
4 545 687 507 
44 16 6 
5 062 2 429 551 
40 19 4 
6 490 3 121 691 
39 19 4 
7 470 4 200 795 
37 21 4 
LAND NATIONAL 
88 
3 
97 
3 
150 
4 
337 
6 
402 
6 
480 
6 
572 
6 
683 1 
5 
939 
6 
080 
5 
339 
6 
382 
5 
433 
6 
500 
5 
088 
8 
631 
10 
877 
9 
ORGANI-
SATIONS 
134 
5 
203 
7 
125 
4 
123 
2 
215 
3 
235 
3 
208 
2 
205 
1 
230 
1 
797 
4 
348 2 790 
13 100 
394 3024 
13 100 
369 3 398 
11 100 
563 5 818 
9 100 
851 7 033 
12 100 
697 7 786 
9 100 
2 361 10 380 
22 100 
2 761 12 757 
23 100 
3 348 16 450 
21 100 
3 710 19 929 
20 100 
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TABLE 34(11) 
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN STuCK OF DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 
1972 - 1977, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES & FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
YEAR TOTAL WORLD SOUTH AFRICA DEVELOPED MARKET DEVELOPING 
ECONOMIES COUNTRI ES 
UNITED KINGDOM * 
1972 9,0 7,5 11,2 3,1 
1973 19,5 15,0 23,2 8,4 
1974 16,5 21,4 18,6 9,3 
1975 10,8 15,3 10,0 13,8 
1976 18,8 17,4 18,9 18,4 
1977 na na na na 
AVERAGE 14,9 15,3 16,4 10,6 
UNITED STATES 
1972 8,6 6,4 8,9 7,5 
1973 12,7 13,6 16,4 2,8 
1974 8,7 25,4 14,8 13,4 
1975 12,7 8,3 9,4 32,4 
1976 10,0 5,2 10,7 9,9 
1977 9,1 7,4 7,6 16,7 
AVERAGE 10,3 11,1 11,3 9,3 
FEOERAL REPUBLIC OF GER~IANY 
1972 11,8 11,9 11,6 12,8 
1973 21,2 13,8 22,7 15,9 
1974 14,0 36,1 14,7 11 ,7 
1975 14,2 28,4 13,9 15,5 
1976 12,0 7,1 10,0 16,2 
1977 10,8 8,9 10,1 13,4 
AVERAGE 14,0 17,7 14,0 14,2 
NOTE: * 1he Un ited Kingdom figures exclude investments in oil, bank i ng and insurance. The UK figures for 1975 and 1976 are estimates based on 
net capital flows. 
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TABLE 35(12} 
F0REIGN DIRECT LIABILITIES OF SOUTH AFRICA 1973-1979 
R million 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
CENTRAL GOVERN~H4T 
AND BANKING SECTOR 
Long term 133 161 182 207 236 272 314 
Short term 29 58 45 46 35 27 62 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
Long term 4 727 5 310 5 740 6 369 6 759 7 307 8 036 
Short term 724 1 174 1 476 1 559 1 671 2077 1 795 
TOTAL DIRECT 
INVESTMENT 5 613 6 703 7 443 8 181 8 701 9 683 10 207 
The geographic origin and sectoral distribution of foreign investment is given 
in Table 36. These data are from the Second Census of Foreign Transactions, 
Li ab il it i es and Assets, as pub 1 i shed by the South Afri can Reserve Bank in 
1973, and are divided into direct and non-direct investment in the private 
sector. Although thi~ classification differs from that of Clarke it is useful 
to compare the sectoral contributions of direct and non-direct foreign 
investment, (non-direct foreign investment comprising, in terms of Clarke's 
classification, portfolio investment and direct lending). At the end of 1973 
forei gn investment was most heavily concentrated in the four major sectors 
shown in Table 36, which collectively constituted 90,5 percent of total 
foreign investment. Direct investment was most significant in the Wholesale 
and Retai 1 Trade, Catering and Accommodation sector, followed closely by the 
Manufacturing sector and the Finance, Insurance ana Real Estate sector. 
Direct investment was less significant in the Mining and Quarrying sector. 
The EEC provided over 60 percent of total foreign investment, with the rest of 
Europe and the Americas accounting for the vast majority of the remainder. We 
can therefore conclude that there is a relative absence of foreign investment 
from the agricultural, construction, transport and service sectors and a 
relative concentration in the mining, manufacturing, trade and financial 
sectors. (Foreign direct investment is under-represented in the mining sector 
because of the emphasis on portfolio investment.) Additionally, almost all of 
the foreign investment in the private sector in South Africa originates in the 
industrialised nations. 
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TABLE 36(13) 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN SOUTH AFRICA BY 
GEOGRAPHIC ORIGIN AND MAJOR SECTOR, END-1973 
R million and percent 
DIRECT NON-DIRECT TOTAL DIRECT 
R m % R m % R m % INVESTMENT, % OF TOTAL 
MINING & QuARRYING 
TOTAL 420 100 928 100 1 348 100 31 
EEC 256 61 570 61 826 61 
REST OF EUROPE 6 1 191 21 197 15 
N & S AMERICA 157 37 112 12 269 20 
MANUFACTuRING 
TOTAL 2 458 100 177 100 3 635 100 68 
EEC 1 590 65 745 63 2 335 64 
REST OF EUROPE 213 9 117 10 330 9 
N & S A~lERI CA 608 25 154 13 762 21 
WHOLESALE & RETAIL 
TRADE, CATERING & 
ACCOMMODA T ION 
TOTAL 798 100 235 100 033 100 77 
EEC 477 60 136 58 613 59 
REST OF EUROPE 68 9 18 8 86 8 
N & S AMERICA 234 29 33 14 267 26 
FINANCE, INSURANCE 
& REAL ESTATE 
TOTAL 489 100 789 100 2 278 100 65 
EEC 173 79 510 65 1 683 74 
REST OF EUROPE 51 3 79 10 130 6 
N & S A~IERICA 154 10 90 11 244 11 
OTHER SECTORS 
TOTAL 286 100 583 100 869 100 33 
EEC 189 66 387 66 576 66 
REST OF EUROPE 19 7 115 20 134 15 
N & S AMeRICA 52 18 27 5 79 9 
TOT A L 5 451 3 712 9 163 
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TABLE 37(14) 
VALUES OF DIRECT OUTWARD INVESTMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA BY INDUSTRY 
OF SOUTH AFRICAN AFFILIATE. BOOK VALUE OF NET ASSETS ATTRIBUTABLE 
TO THE UK IN SOUTH AFRICA AT END-1971 AND END-1974, AND PERCENT INCREASE 
1 9 7 1 1 9 7 4 1971-74 
£ m % £ m % INCREASE 
PERCENT 
FOOD, DRINK & TOBACCO 68,3 10,5 109,0 10,9 59,6 
CHEMICALS & ALLIED INDUSTRIES 58,6 9,0 105,1 10,5 79,4 
MET AL ~IANUFACTURE 50,8 7,8 (70,3) 7, 1 38,4 
MECHANICAL/INSTRUMENT ENGINEERING 47,7 7,3 114,1 11 ,4 139,2 
ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 74,8 11 ,5 101,3 10,2 35,4 
SHIP BUILDING 0,0 
MOTOR VEHICLE MANUFACTURE 15,5 2,4 34,0 3,4 119,4 
TEXTILES, LEATHER, CLOTHING & 
FOOTWEAR 34,1 5,2 44,4 4,5 30,2 
PAPER, PRINTING & PU8LISHING 19,0 2,9 55,4 5,6 93,1 
RUBBER 19,0 2,9 55,4 5,6 93,1 
OTHER MANUFACTURING 57,4 8,8 110,8 11 ,1 93,0 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 426,2 65,4 712,2 71,4 67,1 
AGRICULTURE, FORESTRY & FISHING 426,2 65,4 
MINING & QUARRYING 75,4 11 ,6 90,8 9,1 20,4 
CONSTRUCTION 12,9 2,0 16,3 1,6 26,4 
TRANSPORT & COMfI,UNICATIONS 
(EXCLUDING SHIPPING) 4,5 0,8 (7,3) 0,7 62,2 
SHIPPING 4,5 0,8 (7,3) 0,7 62,2 
DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES 75,4 11 ,6 99,2 10,0 31,6 
OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 15,7 2,4 24,2 2,4 54,1 
PROPERTY OWNING & fI,ANAGING 15,7 2,4 24,2 2,4 54,1 
OTHER ACTIVITIES 16,0 2,5 29,5 3,0 84,4 
TOTAL 651,7 100,0 997,2 100,0 53,0 
NOTE: The bracketed figures are estimates based on net investment figures for 
1972-74. These figures so not include oil and financial companies. 
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TABLE 38(15) 
USA DIRECT INVESTMENT POSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA BY INDUSTRY UF 
SOUTH AFRICAN AFFILIATE, END-1973 AND END-1977 
197 3 197 7 1973-77 
$ m % $ m % INCREASE 
PERCENT 
ALL INDUSTRIES 167 100,0 791 100,0 53,5 
MINING & SMELTING ) 137 13,3 45,9 500,0 
PETROLEU~I ) (1972)* (1972)* (1972-77 )* 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 501 42,9 710 39,6 41,7 
FOOD PRODlJCTS 69 5,9 115 6,4 66,7 
CHEMICAL & ALLIED PRODUCTS 85 7,3 102 5,7 20,0 
PRIMARY & FABRICATED METALS 35 3,0 53 3,0 51,4 
MACHINERY 91 7,8 186 10,3 104,4 
TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT * 85 (5,1 ) 
(1976)* 
OTHER MANUFACTURING * 210 (12,6) 
(1976)* 
TRANSPORT, COMMUNICATIONS AND 
PUBLIC UTILITIES 0,1 2 0,1 100,0 
TRADE 113, 9,7 199 11 ,1 76,1 
FINANCE & INSURANCE 37 3,6 -11 -0,6 
(1974)* (1974)* 
OTHER 45 3,9 70 3,9 55,6 
NOTE: * The individual figures for mlnlng and petroleum have been 
suppressed and are presented as a single figure. The 
symbol * indicates where relevant figures for that year are 
not available, and where the closest available annual 
figures have been substituted. 
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Direct investment figures have also been published on a more detailed sectoral 
level by Clarke, with respect to British and American investments in South 
Africa. As is often the case with statistics reproduced in the sanctions 
debate, these figures (Tables 37 and 38 above) would seem of doubtful accuracy 
indeed : for example, in Table 37 the totals do not agree with the sum of 
individual parts, while in Table 38 there are several unexplained omissions. 
Given such obvious and telling shortcomings it may be inferred from these two 
tables, such as they are, that British direct foreign investment is 
concentrated in the manufacturi ng sector, and Ameri can di rect forei gn 
investment is concentrated in the petroleum, manufacturing and ITIlnlng 
sectors. These two tables are therefore in general agreement with the 
official Reserve Bank statistics, in respect of the sectoral distributive 
pattern of foreign direct investment. 
In summary, then, it woul d appear that the total of fore i gn direct investment 
has increased in recent years at current prices, probably enough to maintain 
its real value. Direct investment is concentrated in the manufacturing, 
petroleum, mining and financial sectors, with the country of origin having a 
bearing on the sectoral destination of the direct investment: for example, 
Britain has relatively little interest in motor vehicle manufacture, whilst 
America has 1 ittle interest in the finance and insurance sector. The most 
important countries by foreign investment in general, in South Africa, appear 
to be the United Kingdom and the United States, though Germany is rapidly 
increasing its commitment, followed by the rest of the EEC, and then the rest 
of Europe. This pattern is not very dissimilar from the trade pattern that 
emerged from the previous chapter. 
PORTFOLIO I~VESTMENT 
Portfolio investment is defined by Clarke as "the purchase of stocks and shares 
either of a public company or of a government or local authority, without the 
resultant holdings being sufficient to give a controlling interest,,16, and 
it therefore excludes foreign holdings of South African (Euro) bonds. 
Portfolio investment can be divided into stock and share holding . The former 
involves a commitment to make regular interest payments and to repay the loan, 
whereas shares involve no such commitment on the part of the issuing company, 
but they may give some control over the administration of the company. Shares 
in So uth African companies cannot be issued abroad, although they can be 
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quoted and transacted abroad, but stocks (or bonds) can be issued abroad to 
raise foreign exchange. This latter type of transaction has been facilitated 
and expanded largely by the development of the 'Eurodollar' or 'Eurocurrency' 
markets, of which the 'Eurobond' market is an offshoot. The floating of 
foreign bonds is very different to the traditional type of portfolio 
investment and may be conveni ent ly ana lysed under the head i ng of 'di rect 
lendi ng' • 
In the past, portfolio investment played a significant role in financing South 
Africa's economic development, but in recent years the popularity of other 
forms of foreign investment and the increasing regulation of exchange control, 
by both the capital-exporting countries and South Africa (for example, South 
Afri can contro 1 s on the repatri at i on of the proceeds of 1 i qu i dat i on of an 
investment, and the dual exchange rate system) has seen a relative decline in 
the popularity of portfolio investment, though the dual exchange rate system 
is designed to foster all types of foreign investment. This trend away from 
portfolio holdings can be seen in Table 39, which Details the foreign 
liabilities of South Africa under the heading of non-direct investment for the 
period 1975-79. (Figures for 1980 were not available at the time of going to 
press). These figures include not only portfolio investment, but also bonds 
floated abroad and direct long and short term lending. However, the figures 
relevant to private sector portfolio investment, as defined above, are to be 
found under the headings 'ordinary and other shares, nominal value', which 
indicates the volume of shareholding, 'share premium, reserves and 
undistributed profit', which records the increase in value of those shares, 
and 'debentures, loan stock and similar securities', which indicates the 
amount of foreign stock holdings. The increases in the liabilities of the 
public sector are primarily due to bond finance and will therefore be analysed 
in the next section. 
Between 1975 and 1979 the nominal value of shares held by foreigners increased 
from R291 million to R303 million but was still less than the 1973 figure of 
R320 million. 18 • This means that the volume of foreign shareholding in 
South Africa declined between 1973 and 1979, although the value of share 
premium reserves and undistributed profit increased. This Decline in foreign 
shareholding is reflected on. the balance of payments under the heading 'stock 
exchange transactions' which records a net outflow in every year, bar 1978, 
since 197219 , Between 1975 and 1979 foreign holding of South African 
private sector stock decreased from R1l4 million to R80 milli on. Overall, it 
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TABLE 39(17) 
FOREIG~ LIABILITIES OF SOUTH AFRICA, NON-DIRECT INVESTMENT, 1975-1979 
R million at current prices 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
CE~TRAL GOVER~MENT & BANKING SECTOR 2 718 3 834 4 339 3 797 3 295 
PUBLIC CORP'NS & LOCAL AUTHORITIES 2 442 3 233 3 054 3 611 3 827 
PRIVATE SEClOR: LONG TERM : 
Ordinary & other shares, 
nominal value 291 288 276 296 303 
Share premium reserves & 
undistributed profit 566 1 966 2 173 2 388 2 595 
Debentures, loan stock & 
similar securities 114 105 100 90 80 
Mortgages & long term loans 953 140 1 530 845 432 
Other 112 133 119 124 122 
PRIVATE SECTOR: SHORT-TERM: 824 950 1 040 1 052 1 019 
TOT A L 9 020 11 649 12 631 13 203 12 673 
is apparent that portfolio investment is aec1ining in volume terms, although 
capital appreciation ensures that it increases in value terms, which accounts 
for the increase in the item 'share premium, reserves and undistributed 
profit' . 
An examination of the distribution of portfolio investment, by area of orlgln, 
reveals that at the end of 1979 both stocks and shares were held almost 
exclusively by the EEC, the rest of Europe and the Americas. The South 
African sectoral distribution of portfolio investment, as published in the 
Second Census of Foreign Transactions, (which includes local authorities and 
public corporations as part of the private sector) shows that it is only in 
the 'mining and quarrying', and 'finance, insurance and real estate' sectors 
that portfolio investment has any significance. This is reflected in Table 40 
where the sum of portfolio investment, as a proportion of total foreisn 
investment for 1973, was 64 percent for 'mining and quarrying' and 23 percent 
for 'finance, insurance and real estate'. The 'manufacturing' sector was the 
next most significant with only 9 percent. 
TABLE 40(20) 
FOREIGN L1ABILllIES UF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRIVATE SECTOR BY KINO OF ECONOfllC AClIVITY, 
NON-DIRECT INVESTMENT, AND TOTAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT, END-1973 
R million 
AGRICULTURE, MINING & MANUFACTURE ELECTRICITY, CONSTRUCTION TRADE, TRANSPORT, FINANCE, COMMUNITY, OTHER TOTAL 
FORESTRY, QUARRYING GAS & WATER CATERING & STORAGE & INSURANCE & SOCIAL & 
& FISHING ACCOMNODATION COMMUNICATION REAL ESTATE PERSONAL 
SERVICES 
LONG- TERf; 5 909 973 303 2 BO 62 718 27 46 3 125 
SHARES, NOMINAL VALUE 2 145 75 1 14 1 82 320 
SHARE PREMIUMS, RESERVES, 
UNDISTRIBUTED PROFIT 3 702 123 47 4 418 298 
DEBENTURES, LOAN-STOCK, 0 ETC 19 132 172 30 45 398 
MORTGAGES & LONG-TERM 
LOANS 43 643 131 19 38 83 27 985 
OTHER 19 105 124 
SHORT - TERfl- 19 204 29 4 155 13 71 2 90 587 
TOTAL NON-DIRECT INVESTMENT 5 928 177 332 6 235 75 789 29 136 3 712 
TUTAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT 47 1 348 3 635 333 67 033 184 2 278 34 204 9 173 
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The position with regard to portfolio investment is summarised by Clarke who 
writes: "historically portfolio investment has had an important role to play 
in financing South Africa's economic development but today this importance is 
considerably reduced. Portfolio investment is not a source of new investment 
finance and overall, in volume terms, a net disinvestment is taking place, ... 
Only in the mining sector does a large proportion of foreign investment still 
take the portfolio form, but this is also an historical legacy rather than a 
reflection of present tendencies in investment finance. Finally, the newly 
introduced dual exchange rate system is likely to lead to an acceleration in 
the decline of portfolio holdings as they are liquidated and the funds used 
for direct investment,,21 
DIRECT LENDING 
According to Clarke "direct lending is like portfolio investment in that it 
gives the lender no control over the activities of the borrower, but unlike 
portfolio investment it does not involve the lending of money against the 
issue of stocks and shares, but involves the direct loan of funds, usually 
from a financial institution"22. Direct lending from parent companies to 
their overseas affiliates and subsidiaries is included within direct 
investment. Direct lending usually has a shorter maturity structure than 
portfolio investment, and is usually associated with specific short term 
objectives. 
Direct lending takes many forms and serves many purposes. The most common is 
trade credit which is embodied in the present structure of most international 
transactions. A large and inceasing proportion of trade involves credit which 
is guaranteed by government bodies such as the British Export Credit Guarantee 
Department and the United States Export-Import Bank. Considerable though this 
type of credit is, it turns over quickly and is proportional to the volume of 
trade. This credit is handled almost exclusively by financial institutions . 
Short term borrowing is undertaken by the government, public corporations and 
private enterprise when they need money for a limited period. Large 
institutions can avail themselves of foreign money markets and often dO so if 
the terms of foreign loans are more favourable. South African financial 
authorities, as is the case in other countries, often have to reconcile the 
control of monetary poli cy with borrowing requi rements, and may turn to 
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foreign money markets to relieve pressure on domestic capital markets. A 
special case of short term borrowing involving the monetary authorities, is 
the securi ng of balance of payments fi nance. Such accommodat i on has in the 
past been provided mainly by foreign central banks and international 
organisations, but in recent years the major international banks have also 
entered this field. 
Long term loans are usually undertaken by bond or share issues, and where the 
local capital market is tight or relatively underdeveloped, large investment 
projects can be financed by borrowing from abroad. The last decade has seen a 
vast increase in direct foreign lending to South Africa. This is mainly due 
to the borrowing of public corporations and · the government. In 1972 
non-direct foreign investment (portfolio investment plus direct lending) 
accounted for 46 percent of tot a 1 fore i gn investment; in 1979 th is fi gure 
stood at 55 percent after peak i n9 in 1977 at 59 percent23 . Si nce portfo 1 i 0 
investment is not a source of new investment the increase in non -direct 
foreign liabilities must be due to the growth of direct lending. This 
i nformat ion is conveyed in Table 39 above under the headi ngs ' Central 
Government and Banki ng Sector', 'Pub 1 i c Corporations and Local Authorit i es ' 
and 'Mortgages and Long-term loans'. 
The increase in direct lending is i n part due to the expansion of the public 
corporat ions, wh i ch since the 1 ate 1960s has underp inned the growth of the 
South African economy, which has a high propensity to import; hence economic 
growth represents a constant potential strain on the balance of payments. The 
public corporations, eg., ARMSCOR and SASOL, are extremely capital-intensive 
enterprises with enormous investment demands, which cannot be met readi ly by 
the domestic capital market. According to Clarke, "Between 1971 and 1978 the 
fixed capital stock of private business enterprises increased by only 33,4 
percent in rea 1 terms wh il e that of the pub 1 i c corporat ions rose by 148,6 
percent,,24. ~hile this demand for investment funds has increasea 
significantly the South African savings/income ratio has remained more or less 
static or even declinea. The resulting pressure on aomestic capital resources 
has meant that public corporations have had to borrow from foreign capital 
markets 25 . 
Despite the difficulties, (for both political and economic reasons) 
encountered by South African borrowers in securing foreign finance, 
consid erable funds have been obt ained, a lbeit at a premium. labl e 41 gives a 
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summary of the most complete data available on bank lending (including public 
and private bond issues) to South Africa, where the bulk of lending is to 
public corporations. Although the major investment projects undertaken by the 
public corporations, for which they borrowed abroad during the 1970s, are now 
well past their peak, the maturity structure of the loans and the need to 
finance further projects is unlikely to diminish the demand for foreign direct 
lending significantly. 
TABLE 41 (26) 
IDENTIFIED BANK LOANS TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1972-1978 
(US $ millions equivalent) 
BORROWER 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS: 
DEPT OF POSTS & TELEGRAPHS 13,0 16,6 
ESCOM 123,6 68,2 130,7 226,9 409,6 9,5 103,6 
INDUSTRIAL DEV'T CORP'N 67,0 12,1 
ISCOR 47,1 396,5 249,0 385,8 99,8 51,4 69,1 
SA AIRWAYS 29,9 
SA BROADCASTING CORP'N 25,0 20,0 38,2 
SAR & H 106,0 54,8 132,4 448,8 64,1 90,2 
SASOL II 25,5 
SOF 29,4 20,0 
CORP'N FOR ECONOMIC DEV'T 12,2 
TOTAL, PUBLIC CORPORATIONS 208,7 587,3 454,5 842,0 025,2 125,0 333,3 
CENTRAL & LOCAL GOVERNMENT 212,6 37,0 245,0 306,5 149,5 311 ,5 
PRIVATE SECTOR 121,7 131,0 104,5 166,9 23,0 80,2 
TOT A L 543,0 624,3 830,5 946,5 498,6 297,5 725,0 
NOTE: These fi gures include public and private bond issues under the heading 
"Bank Loans". 
The South African government has borrowed abroad for reasons similar to the 
public corporations, namely to alleviate pressure on domestic capital markets 
and the balance of payments, and to increase its expenditure, particularly on 
defence and other strategic items such as stockpi 1 ing oil. The governemnt 
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has, at times, been faced with the conflict of increasing its expenaiture, 
whilst maintaining tight monetary control over the economy. These objectives 
may be at least temporari ly reconci led by financing budget deficits from 
overseas. To a large extent, this particular borrowing requirement is 
dependent on the structure of the South African economy, and in particular the 
interaction of imports, exports and growth. As stated in the Reynders 
Report: "The South African position in this respect is such that the country 
will continue to require rising absolute levels of imports, particularly of 
intermediate and capital goods to sustain grwoth. The tendency for exports to 
increase too slowly in value to permit of an increase in the rate of growth 
necessary to ·provide for an increasing population, employment and rising 
living standards, is a particular problem in the present stage of South 
Afri ca' s economi c deve 1 opment"27 • Thus in peri ods of hi gh economi c growth 
imports increase more rapidly than exports and unless the resulting payments 
gap is covered by an inflow of foreign capital, the balance of payments moves 
into deficit (see Table 42). The government can temporarily cover this 
balance of payments deficit and finance its budget aeficit by borrowing 
abroad, but, ignoring the special role of gold in South Africa's foreign 
accounts, in the longer term there remai ns a prob 1 emati c trade-off between 
economic growth and the level of the country's foreign reserves. 
Borrowing abroad by the South Afri can government for balance of payments 
purposes is refl ected in Tab 1 e 42 where, as is apparent duri ng the recess i on 
years of 1975 and 1976, following the prior vigorous economic upswing, large 
sums were borrowed; the extent of which is indicated under the headings 
'liabilities related to reserves', (which represents mainly private and 
central bank lending to the South African Treasury) and SDR allocations and 
valuation adjustments (which are essentially transactions with the I~IF). As 
can also be seen from Table 42 South Africa has relied heavily on the IMF 
since 1976, although the sUbstantial increase in the price of gold, and the 
revaluation of gold reserves enabled her to repay her debt commitments by the 
beginning of the 1980s. The item 'short term capital movements not related to 
reserves' may include an element of government borrowing too, as, for example: 
"Nedbank, a locally-ownea South African banking group, raised a $200 million 
credit for the South African Treasury ... a sizeable chunk of the money came 
from American commercial banks"28 . However, this item, like the 'central 
government and banking sector' item, reflects transactions in respect of 
purposes other than altering the level of reserves. The net annual flow of 
foreign expenditure of the public corporations is reflected under the item 
'public corporations and local authorities'. 
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TABLE 42(29) 
BALANCE OF PAYNENTS: SELECTED ITEMS, 1974-1981 
R tilILLION 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1~78 1979 1980 1981 
BASIC BALANCE -237 -67 -682 708 1 335 1 946 2 222 -3 590 
SHORT-TERM CAPITAL MOVEMENTS 
NOT RELATED TO RESERVES 17 -298 -488 -848 -810 -1 529 -1 691 755 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT & 
BANKING SECTOR -113 -110 49 16 13 -22 -15 -54 
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS & 
LOCAL AUTHORITIES 31 173 6 103 202 297 11 -208 
PRIVATE SECTOR 99 -361 -543 -967 -1 025 -1 804 -1 687 1 017 
CHANGE IN NET GOLD & OTHER 
RESERVES OWING TO BALANCE 
OF PAYMENTS TRANSACTIONS -220 -365 -1 170 140 525 417 531 -2 835 
LIABILITIES RELATED TO 
RESERVES 123 478 648 -209 -489 -401 1 1 830 
SDR ALLOCATIONS & VALUA-
TION AuJUSTMENTS 29 85 303 250 406 2 036 979 -543 
CHANGES IN RESERVES 
-68 198 -219 -99 442 2 052 511 -1 546 
Analysis of the sources of bank lending, by national origin, may be extremely 
misleading because the funds emanate from international banks, which have 
access to funds from the international monetary system outside of national 
boundaries and jurisdiction. Thus the immediate source of a loan does not 
imply that the original or ultimate source is the same. For example, a bank 
operat i ng from the USA may 1 end reserves of Eurocurrency, thus art ifi ci ally 
inflating the USA direct lending figure . Thus, to a large degree, any attempt 
at speCifying the national origin of funds is merely an indication of the 
strength of certain banks· and/or currencies. Table 43 ranks lending countries 
according to the extent of their banks' involvement in lending to South 
Africa. The original source of the data is identified by Clarke (the 
secondary source), as a report compiled by the United Nations Centre Against 
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TABLE 43(30) 
LOANS TO SOUTH AFRICA, 1972-1978: BANKS GROUPED BY NATIONALITY 
US$ mill ions 
NATIONALITY U N REPORT CDE HANDBOOK TuTAL 
OF NO. OF NO. OF At<'iOUNT NO. OF AMOUNT NO. OF A~IOUNT 
PARENT BA~K BMKS LOANS OF LOANS LOANS OF LOANS LOANS OF LOANS 
wEST GERMA~Y 59 72 2 427,3 72 2 427,3 
UNITED STATES 69 42 1 946,4 10 445,0 52 2 391,4 
UNITED KII'.GDOM 42 54 2 388,3 54 2 388,3 
FRANCE 31 50 848,0 50 1 848,0 
SWITZERLAND 22 36 1 277,3 36 277 ,3 
BELGIUM 14 32 1 072,4 32 072,4 
I NTERNA TIONAL 22 29 072,0 29 072,0 
NETHERLANDS 7 24 769,8 24 769,8 
ITALY 33 24 747,1 24 747,1 
CANADA 13 16 644,6 16 644,6 
JAPAN 16 14 503,4 14 503,4 
SOUTH AFRICA 5 12 485,0 12 485,0 
NATIONALITY NOT 
AVAILABLE 13 13 474,8 13 474,8 
AUSTRIA 4 14 456,8 14 456,8 
LUXEMBOURG 4 11 368,2 11 368,2 
DENMARK 5 10 353,4 10 353,4 
NORWAY 7 7 261,4 7 261,4 
SWEDEN 3 7 236,3 7 236,3 
FINLAND 6 220,9 6 220,9 
SPAIN 6 5 188,7 5 188,7 
ISRAEL 3 3 150,0 3 150,0 
AUSTRALIA 1 1 50,0 50,0 
BAH~IAS 50,0 50,0 
BERMUDA 1 25,0 25,0 
NOTE: The dollar figures represent the total value of loans in which banks of 
each country participated, Because many banks of differing nationalies 
take part in an international loan, it is inaccurate to claim, for 
example, that Swiss banks made $ 1,3 billion of loans to South Africa. 
It can only be siad that----s"Wlss banks were involved (to an unknown 
degree) in $ 1,3 billion of loans. 
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TABLE 44(31) 
BANK LOANS TO SUUTH AFRICA, 1972-1978. TOP T~ENTY LENDERS 
US $ million 
The following is a ranking of the top twenty parent banks identified in 
bank loans to South Africa, 1972-1978, according to the total dollar 
amount of all loans in which the parent and its subsidiaries 
participated. The nationality of each parent is indicated in 
parentheses. 
PARENT BANK 
1. CITICORP (US) 
2. MANUFACTURERS HANOVER COPR (US) 
3. CREDIT COMMERCIAL DE FRANCE SA (F) 
4. DEUTSCHE BANK AG (FRG) 
5. DRESDNER BANK AG (FRG) 
6. HILL SAMUEL & CO LTD (UK) 
7. UNION BANK OF SWITZERLAND (CH) 
8. COMMERZBANK AG (FRG) 
9. KREDIETBANK NV (B) 
10. WESTDEUTSCHE LANDESBANK GIRO (FRG) 
11. CREDIT LYONNAIS SA (F) 
12. SWISS CREDIT BANK (CH) 
13. ~1 0RGAN (JP) & CO INC (US) 
14. HAMBROS LTD (UK) 
15. ALGEMENE BANK NEDERLAND NV (N) 
16. SOCIETE GENERALE (F) 
17. AMRO BANK NV (N) 
18. BAYERISCHE VEREINSBANK (FRG) 
19. SOCIETE GENERALE DE BANQUE SA (B) 
20. BANQUE DE L'INDOCHINE (F) 
UN REPORT 
CDE 
HANDBOOK TOTAL 
NO. OF A~IOUNl Al'IOUNl A~iOUNT 
LOANS OF LOANS OF LOANS OF LOANS 
27 
22 
32 
25 
24 
27 
29 
30 
27 
22 
22 
22 
12 
15 
21 
18 
18 
23 
16 
17 
1 308,8 
1 037,2 
1 158,0 
1 156,8 
104,2 
055,3 
040,1 
870,9 
859,4 
77Y,8 
725,5 
717,7 
679,3 
640,4 
619,8 
601,8 
597,9 
581,7 
570,4 
554,3 
255,0 
150,0 
12,0 
1 563,8 
1 187,2 
1 158,0 
1 156,8 
1 104,2 
055,3 
040,1 
870,9 
859,4 
779,8 
725,5 
717,7 
691,3 
640,4 
61S,8 
601,8 
597,9 
581,7 
570,4 
554,3 
NOTE: The loan amounts represent the total value of all loans in which the 
parent corporation and/or its subsidiaries participated. In 
international loans where many banks participate, it is inaccurate to 
claim that the loan was mande by anyone of the banks listed. lhus, it 
cannot be said that Citicorp made $ 1,6 billion of loans but only that 
it was involved (to an unknown degree) in $ 1,6 Dillion of loans. 
- 118 -
Apartheid. The figures refer not to the amount lent by the banks, but to the 
total size of loans in which the banks in question played a part. Given this, 
and the significant total of double-counting obviously inherent in the dollar 
figures, the data must be regarded with some caution. Additionally, in terms 
of Table 43, it is not known what figure was lent to South Africa, for 
examp 1 e, by the 59 German banks i nvo 1 ved in the quoted fi gure of 72 German 
loans. However, it is clear that lending to South Africa is dominated by 
German, American, British, French and Swiss banks . This conclusion is 
supported by the data in Table 44, which is drawn from the same sources, and 
identifies the specific suppliers of bank finance to South Africa between 1972 
and 1978. The latter table must also be regarded with some reservation, as 
the dollar figures represent the total value of all loans in which the parent 
corporation and/or its subsidiaries participated, and since with international 
loans it is usual for many banks to participate, it is thus inaccurate to 
state that any of the quoted figures were the sole responsibility of anyone 
of the banks listed ie, there is a significant amount of aouble-counting 
present. Clarke also notes that the table "tends to understate the dominance 
of the leading banks since they more often act as managers of loans than the 
banks less heavily involved,,32. 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
Given the illustrated contribution of foreign investment to South Africa, the 
question which now arises, is whether the economic growth will be affected by 
the withdrawal thereof. The three crucial facets which would be affected 
are: the financing of investment, balance of payments requirements and the 
qualitative impact of foreign investment. 
The first of these issues turns on whether domestic capital markets can meet 
the requirements of domestic investment and hence economic growth . lhis issue 
is not easy to quantify because of its long-run perspectives. Although 
trans-national companies dominate the direct investment figures, most of this 
investment is undertaken through the re-investment of their South African net 
earnings. The private sector is thus more or less independent of foreign 
capital inflow in the literal sense of the term. It is, as illustrated above, 
the public sector which has had to finance expansi on via foreign borrowing. 
According to Table 41 above, the public sector borrowed abroad approximately 
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R3,5 billion during the period 1972-1978. Over the same period total gross 
domestic fixed investment under the headings 'electricity, gas and water', 
'South African Railways' and 'manufacturing: other than private business 
enterprises' amounted to R13,3 billion33 • This is quite a good indicator of 
the scale of investment of the · public corporations during the period 
concerned, and it thus appears that between 1972 and 1978 about a quarter of 
the public sector's investment was financed by foreign borrowing. 
However, this period was peculiar in that extensive long term public sector 
investment was undertaken, and this large contribution of foreign investment 
to gross domestic investment is indicative of short run trends rather than 
long term structure: were figures for foreign borrowing available for the 
period after 1978, the short run pattern would have changed. Such short run 
variations are further reflected below. 
Although the foreign borrowing of public corporations in this period amounted 
to only as bout 7 percent of gross domestic savings (see Table 45 below), this 
occurred ina context where domestic cap i ta 1 markets were a 1 re ady extended. 
In such a situation, a 7 percent component of the demand for investable funds 
may be significant, particularly when it is appreciated that about two-thirds 
of total savings are made up of depreciation allowances and corporate saving. 
However, in 1977 and 1978 when the economy was growing comparatively slowly, 
the public corporations were able to finance their investment domestically 
without upsetting the local capital market. These observations are based on 
the data in Table 45 which also shows that the period 1977 to 1980 was 
characterised by a large outflow of capital in contrast with the period 1972 
to 1976. 
The non-availability of foreign capital to public corporations, given tight 
domestic capital market competition, has frequently prompted these 
corporations to finance capital works from internal savings, effected by means 
of tariff increases. Apart from the potentially deleterious effect of such a 
policy on resource allocation, it introduces a strong inflationary bias in the 
economy, something which has indeed been evident in South Africa lately, even 
under rather depressed economic conditions. According to the 1979-80 8udget 
estimate, the public sector investment requirement for the period 1979-1987 
was R48,3 billion (at 1977 prices) or approximately 50 percent of gross 
domestic fixed investment 35 . This suggests that public sector investment is 
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not expected to dec1 ine a'ppreciab1y in the near future. On the other hand, 
with an intermittently declining personal saving propensity, the flow of funds 
to the domestic capital market seems unlikely to increase in real terms from 
taxation and public utility rates, while 
of i nvestab 1 e tunds cause other problems as 
this source. Increases _ in 
represent i ng potent i a 1 sources 
referred to above. Given, then, that the supply of investable funds, ie, 
savings is unlikely to increase, and that demand ie, investment is likely to 
remain at a high level, capital may continue to be borrowed abroad. Clarke, 
for example, estimated in 1980 that ·South Africa will have to secure foreign 
funds at a rate of R2,5 bi 11 i on per annum to fi nance long term 
investment· 36 , though this arbitrary figure has neither been borne out in 
TABLE 45(34) 
FINANCING OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT, 1972-1980. 
R million at current prices 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
PERSONAL SAVING 397 415 373 2 241 892 2 080 1 866 2 909 3 214 
CORPORATE SAVING 351 778 1 067 607 757 1 695 2 063 4 664 7 939 
SAVING OF GOVERNMENT 388 934 1 180 814 502 663 1 037 1 254 2 722 
DEPRECIATION 2 158 2 158 2 622 3 345 4 187 4 803 5 573 6 614 7 806 
GROSS DOMESTI C 
SAVING 3 986 5 285 6 "42 7 007 7 338 9 241 10 539 15 441 21 681 
NET CAPITAL INFLOW 449 -46 899 1 926 1 110 -810 -1 370 -2 954 -2 466 
CHANGE IN RESERVES -359 98 99 -113 520 345 -42 -16 -532 
GROSS DOMESTIC 
INVESmENT 4 076 5 337 7 240 8 820 8 968 8 776 9 127 12 411 18 683 
practice to date, and nor would borrowing on such a scale appear imminent. In 
addition to any long term funds which may have to be borrowed abroad, there is 
at least a periodic need for foreign short term borrowing to finance 
international trade; hence the De Kock Commission recommendation that short 
term borrowing from abroad should be increased37 • However, the nature of 
- 121 -
trade, and trade credit, is such that it cannot be easily quantified, in 
contrast with long term debt, and it has no regular pattern, a fact which is 
at variance with Clarke's 1980 estimate that South Africa would have to 
"secure an increase in short term borrowing on a once-for-all basis of Rl 
bill ion ,,38 • 
Foreign investment in general does not necessarily have to represent a 
deliberate act of either investment or borrowing, since if the current account 
of the balance of payments is in surplus, net foreign earnings are available 
for domestic investment. In the South African context a current account 
-
surplus has in the past been associated with rises in the price of gold, which 
means additional investable funds for the private and the public sector. Thus 
the demand for foreign investment depends ultimately on the balance of 
payments position, which is related to the country's terms of trade and, in 
particular, the price of gold. In 1980 Clarke claimed that: "A gold price of 
$300 per ounce would leave the current account in balance,,39. Estimates of 
this nature will obviously vary with changing economic conditions and the data 
likewise, which stresses a 
of economic sanctions: 
presumab ly impi nge on the 
specific problem often encountered in the calculus 
while potentially effective sanctions should 
basic fabric or structure of the (South African) 
economy and thus reduce its performance, the actual measures discussed are 
frequently of a short term nature. Consequently, there is a methodological 
flaw in the analysis; short term measures may be neutralised by short term 
counter-measures ana thus render the intended policies of sanctions virtually 
ineffectual. 
However, it is not only the quantitative financial impact of foreign 
investment that is important. Foreign direct investment, in particular, is 
extremely important in giving South Africa access to modern technology and to 
sophisticated managerial skills. A significant reason for this is South 
Africa's notoriously low productivity of both capital and labour. Thus, 
whilst serving to increase the physical stock of capital, foreign investment 
also has the function of bolstering otherwise low productivity levels. As the 
Economic Development Programme 1978-1987 states: "The seventies compare very 
unfavourably with the sixties so far as the trends in the rate of capital 
deepending in the economy in general are concerned ie, the economy is 
becoming more capital-intensive. The data also show that this trend was 
accompanied by the unfavourable trends in the productivity of both capital ano 
labour. Again, it is clear that this trend was present in all but a few 
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sectors of the economy.,,40 This is further supported by Table 46 below, 
which shows that for the period 1970-1980 the average growth rate of the 
productivity of labour and capital was -1,3 percent. 
Thus if access to direct foreign investment was impaired, productivity would 
be further reduced, vi a the qua 1 i tat i ve techni ca 1 and ITIanageri ali mpact of 
this investment. It is, however, no easy matter to estimate the contribution 
of imported technology to South Africa's economic development. An econometric 
study undertaken by John Suckling suggests that 60 percent of the economic 
growth during the years 1957 to 1972 could be ascribed to technological 
changes of which two-thirds was imported42 • In contrast, local studies have 
ascribed a far more modest role to the qual itative determinants of economic 
growth in South Africa. The Mercabank publication Focus on Key Economic 
Issues reported that "productivity increases have traditionally played a 
relatively minor role in growth,,43 This is supported by the Reynders 
Commission which stated that "South Africa has tended to grow largely by 
TABLE 46(41) 
CAP !TAL & LABOUR PRDDUCTIVITY INDICES, 1970-1980 (1970 = 100) 
YEAR LABOUR CAP ITAL LABOUR & CAP IT AL 
1970 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1971 101,3 97,1 99,5 
1972 99,4 91 ,7 96,1 
1973 100,4 89,3 95,2 
1974 104,9 89,9 97,4 
1975 103,8 85,1 94,9 
1976 102,3 81,3 92,2 
1977 99,7 77 ,7 88,8 
1978 99,2 76,3 87,9 
1979 100,3 76,3 87,8 
1980 104,6 78,9 89,8 
AVERAGE GROwTH RATE 0,1% -2,7% -1,3% 
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utilising more inputs with relatively little attention being devoted to the 
more efficient use of such inputs". In respect of specifically manufacturing 
industry, a further issue of the above Mercabank series stated: "The inputs 
of factors of production (labour and capital) increased at an average annual 
rate of 42 percent over the whole of the period from 1950 onwards, whilst 
output per unit of factor input increased by only 1,9 percent per annum on 
average . Factor inputs were, therefore, responsible for more than two-thirds 
of the expansion in manufacturing"45. The Flercabank findings are based on_ 
research by Professor L J Fourie, who has also been cited to the effect - that 
"productivity improvements appear to contribute only some 35 percent to 
economic growth at the best of times, while increases in the crude stock of 
1 abour and capital contri bute as much as 37 percent and 28 percent 
respectively,,45. 
However, a 1973 study found that 74 percent of manufacturing firms interviewed 
claimed that at least 90 percent of their technology was of foreign 
origin. 47 . This technology is channelled through trans-national companies 
to their South African affiliates: "between 55 and 80 percent of royalty 
payments from South Africa to British companies are from 'related concerns'. 
United States figures show royalty receips from South Africa of $49 million in 
1977, of which half was due from manufacturing concerns, and the bulk of the-
rest from mining"48. Moreover, foreign direct investment not only provides 
technology, but also skilled manpower to direct its implementation. One of 
the most severe constrains on growth at present is the lack of skilled 
manpower. "It is evident that South Africa's economic progress is currently 
being 1 imited, not so much by as shortage of capital, but by a shortage of 
skills and knowledge,,49. 
One should not, however, make the mistake of viewing foreign production 
techniques as an unmixed blessing in the South African context. Imported 
technology is often of a capital-intensive kind, more suited, say, to large 
European and American markets than the South African economy with its 
comparatively large supply of labour and small domestic demand. Local firms 
which implement technology channelled to them by their international parent 
companies, may therefore, in some instances, be using sub-optimal production 
methods. Perhaps, somewhat paradoxically, less relaince on foreign know-how 
may actually serve to increase productivity in South Africa. 
DISINVES1MEN1 
The main determinants of foreign 
profit and risk. The literature 
foreign capital stresses the 
juxtaposition with high risk. 
- 124 -
investment, or of any private investment, are 
on why South Africa has attracted substantial 
hi gh returns offered on investment in 
The latter concept is nebulous, though 
relevant, and measurement of returns dependS critically on the nature of the 
statistics used. 1he most comprehensive study of investment in South Africa, 
conducted by S H Frankel, shows that returns on foreign investment in South 
African gold mines between 1887 and 1965 amounted to only 5,2 percent per 
annum. This is not exceptional when compared with other national rates of 
return on investment, although comparisons over time and space of risk and 
profit are subjective, and may overlook important normative variables. 
As far as present sanctions against investment are concerned the, only 
si gnificant moves to date have been made by Sweden and Denmark50 • Swedi sh 
government policy is that Swedish firms should "limit" their activities in 
South Africa. In a report of the Dagens Nyheter in August 1978, 8 Swedish 
firms with investments in South Africa 'were consulted, and none were willing 
to "limit" their activities voluntarily. Consequently, legislation was passed 
prohibiting direct investment and capital export to South Africa. However, 
exemption will be granted from these restrictions "should Swedish jobs be at 
risk" (in Sweden) or "if the firm were to experience unreasonable 
10sses,,51. This illustrates the reluctance of sanctioners to accept the 
cost of sanctions. The result is that potentially effective measures tend to 
become symbolic actions when self-interest is at stake. 1he Holland Committee 
on South Africa, a strongly pro-sanctions group, has also censured Sweden for 
not abiding by its legislative ban on investment52 OAU members have banned 
investment in South Africa but they have, effectively speaking, no investment 
in South Africa; their actions are essentially symbolic. 1he failure to 
disinvest is, in part, due to the immense problems involved in regulating 
foreign investment and financial flows . No strong unilateral or multilateral 
enforcement agency exists for policing sanctions. The legal complications may 
be enormous and evasion relatively easy. At the same time, measures against 
investment do imply higher costs to the potential investor and may thus be a 
d e t err e nt, a lt h 0 ugh the ",R::::e.<:p,,-o r,-t"---,o",fc-t",h.:.:e=-----:S",t:::u",d:.Ly----=C-"o,,,mm:::.:.;i s",s,-,ic:;o",n----=o",n-=u""S--,--P ,,-0 .:..11:...:' c,-"y,----,t:::o",w",a.:...:::.r d
South Africa (Rockefeller Report) has recommended against disinvestment at 
present53 • 
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As far as sanctions against direct investment are concerned, several options 
eXist. New investment can be restricted by law, but this would have little 
impact, because of the relatively limited role that newly invested foreign 
capital plays in South Africa today. More significant measures would be those 
taken to accelerate the outflow of funds from South Africa, by requiring the 
repatriation of all dividends, interest and branch profits, but such action 
too would be limited, because the South African government may well retailate 
in kind, and prevent the remission of such payments. If thus caught between 
Scylla and Charybdis, parent companies may well be pursuaded to run down the 
operations of their affiliates, which would 
such foreign investment. A second possible 
selling off equity in, and assets of, 
then deny South Africa access to 
di s investment measure amounts to 
affiliates and branches: done 
unilaterally, this move would have no impact on South Africa if the buyer were 
to be another trans-national company; done multilaterally, this implies 
selling to South Africans, presumably on a strong buyer's market. Thus 
trans-nationals would have to face capital losses, and may, moreover, 
experience real problems in repatriating their capital, and a change of 
ownership, for example, to South Africa, need not cause any fundamental harm 
to the economy. The loss of funds via the balance of payments would be 
compensated for by the discontinuation of future remittances of interest, 
dividends and profits abroad. 
The most likely and realistic instrument of aisinvestment would be to make 
investment considerably less attractive. This could be done by ending the 
double taxation agreements between investing countries and South Africa; by 
withdrawing official and/or implicit support for trade and investment; and 
also by preventing the assignment of patents and licences to South Africa or 
the renewal of existing licencing agreements (though the latter could easily 
be abbrogated by South Afri cans, and the former circumvented unless 
technology-embodied capital imports were stopped). 
Trade credit could be curtailed if the backing of official state bodies was 
withdrawn as is, for example, from time to time the case with the US 
Export-Import Bank, leaving foreigners to rely on their own resources, and 
hence increasing the risk factor, assuming that substitute trade credit is not 
available from South Africa itself. However, commercial bank lending raises 
more serious problems than does short term trade credit because of the extent 
to which international banks are beyond national regulation. The problem is 
not so much in legislating against lending to South Africa, as in identifying 
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it. Banks are required to make disclosures to their respective national 
authorities, but the extent of these disclosures depends on the co-operation 
of the banks, and much of the lending is financed from funds outside of any 
national exchange controls. Although a few banks have refused to lend funds 
for government or quasi-government purposes, such as balance of payments 
requirements, this has had little effect as other banks have lent the money. 
Thus successful sanctions on bank lending are contingent on bank co-operation 
and on multilateral enforcement. 
Another form of international direct lending is that undertaken through 
international agencies, such as the IMF, membership of which gives South 
Africa access to a lender of last resort. South Africa is unlikely to be 
expelled from the IMF at present and the Fund is not, at least in principle, 
run along political lines. Expulsion of South Africa would stop further 
borrowing from the IMF, but would have serious political implications for its 
future. South Africa recently secured a Rl,2 billion loan from the ItliF, 
despite strong political pressure to the contrary54. 
Quantitative estimates of the effect, on South Africa, of sanctions on foreign 
investment (or for that matter, sanctions in general), are hazardous. 
However, all realistic indicators suggest that sanctions would seriously 
imp i nge on the growth of the South Afri can economy. The Economi cAdi vsor to 
the South African Prime Minister, Dr Simon Brand, has stated that an absence 
of foreign investment puts an unacceptably low ceiling on possible growth 
rates 55 . The official Economic Development Programme 1978-1987, has 
postulated three average annual growth rate scenarios for the stated period; 
3,6 percent, 4,5 percent and 5,0 percent. Accord i ng to thi s programme a 
growth rate of 3,6 percent will result in just more than a doubling of total 
unemployment from 10,6 percent in 1977 to 21,9 percent in 1987. A growth rate 
of 4,5 percent will see total unemployment of 15,0 percent in 1987, and even 
the highest postulated growth rate, 5,0 percent, will leave more total 
unemployment, 11,5 percent, than in 1977. The Unit for Futures Research at 
Stellenbosch University postUlates a "normal growth figure" of about 4,8 
percent57 • The latter study assumes a substantial injection of investment 
from abroad whilst the Economic Development Programme makes no such 
provision. The chairman of a leading South Africa banking group, Nedbank, Dr 
Frans Cronje, maintains that the economy can continue to grow at something 
1 ike past rates (ie, average 4,5 percent) without foreign capital, but that 
rates of 7 percent to 8 percent are required to absorb yearly increases in the 
labour market and reouce unemployment 58 . 
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As South Africa's annual population increase is some 3 pefcent per annum, the 
economy must employ between 200 000 and 220 000 new entrants into the labour 
market annually. Thi s impl ies that an economic growth rate of 3 percent per 
annum would result in no per capita increase in standards of living. 
Employment of these work seekers may, then, be contingent on access to foreign 
capital. "In the end, therefore, withdrawal of international investment is 
basically a growth-related threat,,59. Some such consequences have been 
given empirical treatment by Arnt Spandau via the use of the same input-output 
model as referred to above in Chapter 4. 60 Taking 1976 as his base year 
Spandau assumed that firstly a 20 percent, and latterly a 50 percent reduction 
in long term cap ita 1 movement took p "lace. The resu 1 ts by sector in terms of 
Gross Domestic Product, unemployment and disposable income are reproduced 
below in Tables 47 and 48. 
These results, though useful indicators in themselves, make no predictions as 
to the long term growth path that would result. Spandau's conclusion in this 
connection appears somewhat glib and superficial: "There is little doubt that 
even a 100 percent i nvestmen t boycot t wou 1 d not have dea lt South Afri ca a 
death blow. 10 be sure, the unemployment rate would have increased 
drastically, personal disposable incomes would have dropped, and the 
confidence in the future of the country's economy would have suffered severe 
damage. But there is no doubt that the country would have embarked upon 
suitable remedial measures,,61. A seemingly more realistic view of sanctions 
is that put forward by Andre Hamersma : "Sanctions which lead to a stagnant 
economy are successful sanctions,,62. Remedial measures may be beyond the 
drawing board, but it is foolish to believe that autarky is desirable or 
feasible. However, a somewhat surprising recent research finding in this 
respect, is Dr B P Groenewald's study of past foreign investment in South 
Africa, which shows that "South Africa attracted no additional foreign capital 
for investment purposes in the past 22 years~63. 
As matters stand at present, it is not feasible to anticipate who may apply 
what sanctions under which conditions; even if the principle of sanctions 
were not in doubt, their scope, nature and effectiveness would still be 
uncertain; even if the sanctions were known in quantitative terms, their 
resulting impact on the domestic economy is not accurately predictable. In 
brief, we lack an adequate macro-economic model of predictive power, partly 
because of uncertainty and lack of information in general, and partly because 
the parameters of such a model are not known a priori. 
TABLE 47(64) 
CONSEQUENCES OF AN HYPOTHETICAL INVESTMENT ~OYCOTT ON GROSS DOMESTIC PRUDUCT, EMPLOYMENT AND DISPOSABLE INCOMES 
ASSUMPTION: 20 % of LONG-TERM FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN 1976 ARE BOYCOITED 
20% OF FOREIGN DECREASE INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT DECREASE IN DISPUSABLE INCU~ES 
INVESTMENTS IN (NUMBER OF PERSONS) R MILLIUN 
ECONO~>IC SECTOR ( 1976) G U P WHITES COLOUREDS ASIANS . BLACKS TOTAL wHITES COLOUREDS ASIANS bLACKS TOIAL R m R m 
METAL INDUSTRY 30 27 2 280 540 90 4 B3D 7 740 13,0 I,D 0,21 6,1 20,51 
FURNI lURE 7 6 371 329 98 889 1 687 2,1 0,6 0,23 1,1 4,03 
RU8BER PRODUCTS 8 6 344 1I2 48 688 1 192 2,0 0,2 0,11 0,9 3,2 1 
NUN-~IETALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 13 10 611 195 39 248 2 093 3,5 0,4 0,09 1,6 5,59 
IRON & STEEL INDUSTRY 26 19 404 130 52 2 210 3 796 8,1 0,2 0,12 2,8 1l,22 N CO 
NON-FERROUS METAL INDUSTRY 10 8 270 50 30 570 920 1,6 0, 1 0,07 0.7 2,47 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY 4 3 704 44 8 380 136 4,1 0,1 0,01 D,S 4,71 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 8 5 512 144 24 672 352 2,9 0,3 0,06 0,8 4,06 
RADIO & TELEV ISION II 8 583 176 55 715 529 3,4 0,3 0,13 0,9 4,73 
MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 19 9 722 342 38 855 957 4,2 0,6 0,09 1.1 5,99 
RAILWAY EQUIPMENT 4 3 204 28 8 292 532 1,2 0,1 0,02 0,4 1,72 
CONSTRUCTION 59 51 3 363 1 829 295 7 375 12 862 19,5 3,4 0,70 9,3 32,90 
TOT A L 199 155 II 368 3 919 785 20 724 36 796 65,8 7,3 1.84 26,2 101 ,14 
TABLE 48(65) 
CONSEQUENCES OF AN HYPOTHETICAL INVE SH,ENT BOYCOTT ON GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, E~'PLOYMENT ANO DISPOSABLE INCOMES 
ASSUMPTION: 50' of LONG-TERM FOREIGN INVEST~,E NTS IN I Y76 ARE BOYCOTTED 
50% OF FORE I Gh DECREASt INCREASE IN UNEMPLOY~,EN T OECREASE IN OISPOSABLE INCOMES 
I NVESTMEN TS IN (NUMBER OF PERSONS) R MILLIUN 
ECONOMIC SECTOR ( 1976) GOP WHITES COLOUREDS ASIANS BLACKS TOTAL WHITES COLOUREDS ASIANS BLACKS TOTAL R m R m 
~IETAL INOUSTRY 74 61 5 624 332 222 Il 914 19 092 32,6 2,5 D,S 15,1 50,7 
FURNI TURE 17 14 901 799 238 159 4 097 5,2 1,5 0,6 2,7 10,0 
RUBBER PROOUCTS 19 14 817 266 114 634 2 831 4,7 0,5 0,3 2,1 7,6 
NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 33 26 551 495 99 3 168 5 313 9,0 0,9 0,2 4,0 14,1 
IRON & STEEL INOUSTRY 65 48 3 510 325 130 5 525 9 490 · 20,4 0,6 0,3 7,0 28,3 
NON-FERROUS METAL INOUSTRY 23 19 621 lIS 69 31l 2 116 3,6 0,2 0,2 1,7 5,7 N 
"" AGRICUL TURAL MACHINERY 8 6 512 88 16 760 1 376 3,0 0,2 0,9 4,1 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 21 14· 344 378 63 764 3 549 7 ,8 0,7 0,2 2,2 10,9 
RADIO & TELEVISION 28 20 484 448 140 820 3892 8,6 0,8 0,3 2,3 12,0 
MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRY 48 23 I 824 864 96 2 160 4 944 10,6 1,6 0,2 2,7 15 , 1 
RAILWAY EQUIPMENT 13 11 663 91 26 949 1 729 3,8 0,2 0,1 1,2 5,3 
CONSTRUCTION 149 130 8 493 4 619 745 18 625 32 482 49,2 8,6 1,8 23,6 83,2 
T OT A L 498 386 27 344 9 820 1 958 51 789 90 91l 158,5 18,3 4,7 65,5 247,0 
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CHAPT ER V II 
SANCTIONS AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 
TRADE 
Historically links within the Southern African region have been given concrete 
form by the Southern African Customs Union (1910)1, by which the former High 
Commission Territories, Botswana, Lesotho ana Swaziland (BLS), were 
incorporatea along with South Afri ca in a wider customs area, and the Rand 
Monetary Area (1974) by which the South African monetary authorities have 
certain joint responsibilities with the monetary authorities of Lesotho and 
Swaziland2. In addition to these institutions, two further more ambitious 
organisations are in embryonic form; the South African sponsored 
Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS), and the Black African 
promoted Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC)3. 
The 1 atter two organi sati ons are an outgrowth of the general confl i ct or 
trade-off "in the region between economic and political self-determination. 
Broadly speaking, four groups which have an interest in the case of economic 
sanctions and South Africa in the regional context, can be identified; 
namely, commentators such as the United Nations Organisation and the 
Organisation of African Unity, who have little or no economic interest at 
stake; Western trading partners who have varying degrees of economic and 
pol itical advantage at ri sk; Bl ack Southern Afri can states who have a great 
deal of political and economic gain at stake; and lastly South Africa, for 
whom the prospect of sanctions obviously is a matter of great political and 
economic concern. In particular, the Black Southern African States are facea 
with a fundamental choice between political will and economic welfare, as they 
have, with the exception of South Africa, the most interest in resolving the 
political issue of apartheia, whilst similtaneously remaining "economically 
dependent" on South Africa. In the 1 iterature the term "economic dependence" 
is often used loosely to mean "potential vulnerability"; however, trade or 
exchange imp 1 i es interdependence. Though th is interdependence in Southern 
Africa may be disproportionate, if trade between Black Africa and the Republic 
were impeded all parties would experience a welfare l oss; economic 
self-sufficiency in any context where it leads to a lower degree of 
specialisation is undesirable, as it results in a lower standard of living. 
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Despite the wishful thinking of many commentators in respect of applying 
sanctions on South Africa, there does remain a basic choice within the region 
(from which the commentators are usually far removed) between political will 
and economic welfare, which will have to be resolved before any proposed 
sanctions campaign gets off the ground. This "fact of life" is even tacitly 
recognised in some of the pro-sanctions literature, for example, the study 
undertaken by the International UniVersity Exchange Fund includes no less than 
5 chapters out of a total of 12, on matters relating to the regional 
perspective. 
The whole region, or the Southern African sub-continent, is linked 
economically and centres on South Africa; in Southern Africa all roads lead 
to the Witwatersrand. The economic interdependence is pervasive, encompassing 
such diverse aspects of the economic framework as infrastructure, technology, 
trade, fi nance and producti ve factors. Those Southern or Central Afri can 
nations which are thus "dependent" in varying degrees on the South African 
economy include Zaire, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, 
Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho as well as Seychelles and Mauritius. Namibia, 
whose political status is at present in a state of flux, falls into the same 
pattern. In the context of this chapter, the economic linkages between these 
countries and South Africa are examined, particularly in relation to the issue 
of economic sanctions on South Africa. 
In analysing South Afri ca's links with the sub-continent it is difficult to 
decide whether, or exactly when, the primary purpose of these links is 
political or economic4. The principal channel for South African relations 
wi th Bl ack Afri ca is provi ded by trade. It is no secret that the South 
African government hopes to derive at least some political advantage from such 
trade links, and this consideration also applies to regional economic ties in 
general. Some commentators are of the opinion that South African trade with 
Black Africa is unimportant; for example, as early as 1944 Professor Burrows 
sarcastically described South Africa's position vis-a-vis the rest of the 
continent thus: "Unfortunately South Africa seems to be interested in 
neighbouring territories mainly as potential customers. A tew indefatigible 
optin,ists even look on Africa as a vast hinterland crying out for the Union's 
industrial products and anxious to pour its wealth into her bilingual 
lap,,5. This viewpoint is supported by a study of the Economist Intelligence 
Unit I~hich states: "The prospects of vastly increased trade with Africa ... 
have been widely exaggerat ed. ~lost of the coun t ries known to have shol,n an 
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interest with trade in South Africa are both small and bankrupt. Given the 
effects of international increase in the price of oil and the effects of the 
long droughts on the economies of many of the sub-Saharan African countries, 
the prospect of significant markets in Africa is a chimera"6. 
These quotations, however, do not mean that such trade links are simply 
worthless from the South African point of view. Though Africa lagged far 
behind Europe, the Americas and Asia, in 1980, in terms of South Africa's 
continental trading partners (see Table 4), taking only 5,5 percent of her 
total exports and providing only 1,6 percent of total imports, this trade was 
worth more th an one bill i on rand, and exports to Afri ca in part i cu 1 ar have 
eXhibited strong growth trends in recent years. This total trade figure also 
hides the important sectoral breakdown particularly of manufactured products. 
As noted in Chapter V above, South Africa's fUrther industrialisation is being 
hampered by limits to market size, and her trade with Africa may extend the 
. market and, moreover, South Africa maintains a balance of payments surplus 
with Black Africa which is a valuable source of foreign exchange. Obviously 
this trade has growth potential albeit clouded by economic as well as 
political factors. Generally speaking, the advocacy of closer regional 
co-operation rests on the notion that increased liberal isation of trade is 
beneficial. "It is generally accepted that greater freedom as well as 
co-operation in respect of intra-regional mobility of capital, labour, 
tech no logy and i nfrastructura 1 servi ces are bound to enhance the economi c 
well-b2ing of all the countries concerned''? This notion of a free trade 
area leading to greater specialisation and division of labour is hardly novel, 
but in a Southern African context this concept was developed in the lY60s by 
academi cs at the Uni vers ity of Pretori aB , though it arguab 1 y exi sted 
before9. 
The value of South Africa's total imports and exports on a geographic basis in 
19BO was shown in Table 5 in Chapter IV. Although no figures in respect of 
trade with individual African nations are at present published it appears that 
1,6 percent of South Africa's import trade and 5,5 percent of her export trade 
took place with the rest of the African continent (these figures 00 not 
include the value of trade within the Southern African Customs Union), though 
some observers claim that the true trade figures in this context may be twice 
as high as the published figures lO . These tigures are reflected in Table 49 
below which sets out South Africa's exports to Africa (according to the 
Brussels Nomenclature) and the percentage contribution of these exports to 
total exports in each category. 
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TABLE 49(11) 
SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS TO AFRICA: 1980 
R THOUSAND 
EXPORTS TO EXPORTS TO AFRICA AS 
COMMODITY GROUPS AFRICA % OF TOTAL EXPORTS 
PER GROUP 
l. ANIMALS & ANIMAL PRODUCTS 56 444 30,4 
2. VEGETABLE PRODUCTS 253 499 31 ,2 
3. ANI~,AL & VEGETABLE FATS & OILS 8 485 23,0 
4. PREPARED FOODSTUfFS 35 266 4,9 
5. MINERAL PRODUCTS 39 337 2,5 
6. CHEMICALS & CHEMICAL PRODUCTS 125 766 32,2 
7. PLASTICS, RESINS & RUBBER PRODUCTS 43 946 58,1 
8. HIDES, SKINS & LEATHER 1 104 0,8 
9. WOOD & WOOD PRODUCTS 9 265 17,2 
10. PULP, PAPER & PAPERBOARD 34 145 19,1 
1l. ltXTILES 32 239 9,0 
12. FOOTWEAR & MILLINERY 3 511 20,7 
13. NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS 23 341 42,1 
14. GEMS & JEWELLERY 3 940 0,1 
15. BASE ME1ALS & METAL PRODUCTS 150 771 9,5 
16. MACHINERY 167 413 63,5 
17. VEHICLES & TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 86 931 65,9 
18. OPTICAL & OTHER INSTRUMENTS 10 019 41,2 
19. MISC. MANUFACTURED PRuDUClS 3 738 13,8 
20. WORKS OF ART, COLLECTORS' PIECES 42 0,6 
2l. UNCLASSIFIED 8 829 
TOT A L 098 033 5,5 
From the above tab 1 e it can be seen that in 1980 exports to Afri ca of 
plastics, resins and rubber products (group 7), machinery (group 16) and 
transport equipment (group 17) constituted over 50 percent of the value of 
total exports in these three groups . In several other groups too, the value 
of exports to the res t of Afri ca was hi gh 1 Y sign ifi cant. The comparat i ve 
overall African export figure of only 5,5 percent wa s mainly due to the small 
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figures in groups 14 and 21 - and it is of course these two categories which 
feature most prominently in South Africa's aggregate export trade (see Chapter 
IV, Table 4) . The significance of exports to Africa in the categories 
identified above, is that with rapid economic growth a balance of trade 
deficit results because of a lack of manufactured exports. If manufacturing 
is going to be an important cause of economic growth in South Africa, then, 
this sector must in the long run also earn enough foreign exchange to pay for 
its capital input from abroad. Therefore, exports of manufactured goods to 
Afri ca have an important ro 1 e to play if the present imbalance in South 
Africa's export trade i~ to be redressed. Moreover, apart from factors such 
as technology and skills one of the major drawbacks to import substitution in 
the area of intermedi ate and capital goods is market size, and exports to 
Africa will make possible economies of scale and the profitable production of 
such goods. Although Burgess 12 argues that the limited size of the African 
market makes the hope of economies of scale unrealistic, the volume of 
manufactured exports iss i gn ifi cant. However, if the South Afri can non-wh ite 
domestic market expands sufficiently this may in itself initiate the necessary 
economies of scale, which would reduce the need to aevelop export markets, and 
incidentally render South Africa less vulnerable to sanctions in general. 
A 1 though comparat i ve ly modest in scope, the trade between South Afri ca and 
other Afri can states is mutua 11 y benefi ci a 1. Most Afri can countri es cou 1 d 
admittedly obtain manufactured goods from sources other than South Afri ca 
without great physical dislocation, but they would be relatively more 
expensive, which for poor societies would represent a major economic problem. 
Likewise it may be argued that sales to the rest of Africa represent a 
relatively smaller, possibly "insignificant", portion of the total value of 
output of even the 1 arges t exporters in the i r respect i ve groups as di scussed 
above. Available statistics for 1980 show that for the four main export 
groups (see Table 49) namely, 6, 7, 16 and 17, for example export sales 
amounted to 3,7 
respectively, of 
perspect i ve of 
percent, 1,8 
the value of 
growth potent i a 1, 
percent, 
domestic 
4,9 percent 
sales 13 . 
this trade may 
and 3,0 percent 
However, from the 
be of considerable 
significance to the industries concerned, even apart from the country's 
foreign exchange need as such. Economic sanctions within a purely African 
context are therefore not a mere academic matter, but affect existing and 
potential economic growth and welfare on both sides. 
Whilst it may not be imperative f or South Africa to continue trading with 
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81 ack Afri ca, such trade is for the 1 atter an issue of great economi c 
importance under the present regi ona 1 structure. Thi s naturally means that 
many of the Republic's neighbours are unequal trading partners who are 
themselves vulnerable to economic sanctions on South Africa in two different 
ways. International sanctions, given existing trade links, cannot simply stop 
at South Afri ca' s borders but are bound to spi 11 over into her nei ghbouri ng 
territories. At the same time, South Africa has an obvious capacity to 
"retaliate" against her neighbours independently; at least, such an inference 
may possibly be drawn from a statement by f< F Botha, South Africa's present 
Foreign Minister, that the Republic "was not without the power to retaliate" 
and that "other countries will suffer more than we do"14 . 
The maj or port i on of South Afri ca 's Afri can trade is conducted wi th he,r 
immediate neighbours and little of it passes beyond the Zambesi 15. The 
extent of this trade follows closely the political developments in Africa, 
particularly Central Africa. Starting in the early years of the Central 
African Federation, African trade with South Africa declined in absolute terms 
due to protection against South African imports. This trade pattern was 
reversed by such political factors as the break-up of the Central African 
Federation in 1963 and the declaration of UDI in Rhodesia in 1965. BUrgess 
est imates that trade between Rhodes i a and South Afri ca more than doub 1 ed 
during the period sanctions were applied on Rhodesia16 , though largely at 
the expense of other African markets, especially that of Zambia. Zimbabwe's 
atta i nment of 1 ega 1 independence in 1980 has again a ltered the po 1 it i ca 1 and 
economic patterns within the region. The admittance of Zimbabwe into the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has, for example, revitalised hopes of 
Black African leaders that they can form an economic grouping independent of 
South Afri ca. This added impetus has led to a number of meetings of the 
SADCC, the objectives of which are to map out a strategy for the viable 
reduction of economic ties with South Africa, while expanding Black African 
intra-regional economic linkages l ? 
The political and economic relationship between Black Africa and South Africa 
is fraught with ambiguity. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, the BLS 
countries, could not hope to boycott South Africa effectively. According to 
available statistics some 90 percent of their imports, including 50 percent of 
their food, come from South Africa18 . Moreover, they form part of the Rand 
Monetary Area and are inescapably dependent on South African fiscal and 
monetary policies. The Republic was also the second largest source of Zambian 
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imports in 1980, supplying 75 million kwacha's worth 19 • This was _ a 
significant increase over average annual imports from South Africa during the 
preceding years20 • South Africa is the principal source of r~alawian imports 
too, and was the source of 37 percent of the latter's total imports in 
197721 • Mozambique is in an analagous trade position since 25 percent of 
her imports from major trading partners in 1977 were from South Africa, the 
major source of her imports 22 • Intra-regional SADCC trade is, on the other 
hand, statistically negligible23 , and significant restructuring of the 
present trade pattern will have to be undertaken if the SADCC group is to be 
economically effective. 
In addition to exporting the above identified products to her so-called 
"natural market" ie, Africa, South Africa is a most important source of staple 
foods. This trade illustrates clearly the contrary nature of political and 
economic links between South Africa and the rest of the continent. A great 
deal of the Republic's food exports are not reflected in published statistics, 
however, in some respects, this trade is more significant than that of 
manuf actured products. In the 1 ast two decades 39 of 48 countri es in Afri ca 
have had declines in per capita food production. 24 • The reasons for this 
are not difficult to find; rapid population growth, limited husbanding of 
natura 1 resources; 
of inappropriate 
administrative ineptitude and, inter alia, the application 
policies. This situation contrasts sharply with that 
prevailing in South Africa where agricultural output has more than matched 
population increase and output has been available for export. 
Considering the present dependence of many Black African countries on South 
African maize supplies (the staple food in the region) it seems unlikely that 
they would be able to effectively boycott South Africa (see Table 50). In 
terms of OAU resolutions they are not, theoretically, even supposed to be 
trading with South Africa at present. It is likely that, as at present, Black 
Africa would pay only lip service to any pUrported sanctions campaign. 
Although it may be that pro-South African literature tends to over-emphasise 
the dependence of Black Africa on the Republic for food supplies 25 , with a 
veil of secrecy often drawn over such trade for quasi-ideological reasons, the 
true picture may only be revealed if all food exports were to be halted. 
In addition to maize exports, other foodstuffs are also part of this trade 
pattern. In 1976/77, for instance, Black states purchasea 29 200 tons of 
wheat, 2 300 tons of oats and 161 200 cartons of eggs (each containing 30 
YEAR 
1969/1970 
1970/1971 
1971/1972 
1972/1973 
1973/1974 
1974/1975 
1975/1976 
1976/1977 
1977/1978 
1978/1979 
1979/1980 
1980/1981 
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TABLE 50(26) 
SOUTH AFRICAN MAIZE EXPORTS TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES 
1969/70 TO 1980/81 
(TONS) 
BOTSWANA, LESOTHO OTHER AFRICAN 
AND SWAZILAND COUNTRIES 
104 000 37 185 
202 000 166 098 
70 000 . 45 598 
83 000 8 311 
139 000 18 844 
60 000 70 916 
73 000 24 783 
131 000 29 922 
171 000 
248 000 
250 000 
347 000 
dozen)27. South Africa also ships fresh fruit to West Africa and rails or 
fl ies canned and fresh foods to Central Africa. Moreover, it is said that 
South Africa trades with at least 48 African countries28 • 
The present position is still, then, one of fairly close links although the 
emphasis given to these links may vary according to one's particular or 
geographic or political viewpOint. The South African view may be said to be 
represented by the publication Growth (of the South African government 
Department of Co-operat i on and Deve 1 opment) an excerpt from wh i ch is 
reproduced below at some length: 
Recently food has become one of South Africa's most important exports to 
African states. Where, in 1975, Africa took only 6 percent of South 
African agricultural exports, by 1979 this figure had risen to 12 percent 
and is currently in the vicinity of 20 percent. Indeed, last year the net 
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export of agricultural products and raw materials of agricultural origin 
from South Africa to other African countries doubled . 
"Ironically, this boost in South African food exports comes at the very 
time when nei ghbouri ng black states are try i ng to 1 essen the ir dependence 
on South Africa. The reasons for this are not hard to find. 
"Food shortages in Africa are becoming painful as indicated in the case of 
Tanzania. (President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania in a shock announcement 
earlier this year, said that unless good rains came this season between six 
and eight million Tanzanians in the Lake Victoria Zone would face famine in 
1982) ••• And few African countries could afford to meet the shortfall in 
full because of the heavy transport costs from distant supplier countries. 
In the case of sub-Equatorial Africa, South Africa is by far the closest 
and cheapest source of such commodities as maize and wheat. In addition, 
South African transport services have a reputation for being highly 
efficient, especially in emergency food situations. As far as maize is 
concerned the sun-dried South African product is preferred to the American 
machine-dried varieties. 
"These factors have led to even die-hard opponents of Pretoria making 
concessions to their ideological consciences and joining in the queue for 
emergency fOOd suppl ies from South Afri ca. Thus Pres ident Hasti ngs Banda 
of Malawi, who has long traded openly with South Africa on the basis that 
it is more important to have food in f'lalawian vi llages than to conduct a 
political vendetta against South Africa at the United Nations, is being 
joined by neighbours such as President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and 
President Nyerere. 
"Nyerere had admitted that because of the serious impact of the drought on 
Tanzania he is now prepared to suspend his government ' s trade boycott of 
South Africa and buy food from that country . No detailed statistics are 
ever published on South Africa's trade with Black Africa but one estimate 
is that in the season ending in April last year (1980) something like 
800 000 tons of maize, about 76 percent of it yellow maize, could have been 
sent from South Africa to other countries in Africa Among the 
countri es known to have substantial quantities are Zambia (around 
250 000 tons) and ~:ozambique (about 150 000 tons). Moreover, Kenya was 
said to be taking 200 000 tons of South African grain last year. 
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"I n the same peri od, 60 000 tons of the South Afri can Wheat Board's surp 1 us 
of 183 000 tons went to Afri ca. About 45 000 tons of thi s was rai led to 
Mozambique and the rest found its way to Malawi, Zambia and Zaire."29 
From the South African Government point of view, this may actually represent a 
new policy argument: apart from the Cape sea route and its mineral supplies, 
South Africa's significance to the world at large is now evidently also 
defined in terms of her food exporting capacity. 
TRANSPORT 
We have so far concentrated our attention on the magnitude and direction of 
trade between South Africa and the rest of Africa, and now this perspective 
must be expanded to include infrastructural links between these trading 
partners. However, several aspects of the regional economy interact and it is 
important to remember that watertight compartments such as trade and 
infrastructure per se do not exist. This feature is most apparent in the 
transport sector as South Africa is at present the entrepot of the 
sub-continent. Of the Black African nations within South Africa's economic 
orbit only ~Iozambique (with the exception of Naminia) has a coastline. The 
remainder are landlocked and are therefore denied direct access to major trade 
and shipping routes and services. Mozambique has three ports of some 
potential in Maputo, Beira and Nacala, though the latter two are at present 
barely servicable. South Africa can on the other hand offer major port 
facilities at Richards Bay, Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, Cape Town, 
Sa 1 danha Bay and Wa 1 vi s Bay. Moreover, the ~Iozambi que major port of ~I aputo is 
only kept servicable with South African expertise and capital. Thus, the 
Republic has an effective monopoly of port facilities for some 8 000 
kilometers of coastline surrounding the southern portion of Africa. Many of 
the imports and exports of Black Africa require specialised handling 
facilities which are only available at South African ports; for example, 
maize, metallic raw materials and oil. 
Plans by the SADCC group envisage the re-routing of Black African imports and 
exports through Mozambique. However, this plan is contingent on large new 
capital injections in Mozambique ports and the re-building of the regional 
transp ort routes. It is doubtful whether the Mozambique ports will be able to 
operate, in the foreseeable future, independently of South African expertise, 
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at the capacity levels necessary to service even the modest needs of the SADCC 
group. The present Bl ack African infrastructure is also not geared to the 
movement of goods through Mozambique ports and before such re-routing is 
possible, major, probably uneconomic, capital expenditure is required30 • A 
parallel may be drawn here with Zambian attempts during the 1970s to disengage 
from her southern trade links, as the consequent Zambian use of the Benguela 
and Tanzam trade routes proved uneconomic. It would appear, then, that in the 
near future South Africa's neighbours remain dependent on her port facilities 
for their economic welfare. 
In the event of an effecti ve Bl ack Afri can boycott, South Afri can ports are 
not likely to be affected on the whole, as the proportion of this trade to the 
total business handled by South African ports is inconsiderable, and in times 
of rapid economic growth the loss of this trade may in fact be welcomed, as 
port and rail facilities become ·congested. The latter feature was in part 
responsible for the expansion of Richards Bay, Durban, Cape Town and Saldanha 
Bay in the 1970s. On the other hand South Africa, and in particular the 
Transvaal mines, continue to use the Mozambique port of Maputo to export bulk 
materials. The eventuality of losing Maputo for South African exports appears 
to have been foreseen by South African Transport Services (SATS), who operate 
South African ports; this is partly the reason for the construction and 
expansion of Richards Bay, which is equipped to replace Maputo should an 
effective boycott ensue. At present it appears that many exporters are 
switching from Maputo to Richards Bay for purely economic reasons, and there 
seems little likelihood of Maputo being closed to South Africa in the near 
future, mainly because "a substantial portion (estimated at one-third a few 
years ago) of Mozambique's foreign exchange earnings are aerived from handling 
a major share of the Witwatersrand's overseas goods traffic,,31. 
SATS also has jurisdiction over the railway network, and apart from the 
physical aspects of port capacity and facilities, ports can function only if 
they are serviced. In a Southern African context this essentially means the 
movement of goods by the railways. Therefore the economies within the sub-
continent also depend on SATS. The broader activities of SATS include control 
of the railways, harbours, pipelines, South African Airways and considerable 
road transport. 
The BLS countries and Namibia have their transport organised directly by SATS 
which i s responsible for maintenance and development within the Southern 
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African Customs Union, although Botwsana has recently attempted to take over 
some responsibility for the running of its railways. The periodic transport 
crises in Zimbabwe can in part be traced to SATS's policy of disengagement 
from that economi2• The recently retired General ~Ianager of SATS, Dr J G H 
Loubser, is quoted as saying that most neighbouring Black-ruled states have 
had to hire steam and diesel-electric locomotives from South Africa to keep 
their railways running efficient1y33. The Zimbabwean government has stated 
that it cannot take part in economic sanctions against South Africa and there 
is a noticeable lack of criticism from Harare in its oay-to-day aea1ings with 
Pretoria34 . 
South Afri ca operates 75 percent of Southern Afri ca' s rail network35 , as 
well as the most efficient ports, and despite the SADCC group's attempts to 
upgrade Hozambi que rail and port fac il it i es, thereby reduci ng their dependence 
on South Africa, the group remains dependent on SATS for their external 
trade. The trade boom widely anticipated by neighbouring ~lack states after 
the Rhodesian bush war and the establishment of an independent Zimbabwe, has 
not materialised. According to L10yds Shipping Economist, Mozambique, which 
was expected to gain most from the ending of hostilities recorded a mere one 
percent increase in ships calling at its ports in 198036 • The same report 
noted that the greatest hindrances to Black Southern African states in 
cuttting their dependence on South African transport routes and trade outlets, 
were the lack of modern facilities to move goods from the landlocked countries 
to the coastal ports, the ageing rolling stock and poor condition of rail 
tracks, and the silting up of Mozambique ports. The Tanzam railway line, 
built as the linchpin of Zambia's disengagement policy in the 1970s, had 
become a frustrating and expensive bottleneck. Similarly, the Benguela rail 
link from Zambia to the Angolan port of Lobito is subject to lengthy 
disruption, due to the ongoing Angolan conflict, and it has never pretended to 
offer much solution to Zambia's transport crisis. In the context of economic 
growth it is also too much to expect that Zimbabwean rail capacity will be 
able to cope indefinitely with the demands of SADCC plans. 
A withdrawal of SATS services from neighbouring countries will have little 
effect on that organisation, except in times of economic recession, when the 
subsequent loss of revenue would be undesirable, apart from the obvious 
dec1 ine in foreign exchange to the country in general. At other times the 
return of rolling stock and staff may relieve pressure on the domestic South 
African transport sector. Even in the event of e1ack African states 
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expropriating SAIS rolling stock on loan to them, the South African transport 
sector wou 1 d be unaffected, as the quantity of ro 11 i ng stock outs i de the 
Republic is monitored closely. On those occasions when South African rolling 
stock north of the Limpopo has experienced delays in turnaround, trade has 
been curtailed or halted, cont i ngent upon its return. South Afri can ra i 1way 
stock in foreign countries operates on commercial principles and indeed shows 
a profit. 
LABOUR 
The traditional, and almost one might say, "time-honoured", factor in economic 
relations between South Africa and the rest of the continent is labour. South 
African gold, diamond, coal and other mines, as well as agriculture and 
services have attracted millions of mainly unskilled Black workers from all 
over Southern Afri ca for many decades. Table 51 indicates the number of 
foreign-born Africans in South Africa between 1911 and 1977. 
TABLE 51 (37) 
NU~iBER OF FOREIGN-BORN AFRICANS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1911-1977 
FIGURES IN THOUSANDS 
YEAR TOTAL WOMEN MEN 
1911 229 41 188 NOTES 
1921 280 64 216 
1936 334 73 261 
1946 539 104 435 1. Froneman's estimate 
1951 606 121 485 2. 1960 census estimate 
1960 ( a) 836 (1) 186 550 3. Breytenbach's estimate 
1960 (b) 586 (2) 1U2 (2) 483 4. 1970 census estimate 
1965 494 (1) n/a n/a I 5. Clarke's estimate 
1970 (a) 600 (3 ) n/a n/a I 6. Seidman's estimate 
1970 (b) 486 (4 ) 43 443 
1977 n/a n/a 290 ( 5) 
1978 n/a n/a 421 (6 ) 
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Since the first development of the witwatersrand mines during the last century 
the South African mines have depended on expatriate labour. This has become 
so institutionalised that it is now an integral part of the economies of many 
of South Africa's neighbours and is vital for the continued production of both 
gold and coal in South Africa38 . A decrease in foreign labour supplies 
would increase the mines' demand for local labour which might lead to a number 
of social and economic problems. 
Desp ite the fi vefo 1 d increase in Bl ack wages on the mi nes between 1971 and 
197639 , working on the mines remains an unattractive proposition for many 
i ndi genou s South Afri can Bl ack s, due to. the nature of the work s i tuat i on and 
the relatively low remuneration, in comparison with that available in other 
sectors, such as manufacturing and services. Thus, if the mines were forced 
to recruit all labour locally, they would have to introduce more incentives, 
which may well necessitate cost increases. Foreign workers are, on the other 
hand, presently attracted to South Africa by the prospect of employment, and 
wages higher than are obtainable in their countries of origin. This gives 
rise to the much discussed migrant labour system, the costs and benefits of 
which lie outside this analysis. 
This system involves a two-way interaction between the supplier states and 
South Africa. If the supply of foreign labour were curtailed or stopped this 
would obviously leave more employment opportunities for South Afri can &1 acks 
and, given the high unemployment amongst this group, this may be a desirable 
development. For this reason proposals have in fact been put forward to curb 
the flow of foreign migrant labour to South Africa40 • There has in fact 
been a recent reduction in the proportion of foreign migrant workers to total 
employment on the mines. Table 52, which gives the origin by country of Black 
mineworkers employed in South Africa, illustrates this trend, with Malawi, in 
particular, and t'lozambique reducing their labour exports to South Africa. 
This trend is Significant on two counts; the region in general is probably 
relatively less vulnerable to sanctions on, or counter-santions by South 
Africa, and South Africa is also relatively more self-sufficient, though she 
may have less economic leverage over the region in general. However, certain 
states, in particular the BLS countries, were as dependent for employment on 
the South African mines in 1981 as they i~ere in the early 1970s, and over 
50000 workers from Mozambique were still employed on the mines in 1981. 
In addition to working on the mines many thousands of other foreign Blacks are 
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TABLE 52(41) 
BLACK WORKERS EMPLOYED IN MINING AND QUARRYING IN SOUTH AFRICA, 1974-1981 
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
SOUTH AFRICA 220 956 162 028 383 193 467 890 434 910 459 971 400 747 445 202 
LESOTHO 107 221 121 990 129 533 146 158 130 746 128 800 115 078 129.508 
BOTSwANA 25 636 28 329 35 293 35 666 27 514 25 690 22 805 22 500 
SwAZILAND 7 302 13 006 16 599 14 464 10 984 10 120 9 185 10 713 
MOZAMBIQUE 123 725 144 428 103 689 61 422 42 283 53 753 50 766 51 745 
MALAWI 128 471 29 511 2 244 2 178 27 408 24 590 19 309 19 691 
ZI~IBABwE 823 1 888 22 083 26 397 16 315 10 150 8 066 4 849 
OTHER AFRICA 4 953 8 934 7 763 1 541 2 767 2 245 1 827 88 
TOT A L 619 087 570 114 700 397 755 716 692 921 715 319 628 283 684 296 
% SOUTH ) 
AFRICAN l 35,7 31,8 54,7 61,9 62,8 64,3 63,8 65,1 
WORKERS 
in employment in South African manufacturing industry, services and 
agriculture. "In 1978 at least 155 600 people from Lesotho were employed in 
South Africa, compared with some 25 000 in wage employment at home ••• At 
least 34 600 workers from Botswana were in the RSA in 1978, compared with 
65 000 employed in their own country. Approximately 102 000 Swazis worked for 
a salary or wage in 1976, about 33 000 thereof in the RSA. In June 1978 some 
327 000 forei gn workers were in regi stered emp 1 oyment in South Afri ca; the 
true figure is assumed to have been at least half a million,,42. The income 
of these migrant workers is at least partly remitted to their dependants in 
their countries of origin. The "dismantling" of this system would have severe 
consequences for these dependants, in addition to the workers themselves, and 
the i r respecti ve countri es, to wh i ch these remi ttances are a va 1 uab 1 e source 
of revenue. Even one of the more extreme papers contained in the 
International University Exchange Fund study, authored by the late Ruth First 
and Robert H Davies, notes that appropriate and successful rural development 
performance and policies in the SADCC countries are prerequisites for an 
effective labour boycott of South Africa. "Disengagement from the apartheid 
system requires the acceleration of programmes for independent development 
strategies within and between supply states in the region. The emphasis of 
such restructuring of the supply economies should lie essentially in the 
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creation of employment-generating projects and development strategies,,43. 
The alternative is mass unemployment and great welfare loss within supplier 
states, which may be untenable on social, economic and political grounds. The 
above paper argues that present rural development strategies followed by 
supplier states are not able to provide alternative sources of income and 
employment to those current 1 y dependent on mi ne 1 abour. It conc 1 udes that 
only a co-operative development strategy, funded significantly by foreign 
aid-donor agencies, in which the interests of the poor peasants are placed 
foremost, would seem a viable alternative. It is in this economic context 
that South African threats to terminate Lesotho's migrant labour supplier-
status should be viewed44 • Furthermore, calls to boycott South African 
labour markets must be seen in the context of unprecedented population growth 
within the region in general. A relevant synopsis on the migrant labour 
system operating within the Southern African sub-continent is provided by the 
following excerpt from W J Breytenbach: 
"Industrialisation in South Africa in the last quarter of the previous 
century was the direct cause of the start of a labour relations pattern 
between South Africa and the other African states. This process became 
labour-intensive and required large numbers of unskilled workers. The most 
convenient and readily available source for this kind of labour proved to 
be the Southern African region. 
Depending on how one looks at this event the conclusion could be drawn that 
the labour supplying areas were either made up of separate underdeveloped 
economies or that they became part of a single Southern African economy 
with many links, of which labour is only one facet ..• 
"This condition of labour links may be regarded as 
manifestation of inter-regional manpower integration 
officially in 1897 '" 
the functional 
which started 
"The end of colonialism did not (therefore) discontinue this inter-regional 
pattern of labour relations. In fact, it is one of the strongest bonds 
between the geo-political entities in Southern Africa. Nor are these bonds 
clandestine, as they are authorised by the relative governments. This may 
indi cate that labour ties with South Africa are not sti gma tised; that they 
are viewed beneficial ly . 
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"But whatever happens, it is certain that labour relations have become so 
politicised that their political significance will remain crucial.,,45 
OTHER LINKS 
Economi c interdependence in the Southern Afri can regi on is not confi ned to 
trade, transport links and labour. South African private investors and mining 
houses have pl ayed a sUbstantial role in opening up the mineral wealth of 
Southern and Central Africa, and in establishing large agricultural and 
manufacturing . ventures. 46 South African-based companies often attempt on 
their own account to overcome the African "boycott" of the Republic. 
Anglo-American Corporation, for example, has important interests in the 
following African countries: Zambia, Zaire, Sierra Leone, Mauritania, 
Tanzania, Ghana, Zimbabwe and the BLS countries47 . Companies such as this 
operate and control a considerable amount of Black African mineral deposits, 
and if their expertise and capital were to be withdrawn Or expropriated the 
future of their Black African ventures would be bleak. This applies to the 
Zambian copper mines in general and to many other operations, of which two 
examples are the Selibwe-Pikwe copper-nickel mine in Botswana and the 
Latseng-la-Terai diamond mine in Lesotho. 
A further link between South Africa and her neighbours is provided by the 
Southern African Customs Union, which dates from the Union of South Africa in 
1910, by which the then High Commission Territories, present day Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland, were joined with South Africa for the wider purposes 
of an enlarged customs union. The terms of the original agreement were 
re-negotiated in 1969 in an attempt to spread the benefits of protection wider 
amongst the under-developed areas. Nolutshungu suggests that the benefits of 
the customs union arrangement, from the point of view of the smaller newly 
independent states, did not lie in their being relieved of the burden of 
collecting their own duties, but in access to a large market48 . 
Fu rthermore, "termi nat i on of the customs un i on arrangement wou 1 d probab ly 
occur in an atmosphere of acrimony in which South Africa would be tempted to 
use its considerable economic strength to drive home the imprudence of 
breaking away from the Union. It might impose restrictions on the movement of 
goods through South African territory and it could withdraw from joint 
agricultural marketin9 schemes such as those concerning wool,,49. Customs 
duties formed 31 percent of Botswana's total current government revenue in the 
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fi sca 1 year 1975/76. Approximately 50 percent of Swaziland's total current 
government revenue in 1977/78 came from the 
72 percent of Lesotho's revenue in 1978/79 
same source, and as much as 
likewise50• Should the BLS 
countries break away from the Customs Union their subsequent collection costs 
would all but erode present revenue, which might decline if trade were impeded. 
In addition to the Customs Union there is also the institution of the Rand 
Monetary Area, by which South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland co-ordinate the 
application of exchange control and regularly consult one another on monetary 
matters. within the Rand Monetary Area the transfer of funds is more or less 
unrestricted, and in the two smaller states the Rand is legal tender alongside 
the local currency. Additionally, the South African Reserve Bank acts as a 
1 ender of 1 as t resort to the other two monetary authorities and "i n order to 
facilitate long term borrowing in South Africa, public-sector securities of 
Swaziland and Lesotho rank as prescribed investments for South African 
·financial institutions,,51. Lesotho and Swaziland's monetary systems are 
thus intertwined with that of South Africa, though theoretically each country 
is responsible for its own monetary policy. 
Regi on all inks centered on South Afri ca are also typi fi ed by touri sm wi th 
approximately 60 percent of tourists visiting Swaziland coming from the 
Republic, compared with 70 percent in respect of Botswana and nearly all 
tourists to Lesoth052 . In contrast tourist traffic between Zimbabwe ana 
South Africa has diminished rapidly with the increased tensions prevailing 
between the two governments. This development h"as affected tourism little in 
South Africa as its tourist business was never much dependent on Zimbabwean 
visitors, whereas Zimabawean tourist operations are at an all-time low. Both 
the islands of Mauritius and Seychelles are heavily dependent on revenue from 
South African tourists and regular air flights operate between the two islands 
and the Republic. In the regional context Jan Smuts international airport at 
Johannesburg provides the major contact with the outside world. According to 
Malan: "South Africa's expansion of trade with Africa has also been 
accompanied by the growth in air and sea links with Black Africa. South 
African Airways at present operates scheduled flights to ten independent 
African countries while the large C130 tr ansport aircraft of SAFAIR, a freight 
line operate many more. Two South African shipping companies, the Unicorn and 
Tropic Lines, regularly load and offload gOOdS at west Afri can harbou rs ,,53. 
Another area that warr ants mention is energy. So uth Afri ca has supplemented 
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its domestic power by importing electricity from the Cabora Bassa Scheme in 
Northern Mozambique, since its completion in the 1970s. However, this supply 
has recently been severely disrupted, due to excessive natural deterioration 
and sabotage of powerlines. The resulting shortfall, which has caused some 
temporary and intermittent "load-shedding" in the Republ ic has had only short 
run sign ifi cance in South Afri ca, but, on the other hand, the scheme wou 1 d 
appear uneconomic without the large South African market. The operation of 
the hydro-electric scheme on the Cunene River, bordering Namibia and Angola at 
Ruacana, is also bedevilled with similar problems. The BLS countries are 
almost wholly dependent on South Africa for their modest power requirements, 
and Lesotho is presently engaged in negotiations with the Republic in respect 
of the construction and operation of the Oxbow irrigation scheme, by which 
water and power is to be suppl i ed to South Afri Ca. Zambi a, Zimbabwe and 
~iozambi que are independent of South Afri can e 1 ectri ca 1 power supp 1 ies by 
virtue of the hydro-electric schemes on the Zambesi and Kafue Rivers. 
r~artin Bailey presents a more-or-less detailed analysis of the oil 
requirements of the countries within the region in his article "Oil 
Sanctions: South Africa's Weak Link,,54. He comes to the somewhat 
surpri sing and nonchalant conc 1 us i on that the current dependence of South 
Africa's neighbours on supplies of refined oil from South Africa should not 
prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to the imposition of an oil embargo. 
"In the case of Lesotho an oil embargo against South Africa would pose grave 
transport problems. This could, however, be considerably alleviated if large 
oil stockpiles were built up. Botswana WOUld face some difficulties but 
supplies could probably be obtained through Zimabawe. For the other countries 
of Southern and Central Africa (Namibia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, filozambique, etc) 
the direct costs would be relatively small,,55. However, this scenario is at 
present, patently unrealistic, as the relatively underdeveloped countries in 
the region do not have the resources to build up stockpiles, construct 
refineries and pipelines, and air-lift oil supplies, as suggested by Bailey. 
There is also, obviously, a limit to the funds which aid-donor agencies could 
make available, a source of finance which Bailey suggests is a way out of the 
sanctions dilemma faced by Black Africa in respect of oil supplies. 
CONCLUSION 
Thi s sketch of economi c ties between South Afri ca and her nei ghbours in the 
regional context, does not give any accurate indication of what the likely 
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consequences of sanctions will be within the region. As with the literature 
deal ing with the case of sanctions and South Africa in general, different 
sources give contradictory information, and the same source may even 
contradict itself at different times. For example, it is variously stated 
that South Afri ca' s nei ghbours are in favour of or agai nst any purported 
sanctions campaign, although some of this inconsistency may be due to changes 
in official policy or spokesmen (or even reporting agency)56. Despite the 
obvious economic "dependence" of Black African states on South Africa, they 
nonetheless, may feel a moral obligation to support any sanctions campaign, 
since they are ususally the most vociferous advocates of sanctions, although 
much of the Black African rhetoric is designed to coerce South Africa's major 
economic partners to do Black Africa's political chicanery. Black African 
nations within the region will obviously try to reduce their oependence on 
economic links with South Africa, and such moves may meet with some measure of 
success in the long term. This bias is the raison d'€tre for the 
establishment and propagation of the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference. In the case of sanctions on Rhodesi a, the estimated costs to 
Zambia and Mozambique of border closures, were RBOO-900 million per annum and 
R140 million per annum respectively, whilst at least 10 000 Mozambiquans lost 
their jobs. 57 • It would not be incorrect to state that the costs of 
sanctions on South Africa, to the region in general, due either to economic 
"spill-over", or to deliberate counter-sanctions by the Republic, would be far 
greater than in the case of Rhodesia. This represents a clearcut dilemma for 
Black Africa, which is seeking to promote economic oevelopment not economic 
destruction. The situation is usefully summarised by the pro-sanctions 
commentator, R H Green, who writes, "However, the sketch suggests a compell ing 
case against any repetition of the Rhodesian sanctions experience. A 
combination of a largely ineffectual sanctions policy - applied by all or 
several Southern African states, but grossly evaded by many other states ana 
by firms based in them, which might be late, limited and not underpinned with 
adequate international support for affected Southern African States is a 
scenario for disaster. The independent Southern African states and peoples in 
themselves are in no position to bear the cost of fifteen years of that type 
of confrontation with the Republic of South Africa,,5B. 
The trade-off between political will and economic welfare within the region 
amongst would-be sanctioners, is, however, clouded by the sometimes escalating 
military confrontation, which may, on the one hand, increase the political 
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resolve of the United Nations but decrease that of South Africa's neighbours, 
who wou 1 d subsequent ly be under i ncreas ing doub 1 e pressure. On the other 
hand, such confrontation may decrease economic co-operation within the region 
as it becomes problematic. Furthermore, the South African government may come 
under i ncreas i ng ri ght-wi ng pol i t i ca 1 pressure to termi nate economi c 
intercourse with neighbouring territories . Essentially, then, it is evident 
that the political and economic relationships within Southern Africa are in a 
state of flux. 
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CONCLUSION 
The various chapters in this thesis have dealt with the notion of economic 
sanctions in general and tried to relate it to the main features of the South 
African economy, using both routinely available data and 
specifically related to the topic. The overall sense of the thesis 
summarized below. 
1 iterature 
is briefly 
It has been pointed out above that economic sanctions are essentially economic 
measures directed to political objectives. The "economic" aspect of sanctions 
assumes a mainly intermediate character, where economic variables may be 
reviewed as either "ends" or 'means", at least from a methodological point of 
view. Furthermore, although the ultimate target of sanctions may be the 
government of a nation, or its policies, the intermediate . target may well be 
represented by private companies, institutions, or groups of persons. 
However, such methodological and empirical complications do not necessarily 
materially alter the academic investigation or practical application of 
sanctions. The general lack of success of sanctions to date is rather due to 
the confusion of "sanctions" in times of peace with "economic warfare" in 
times of (total) war. 
The choice of different sanction strategies in respect of a potential target, 
such as South Africa, would appear to be normally governed by a variety of 
national-specific considerations which generally involve a trade-off between 
political will and economic self-interest . Where this trade -off is acute, it 
usually implies problems for the . sanctions campaign. This feature is 
particularly prominent in the Southern African regional context, because for 
the people of the sub-continent, sanctions are not an 
designed to illustrate the potentially coercive power 
abstract exercise 
of international 
organisations, but a set of measures likely to deprive them of, and disrupt, 
their livelihood. This may account for the naivety and evident 
self-righteousness of many of the economically and geographically removed 
commentators on the issue. Apart from nationa l-specifi c differences towards 
sanctions strategies in general, and South Africa in particular, the selection 
of sanctions may be arbitrary and inconsistent. Sanctions are, for example, 
often rel ated to issues of emotional appeal, such as mil itary capacity, or 
areas of weak resistance li ke sport and tourism, and also where they could 
potentially be most effective in a functional sense as, for example, with oil 
sancti ons . 
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Certain methodological shortcomings are also present in the sanctions 
literature. In particular, one ·of the more serious flaws is the preoccupation 
with short term measures designed to destabilise the economy, when the 
objective of effective sanctions would surely be to alter the structure of the 
economy. The measures usually advocated, and the time periods to which they 
relate, may well amount to a self-defeating or misleading exercise, as they 
are often overtaken by swi ngs in the bus iness cyc 1 e or corrected by po 1 i cy 
measures introduced by the authorities . This is a recurring feature in the 
literature which is not easily reconciled with either sound theory or economic 
reality, and incidentally also complicates the logical anaysis of sanctions 
1 i terature. 
Apart from such methodological problems, there are also certain terminological 
difficulties, for example, the somewhat careless use of terms such as 
"dependence" and "control ", where it might be more appropri ate to speak of 
"trade" or "resource endowment"; terms 
"disinvestment" which are often used in a 
similar analytical difficulties. 
like "foreign investment" and 
rather broad sense may present 
South Afri can commentators sometimes stress that the economy is technically 
ab 1 e to produce a lmos t anyth i ng it requi res, and emphas i ze th i s poi nt by 
referri ng to the successful development of the local arms industry si nce the 
imposition of the United Nations mandatory arms embargo in 1977: South Africa 
can evidently now produce its own submarines and is reputed to be the tenth 
largest arms producer in the world. However, it is not necessarily only the 
technical feasibility which is important in the context of sanctions, as the 
associated costs and misallocation of resources may be substantial, 
particularly in the long run. Anti-sanctions literature tends to overlook 
issues related to efficient resource allocation, and it would appear that from 
a political viewpoint, it is the physical availability of certain products 
that is deemed more important than the impact of sanctions on the standard of 
1 iving. This feature may, for example, be illustrated by the conspicuous 
absence of detailed literature on the potential problems of the manufacturing 
industry under sanctions . In particular, the area that has been largely 
ignored is the capital goods industry, espeCially in respect of capital 
deprec i at ion, obso 1 escence and rep 1 acement prob lems. As sanct ions genera 11 y 
amount t o a piecemeal exercise, there may exist several loopholes in a 
potential s anc tions campaign, not always immeoiately obvious . 
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There are essentially three issues which may serve to precipitate trade and 
investment sanctions against South Africa, namely: Namibia, apartheid and 
military attacks on neighbouring states. Likewise, such sanctions can, in 
principle, be countered by one of three models, elements of which, 
historically speaking, are to be found in the application of economic 
sanctions. The first model is based on non-compliance by the countrY's main 
economic partners with international sanctions, and implies a low cost for 
South Africa. The second model is based on the experience of Rhodesia and 
envisages a friendly "backdoor" by which it is possible to continue trading 
and investing, albeit at a higher cost than in the first model. The third 
model is one of enforced autarkY which represents, for the target country, the 
alternative with the greatest economic cost. However, in the absence of an 
adequate macro-economic "sanctions" model of sufficient predictive power, it 
is not feasible to forcast the economic (or political) outcome of potential 
sanctions strategies in detailed quantitative terms. 
would appear that economic sanctions on South 
In general, however, it 
Africa would only be 
"successful" if the political interests of potential sanctioners, for example, 
the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, could be reconciled 
with the economic interests of her major trading partners . As long as this is 
not the case, effective economic sanctions against South Africa are likely to 
remain literally wishful thinking by impotent parties. 
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